



Egypt, Nile River and Delta (green triangle in center), and Egypt's main migrant source and destination countries (except North America and Australia). Google Earth

DEVELOPMENT IN MOTION

Mainstreaming Migration and Development in Egypt

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	1
1. Introduction	3
1.1 Purpose	4
1.2 Methodology and structure	5
2. Growing Understanding of Migration and Development	5
3. Migration in Egyptian Development	9
3.1 Migration in the Middle East and North Africa	9
3.2 Egypt's economy and labor market	9
3.3 The scale of Egypt's migration	11
3.3.1 Eight million Egyptians abroad.....	11
3.3.2 Internal migration of 10 per cent of population	13
3.3.3 Up to a million non-Egyptians in Egypt.....	14
3.3.4 Trafficking and smuggling of Egyptians and migrants.....	16
4. Migration, development and United Nations assistance in Egypt	18
4.1 Poverty alleviation	18
– Suggestions	24
4.2 Quality basic services	25
– Suggestions	29
4.3 Democratic governance	30
– Suggestions	32
4.4 Food security and nutrition.....	33
– Suggestions	35
4.5 Environment and natural resource management.....	36
– Suggestions	38
5. Conclusions and major recommendations	39
5.1 Major recommendations	40
Bibliography	43
Interviews conducted	46

Executive Summary

This study aims to mainstream consideration of migration across many different economic and developmental sectors in Egypt. In doing so, the study seeks to create value along three main dimensions of development planning. Firstly, it identifies areas where a range of UN and other agencies can apply the analysis of migration and development in Egypt to their work. Secondly, the paper provides a foundation for the inclusion of migration-related issues in the development of Egyptian governmental strategies, including macroeconomic, human capital development and industrialization strategies. Thirdly, in the context of the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, the national consultations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the establishment of a Regional Thematic Working Group for the Arab States on International Migration, the paper can feed into discussions on migration and development strategies at the regional level or at the level of the migration corridor and contribute to the harmonization of states' migration policies.

Following Section One's introduction on purpose, method and structure, Section Two looks at global understanding of migration and development today. Over three percent of global population is now international migrants and over 10 per cent internal migrants, or altogether nearly one billion people. The benefits of migrants' remittances, now worth over USD 400bn per annum worldwide – particularly the benefits in poverty reduction – outweigh such disadvantages as sometimes contributing to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. While there has long been concern that the 'brain drain' undermines development at home, a country can greatly benefit from its nationals abroad – through transfers of capital and knowledge, especially if this is enabled with the right policies.

Half of migrants are women and migration is often positive for them, increasing their incomes and supporting their social empowerment. However, many fall victim to exploitation and abuse, something that also affects many children and men. Migrants generally lack adequate social protection while irregular migrants almost always lack access to health care and other protection; they are frequently abused and suffer many violations of their rights. The scourge of trafficking in persons is particularly severe and still receives inadequate attention.

Migration has myriad impacts in many sectors including education, health, environment, human rights and governance; migration is also very much about environmental change and climate change adaptation, as slower onset disasters push millions out of their areas. Sudden disasters, too, are displacing larger numbers today and the numbers of refugees and other persons displaced by conflict are also on the increase.

A crucial international discussion is now taking place about migration and development issues, including the upcoming High Level Dialogue at the United Nations. These events also will help to develop the Post-2015 Development Agenda and will benefit from concrete examples of national governments mainstreaming consideration of migration into policy and planning.

Section Three reviews migration in Egypt's economy, labor market, paying particular attention to its recent economic performance. The Middle East is host to the world's greatest concentration of foreign workers as a share of population. In Egypt, only 45 per cent of population 15+ years of age is employed, compared to an average of 55 per cent for other lower middle income countries. Female labor force participation rates are among the lowest in the world and youth unemployment is especially high, yet key sectors often lack skilled workers.

Egypt experienced a revolution in 2011, forcing the President and his government to step down, followed by the holding of elections and a constitutional referendum. This caused considerable further slowdown of an economy already negatively affected by the global financial crisis of 2008, further exacerbating unemployment.

About eight million Egyptians are international migrants, another eight million are internal migrants and there are perhaps another million foreign migrants in Egypt. These 17 million people are equal to nearly one fifth of Egypt's population. Egyptian migration to the gulf tends to be on a short-term contractual basis and is almost exclusively male. Migration to countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Italy, however, tends to be undertaken on a longer-term or permanent basis, includes more females, and is characterized by more variation in the kinds of occupations undertaken in host countries.

Migrants are more skilled than the average in Egypt's domestic labor force. Short-term contractual labour migrants are often from the poorest parts of Egypt, especially rural areas in Upper Egypt. In the recent past, when tourism was growing, Greater Cairo was attracting fewer rural migrants as they increasingly headed to destinations such as the tourism centers on the coast instead. This pattern is likely to return if the tourism sector returns to growth.

The situation of Egyptian irregular migrants abroad is often characterized by insecurity, a lack of access to health care and other services, and a lack of access to justice. Smuggling of migrants into another country is common and sometimes linked to trafficking in persons. There are an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 non-Egyptian citizens inside Egypt although higher numbers are often given. They too – especially irregular migrants – suffer from poverty, lack of services and abuse. Victims of trafficking are often subject to forced sex work, forced labor, slave-like practice, and even organ theft. Egypt now has model legislation on anti-trafficking and aggressive implementation is the next step.

Section Four assesses the potential to incorporate the consideration of migration into development work much more thoroughly than in the past, using the 2013-2017 UN Development Assistance Framework as the structure. It is divided into five 'pillars' which constitute the UN's priority areas of work: poverty alleviation, basic services, democratic governance, food security and nutrition, and environment and natural resource management.

The relevance of migration to the attainment of each of the Framework's 23 expected specific outcomes and results is rated and summarized in a table for each pillar. Fifteen outcomes are found highly relevant, seven of medium relevance and only one of lower relevance. This is accompanied by a discussion of some of the most relevant issues as well as some specific suggestions.

Under the poverty alleviation pillar, remittances are an important contributor to poverty reduction and could be leveraged more. The enormous potential for 'remitting skills and knowledge' is described, using the talent of Egyptian expatriates for Egyptian development and poverty reduction. The importance of the migration/education nexus is also underlined, including technical vocational training and 'soft skills' needed in internal and international labour markets alike.

Suggestions include assisting migrant households to invest their remittances better, designing programs to build on women's empowerment, studying how households use their extra cash, assisting Egyptians abroad to contribute more to Egypt's development and improving education policy.

Under the quality basic services pillar, migrants' limited access to health care is discussed, as is their vulnerability to communicable diseases, the special situation of many child migrants, and the potential of Egyptian expatriates to contribute more to improving Egyptian services such as health.

Suggestions include championing migrants' access to health care, increasing efforts to reach migrants with preventive health care, promoting health insurance tailored to migrants and increasing prevention for migrants on the spread of communicable diseases.

Under the democratic governance pillar, the skills and values of Egyptian expatriates abroad are examined in the context of strengthening governance and civil participation in Egypt. Also discussed is the need of migrants – Egyptians abroad and foreigners in Egypt – for greater access to justice.

Suggestions include the promotion of Egyptian expatriates' participation in improving Egypt's governance and management practices, and in civil society, making particular use of online, virtual methods to help migrants network more. Research is needed on how to reconcile irregular migrants' status with respect for their basic human rights.

Under the food security and nutrition pillar, the paper first looks at how agricultural restructuring in combination with environmental degradation is steadily reducing the agricultural labour force, pushing farm workers to migrate. Households most prone to migrating to work are among those most food insecure.

Suggestions include more enhancement of technology for farming in deteriorating environmental conditions to mitigate their effects and the push to migrate, more research on techniques to improve the efficiency on small scale farms, greater use of Egyptians abroad in agriculture and the targeting of households in poor, high migration areas for nutritional education.

Under the environment and natural resource management pillar, the consequences of environmentally and climate- change induced migration are discussed, along with migration as a means of adaptation.

Suggestions include the intensification of mitigation of risks of coastal flooding, factoring migration into disaster risk reduction, long term urban planning for flooding and the potential for national development planning to plan migration in 'win/win' moves to areas with high growth potential.

The paper concludes that in Egypt the mainstreaming of migration into wider development policy and programmes is highly relevant. The poor are most often the migrants and many more skilled Egyptian migrants abroad could and would contribute to Egypt's development more if this were facilitated more. Women's roles are profoundly affected by migration and there is opportunity there for their empowerment. Child migrants are particularly vulnerable and need special attention.

Section Five then makes general recommendations along five main dimensions: mainstreaming migration at the policy and strategic level; internal and external migrants as a target group; engaging expatriates in socio-economic and political development; Egyptians as a target group, including potential migrants, returnees and host communities; and, improving migration-related research, analysis and data collection. The recommendations include the setting up of an *Inter-ministerial Commission on Migration* along with a *National Focal Point*, to ensure that consideration of migration is fully integrated into development planning in a cross-cutting manner and that Egypt is a leading contributor in international discussions on migration and development. It is also recommended that data be improved on internal migrants and foreigners in particular and that future migration scenarios be studied.

Universal access to health services by migrants is a lead priority. Egyptian consulates should do more ‘soft outreach’ to Egyptians abroad. Development partners could organize a *Series of Thematic Meetings* on mainstreaming migration in Egypt, identifying targeted policy- oriented research projects. Platforms for online networks of highly skilled Egyptians abroad would be a low cost method of promoting their contributions, allowing different UN agencies to tap into them in their own sectors. □

1. Introduction

Over many millennia, migration grew in frequency and scale. Today, international migrants are over three per cent of global population while migration to cities has also become especially important. In just 50 years, cities have grown from only 20 per cent of population to 50 per cent or 3.5 billion persons and will soon double again in size. One in every eight or nine persons in the world is now an internal migrant, and combined with international migrants one in seven persons – or about one billion people – are migrants today.

This study unravels the general relevance of global thinking on migration and development to the specifics of Egypt, in order to see where migration has the greatest impact on Egypt’s development. There are an estimated 17 million migrants in or from Egypt today, including eight million abroad, eight million more internal migrants and up to one million foreign migrants within Egypt. This is a profoundly important dimension of Egyptian socio-economic development, with large positive and negative impacts in a broad range of areas. Thus, when mainstreaming migration into development, this paper examines many of the actual and potential synergies between migration and a number of different areas, including:

poverty reduction	access to health care	access to justice	urbanization	disaster risk reduction
production of skills for domestic and international labour markets	preventing the spread of communicable diseases	building management capacities	agricultural development and adaptation	climate change adaptation
supply and demand of micro-finance	strengthening health service capacities	government accountability and transparency	food security and nutrition	
youth unemployment	education and training	social gender roles		
investment in SMEs		more inclusive governance		
		civic participation		

1.1 Purpose

This paper is aimed at promoting the engagement of a wide range of UN agencies and other development partners on the migration and development nexus, each working within their mandate but aiming to understand better – possibly with specific additional research – how migration affects the issues they address. It establishes policy areas in Egypt within which it makes sense to move to a deeper assessment of migration's impacts, followed by application of the findings.

The Government of Egypt, as leader of the development process, may be able to use this analysis to both engage in mainstreaming migration within economic development planning overall and in working on specific initiatives. Some of the arguments and observations advanced here could serve as the starting point for development of a comprehensive migration policy with synergies with national economic strategy overall and in individual sectors.

With the upcoming dialogues at the United Nations on migration and development this kind of work will also serve as concrete examples of what it means to mainstream migration into development plans and programs. Migration must henceforth be treated as an important cross-cutting issue which should be integrated into any comprehensive, high-level development framework.

1.2 Methodology and structure

Following an initial, extensive literature search, interviews were held in Cairo with representatives of Government, the UN Country Team, donor organizations and research institutions. The overarching questions were: ‘Where is the greatest potential to maximize benefit to Egypt from migration, and minimize harm? Where does policy, planning and implementation need to take more account of migration?’ These questions are addressed across multiple sectors of the Egyptian economy and society. The literature search was then continued to follow up on suggestions made by interviewees and all publications recommended were tracked down and read.

Section 2 begins the main body of the paper, discussing the growing importance of migration globally and increasing understanding and discussion of migration and development issues.

Section 3 is an overview of migration in Egyptian development, looking at migration in the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt’s economy and labor market, the scale of migration in and from Egypt, migration emergencies and foreigners in Egypt, and trafficking and smuggling of persons.

Section 4 looks at the UN’s recently signed *Development Assistance Framework* for Egypt 2013-2017 and where the UN Team could leverage migration more for development. There are five sections: **Poverty alleviation, basic services, democratic governance, food security and nutrition, and environment and natural resource management**. Each of the *Framework’s* 23 expected specific outcomes is scored as having high, medium or low migration relevance to the obtaining of its expected result and the rationale for this is then summarized in a set of tables. High relevance, for example, is defined as a case where consideration of the migration and development dimension should have a high impact on obtaining the expected result for that outcome.

Section 5 concludes the paper, making a number of recommendations on how to mainstream migration into Egyptian development policy and programming.

2. Growing Understanding of Migration and Development

In 1954 Arthur Lewis wrote a seminal article on the economics of labor migration, looking at Japan and arguing that a rural sector labor surplus could allow a new industrial sector to increase its labor supply dramatically without increasing wages, fueling growth.¹ During the 1970s and 1980s, there was much debate about whether or not international labor migration was good for sending economies and whether or not poor migrants had much choice. Was migration reducing inequality or exacerbating it? Wasn’t development at home better? The debate was something of a deadlock and for years the complexity of migration stymied efforts at an overall ‘tallying up’ of costs and benefits.²

Statistical understanding of at least the economics of migration has now advanced enough to reveal generally positive correlations between migration and growth and income, both in the receiving country and in the home country. In the United States for instance, there is a growing consensus on such data at both ends of the political spectrum.³

There is also increasing understanding that the act of migration ranges all the way from being completely voluntary to choices made in desperation to abduction for human trafficking. Many migrants are indeed not free and many irregular migrants are harshly exploited.

¹ Lewis, Arthur, 1954. *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*. Manchester School of Economics and Social Sciences, pp. pp 139-91.

² Paton, B., 1995. *Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and The Hague: Macmillan UK.

³ i.e. Zavodny, M., 2011. *Immigration and American Jobs*, s.l.: American Institute for Policy Research and Partnership for a New Economy.

Academic attention has shifted to the challenges of managing migration and its relationship to economic and social trends. How do we optimize benefits for migrants, their households, societies of origin and destinations? How do we ensure migration is as voluntary and as orderly as possible? How do we minimize the harm?

Over three percent of global population today are migrants to another country. Within countries, more than an additional 10 per cent of global population are now internal migrants, thus about one in seven persons today is a migrant – altogether one billion people.⁴

The majority of today's migrants from developing countries go to work in other developing countries nearby, especially poorer migrants. Migration is not only for higher wages directly, but also to pay for education or training that will lead to higher pay later on. Households take migration decisions more than individuals, not only to increase income but also to diversify it.

Half of international migrants worldwide abroad are female and this has been the case for half a century (though from Egypt only 13 per cent are women). Migration patterns are usually very different for men and women, even from the same place.⁵ Women's migration can be very positive for their role, standard of living and education, but can also be a tragedy. There are also many migrants who are still children when they set off on their own.⁶

Migrants often lose their access to social protection and many pay into benefit schemes that are not portable. Irregular migrants do not have access to such benefits at all. In China for instance – currently experiencing the largest migration in human history to its growing cities – the new Government recently pledged to reform its '*hukou*' system of residence permits to allow migrants more equal access to housing and health care.⁷ Importantly, good health is necessary for migration to succeed.⁸

Worldwide remittances grew in the 1970s and 80s, waned in the 1990s, and then grew again in the 2000s to exceed USD 400bn today.⁹ Better banking procedures and reduced transaction costs have helped migrants to retain more of their earnings and steer them increasingly into the formal sector, though about half still go unrecorded. Remittances are counter-cyclical and have been shown to reduce poverty by raising household consumption and stimulating investment – particularly in property but also in better education, health care and small businesses. However, remittances can also sometimes fuel currency appreciation or reduce pressure on authorities to reform and create more jobs at home.¹⁰

Concern still lingers that the 'brain drain' undermines development at home and this can indeed be the case where skilled labor supply is especially small. A famous controversy is doctors who emigrate from developing countries, having often been trained with the public purse. Some governments now embrace such migration as inevitable and valuable. For instance, the Philippine government privatized nurse training, reasoning that students were investing in future earnings abroad. In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Health is building enough schools of medicine to eventually train an extra supply of doctors, calculating that they will first work in Ethiopia and then still remain a national asset even if they go abroad. In general, poor health systems are more a cause than a consequence of the departure of health professionals. Large numbers of skilled migrants do return home, including doctors – having improved their skills and earnings – and this is on the increase.¹¹

A country can benefit greatly from its nationals abroad in terms of both transfers of capital and knowledge exchange, but this requires enabling policies that are generally not well developed.¹² Trade and foreign direct investment from a country are positively correlated with migration.¹³ Today's communications allow migrants to contribute to development of their country of origin from abroad.

⁴ IOM, 2011. World Migration Report 2011, Geneva: IOM. UNDP, 2009. Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human mobility and development, New York: UNDP.

⁵ IOM 2010a, A Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages, Cairo: IOM.

⁶ DRC, 2009. Making Migration Work for Development, Sussex: University of Sussex, Development Resource Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty.

⁷ See for instance, *China will quicken hukou system reform* in China Economic Review, 19 December 2012.

⁸ IOM, undated. Brochure -- Mainstreaming Health in the Development Dialogue, Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

⁹ World Bank, November 2012. Migration and Development Brief 19, , s.l.: s.n.

¹⁰ Nallari, R. & Griffith, B., 2011. Understanding Growth and Poverty. Washington: World Bank.

¹¹ UNDP, 2009, op.cit. Ethiopia from a private conversation of the author's with the Minister of Health in 2008.

¹² DRC, 2009, op.cit.

¹³ UNDP, 2009, op.cit.

Social networks create beneficial skills transfers and professional development. Migrants also often start businesses and support 'home town projects'.¹⁴

There are also myriad impacts of migration in many different sectors. How many children's school fees are paid by migrant's remittances? How many migrants are vulnerable to contracting HIV? How many migrants are victims of trafficking? How many of those abroad campaign for greater respect for human rights in their country of origin? There is also

new evidence that migrants abroad are willing to participate in improving governance back home, especially those who feel that they moved to a country where governance is better.¹⁵

Climate change adaptation can also ill afford to neglect the migration consequences. Slower onset disasters exacerbated by environmental change are pushing large numbers out of their home areas. While droughts and desertification are the main problems provoking such migration today, in the future floods, salinization and erosion due to sea-level rise will be leading causes, especially in low lying river deltas such as in Bangladesh or Thailand.¹⁶

Sudden disasters are also displacing large numbers. For example, 350,000 persons remained displaced months after the 2011 Tsunami in Japan. Disasters rival conflict for the numbers they displace – 42 million in 2010 – due to a lack of risk reduction and mitigation.¹⁷ Disasters also spur migration indirectly; heavy flooding in Thailand damaged the economy and increased economic migration internally and abroad.¹⁸

Refugees and internally displaced persons due to conflict are also on the increase, up to 42.5 million as of 2011, the fifth consecutive annual increase. This includes a relatively stable 16 million refugees and asylum seekers but a growing number – over 26 million – of internally displaced persons.¹⁹ The Arab Spring showed that large numbers of international labor migrants can also become stranded in a third country. For those hosted in a developing country, whether for refuge or other reasons, conditions are often difficult, with higher rates of child poverty, lower access to health services and higher vulnerability to exploitation.²⁰ The world over, migrants are among those who enjoy their human rights least.

The scourge of trafficking in persons is the worst form of 'migration' and is still receiving inadequate attention. Trafficking is very often for forced prostitution, forced labor, slave-like practice or sometimes even organ removal. An estimated 12.3 million persons were in such conditions in 2010, and as many as three persons per thousand in Asia.²¹ Worldwide, more than a quarter of such victims are minors. There are significant overlaps between people trafficking networks and drug trafficking networks, as drugs are the main source of income of international organized crime. Indeed, these two kinds of networks are often mixed and help to sustain each other.²²



View of the densely populated Nile River Valley and Delta at night.

Wikipedia

¹⁴ Simmons, A. B., 2005. Globalization and Migration. In: International Migration and the Millenium Development Goals: Selected Papers of the UNFPA Expert Group Meeting, Marrakech, Morocco 11-12 May. New York: UNFPA.

¹⁵ Batista, C. & Vicente, P. C., 2011. Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home?. World Bank Economic Review, January, 25(1).

¹⁶ Gemene et. al. 2012, op.cit.

¹⁷ IOM, 2011, op. cit.

¹⁸ Gemene et. al., 2012. The State of Environmental Migration 2011, Paris: Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales and IOM.

¹⁹ UNHCR, 2012a. UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A year of crises, Geneva: UNHCR.

²⁰ UNDP, 2009, op. cit.

²¹ IOM, 2011, op. cit.

²² UNODC, 2012. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, Vienna: UNODC.

Finally, to ensure the most positive developmental impact from migration, the migration process must be safe. There is growing understanding of the kinds of legal-institutional frameworks that must be developed for border management to help ensure that this is the case. This includes extradition and prosecution legislation; fora for international cooperation, including between national judiciary and police forces; mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information among states; and, enhanced border control mechanisms, including infrastructure at border-crossing points. Further development of these institutional-legal frameworks will help to facilitate the movement of goods and persons, uphold migrant rights, and combat transnational crime, including trafficking in persons,

In 1994, the *International Conference on Population and Development* (ICPD) in Cairo adopted what remains today the signature document of this discussion, the *Cairo Programme of Action*. Although outdated in some respects it remains the seminal document on the issue with clear objectives to improve action on migration and development.

International discussion of migration and development dates back to at least 1974 and the (first) *United Nations World Population Conference*, followed by the 1984 *International Conference on Population*, the 1995 *World Summit for Social Development* in Copenhagen and the *Fourth World Conference on Women* in Beijing. The topic was also mentioned in the *Millennium Declaration* in 2000.

In 2006, a *High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development* held by the *United Nations General Assembly* endorsed the United Nations Secretary-General's proposals to: create a *Global Forum on Migration and Development*, led by member States, to continue the global dialogue; appoint the first *Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration and Development*; and establish a *Global Migration Group* of agencies to increase coherence between the United Nations system and IOM in responding to international migration. In recent years a number of new *Regional Consultative Processes* have also taken place.

The growing scale of disaster and environmental migration just mentioned is now provoking particular international concern, as is the topic of migration and health.²³ There is a call for consideration of migration dynamics in general development strategy and in policy, planning and development assistance work across many sectors.²⁴ Migration is intrinsically important to poverty reduction, including for instance to reversing the spread of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, promoting gender equality or building partnerships for development around the world.

The run-up to 2015 will also be a busy agenda for migration and development, beginning with a second *High-level Dialogue in 2013*,²⁵ a session of ECOSOC's *Commission on Population and Development* in 2013 themed *New Trends in Migration: Demographic Aspects*, followed by a 2014 session on the status of implementation of the *Cairo Programme of Action*. The *General Assembly* will then hold a special session on *ICPD+20* during 2014.²⁶

The *Post-2015 Development Agenda* would benefit from concrete examples of national governments and the UN System mainstreaming migration into their work. Egypt, as a leading country of migration in the world can make a seminal contribution to helping the world, and itself, get more out of migration for development.

The Cairo Programme of Action contained detailed and agreed objectives and actions on these migration topics:

- **Population distribution and sustainable development**
- **Population growth in large urban agglomerations**
- **Internally displaced persons**
- **International migration and development**
- **Documented migrants**
- **Undocumented migrants**
- **Refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons**

Many of the actions remain relevant and were not fully implemented nearly two decades later.

²³ UNFPA, 2005. *International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals: Selected Papers of the UNFPA Expert Group Meeting, Marrakech, Morocco 11-12 May*. s.l.:s.n.

²⁴ UNCSD, 2012. *Rio 2012 Issues Briefs: Migration and Sustainable Development*. s.l., UN Conference on Sustainable Development - Rio+20- Secretariat.
IOM, 2013a. *2013 United Nations General Assembly High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development*, Geneva: unpublished IOM document.

²⁵ For the official site of the High Level Dialogue see: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hlmimd2013/highlevelmim2013.htm>

²⁶ UNDESA, 2011. *International Migration and Development at the United Nations*, New York: unpublished.

3. Migration in Egyptian Development

3.1 Migration in the Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East hosts the greatest concentration of foreign workers in any region or sub-region in the world as a percentage of population. This co-exists with some of the highest unemployment and youth unemployment rates in the world among those countries that do not have large natural energy reserves, especially in North Africa. Unemployment was undoubtedly a key factor contributing to the Arab uprisings; faced with further rapid growth of their young populations, the stability of such countries depends on their governments' abilities to implement reforms needed to create new jobs.

Not only are the MENA countries underperforming at creating jobs at home, they are also underperforming at seizing jobs within their region. Eight of the top 10 countries in the world for foreign share of labour are in the Gulf.²⁷ Despite this, rising MENA unemployment and rising Gulf wages²⁸, growth in international remittances within the Middle East and North Africa still grew more slowly in the 2000s than the world average. Gulf labor forces are drawn increasingly from all over the world but Egypt, to its credit, has at least kept up its share of Gulf jobs and has more than matched the world average for increasing remittances.

North Africa today is again also the scene of a great deal of humanitarian migration. The 2011 war in Libya caused one of the most serious migration crises²⁹ of modern times when some 800,000 migrants fled, often to third countries. A quarter of a million went to Egypt, more than a third of a million to Tunisia, and tens of thousands fled to other neighbouring countries and countries further afield, including Bangladesh (36,700), the Philippines (26,000), Chad (87,000), and Niger (96,700).³⁰

Fighting in Syria since 2011 has led to at least 1,144,000 Syrians being registered as refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. Many more have fled to North Africa and Europe. The number of Syrians registered as refugees has reached 50,000 in Egypt at the time of writing, and the total number of Syrians in Egypt is probably an order of magnitude higher than that.³¹

In the past, the two Gulf Wars and other wars resulted in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, including to Egypt. To this can be added the sizeable presence in the region of such groups as Eritreans, Sudanese, Somalis, Ethiopians and Yemenis, also often having fled violence but sometimes just seeking a better life.

3.2 Egypt's economy and labor market

Egypt's growth rate had been good for several years in the mid-2000s, up until the global financial crisis began in 2008 and then Egypt's revolution in 2011. Banking and other economic reforms begun in 2004 contributed to GDP growth rising to 7.2 per cent per annum by 2008. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rose to USD 13.2bn by 2007/8, equal to nine per cent of GDP. UNCTAD rated Egypt top in Africa at attracting FDI and second in the MENA region after Saudi Arabia. Total

²⁷ Nallari & Griffith, 2011, op.cit.

²⁸ Data was from www.gulfalent.com cited in IOM, 2011, op. cit., p 75.

²⁹ IOM uses the term 'migration crisis' to describe complex migration flows and mobility patterns – often large scale – due to a crisis which typically involves significant vulnerabilities for the individuals and communities affected and generate acute and long-term migration management challenges. A migration crisis may be sudden or slow in onset can have natural or man-made causes and can take place internally or across borders.

³⁰ IOM, 2011b.

³¹ UNHCR, data from Syria Regional Refugee Response - Inter-Agency Sharing Portal.

GDP of USD 230bn, divided by a population of about 84 million, gives Egyptians an unadjusted GDP per capita of about USD 2,750.³²

Egypt's economic performance was nonetheless still lackluster overall in the 2000s. It did not rank as actually improving in competitiveness, due mainly to macro-economic instability, the limited activity in the manufacturing sector and inadequate human resources.³³ Only 45 per cent of Egypt's population 15 years of age or over is employed, compared to an average of 55 per cent for other lower middle income countries. The female labor force participation rate is among the lowest in the world at only 24 per cent in 2010, and much lower among young women aged 15-24, though these rates are slowly rising.³⁴

Egypt's labor force is 35 per cent employed in the informal sector. A very high 27 per cent are employed in government and another 28 per cent in agriculture. Only about 10 per cent are employed in the more modern parts of the private sector such as tourism and textile manufacturing. Despite some of the world's best cotton, textile exports are declining (now below 3 per cent of GDP) due to structural issues. There is, however, growth in some niche areas of manufacturing. Tourism saw better growth in the first decade of 2000, contributing directly eight per cent of GDP in good years, but the industry has been hit hard by the revolution and subsequent unrest.³⁵

Labor supply has generally been growing faster than employment over the years, causing longer and longer waits after school to find a job. However, during faster growth years in the mid-2000s Egypt's government reported *reduced* unemployment rates – from 11.2 per cent in 2005 to 8.7 per cent in 2008. With the right policies and conditions it seems that Egypt could indeed absorb its net annual 700,000 new labor force entrants.³⁶

Women along with youth and low-skilled returning migrants are among the most affected by unemployment. Women are particularly vulnerable to downturns as they work more in export sectors such as textiles or food processing. The World Economic Forum ranked Egypt 126th for women's equality in 2012, out of 135 countries, looking at economy, health, education and politics.³⁷

There is a widely acknowledged mismatch between educational training and labour market needs. Altogether, 62 per cent of urban males and 56 per cent of females have at least completed high school (46 per cent and 30 per cent in rural areas) and 20 per cent and 17 per cent respectively have a first university or higher degree.³⁸ Despite this, manufacturing, tourism and construction often lack workers with adequate skills at prevailing wages. This may be due to many Egyptians choosing higher wages abroad instead. Egyptian migrants abroad are more skilled than the average employee in the Egyptian domestic workforce.³⁹

The Egyptian government has recognized the contradiction of high unemployment and labor shortages, notably by establishing a Supreme Council for Human Resource Development in 2000 to create and lead national human resources development. Thanks to such efforts, today's challenge, though still very great, is more about quality of education than quantity.

The global financial crisis struck in 2008, temporarily reducing labor migration to the Gulf states as well as tourism and exports. Just as recovery was beginning, massive demonstrations took place in Cairo, initiated by young Egyptian men and women protesting the absence of political freedoms and exclusion from the benefits of growth. President Mubarak and his government were obliged to step down and elections and a constitutional referendum were held.

Controversy continued after the revolution, especially surrounding the holding of elections and some clauses in a new constitution approved by referendum but also because of impatience to see more progress addressing the concerns of the poor and unemployed, especially youths. Large and violent confrontations continued in several places in early 2013, greatly challenging the new

³² IOM, 2012a, op. cit.

³³ ILO, 2009. Economic and Social Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Egypt, Cairo: ILO.

³⁴ See World Bank's online data at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS>.

³⁵ ILO, 2009, op. cit.

³⁶ ILO, 2009, op. cit. ILO, 2010a. Impact of the Economic Crisis on Trade, Foreign Investment and Employment in Egypt, Cairo: ILO.

³⁷ World Economic Forum, 2012. Global Gender Gap Report, Geneva: World Economic Forum.

³⁸ OECD, 2010. Business Climate Development Programme: Phase I Phase Assessment, Egypt, Dimension III-2 Human Capital, Paris: OECD.

³⁹ ILO, 2009, op. cit. Ghoneim, A. F., 2010. Labour migration for decent work, economic growth and development in Egypt, Geneva: ILO.

government to meet the concerns of the opposition. Scores of people were killed in fighting between demonstrators and police.

This continuing unrest has exacerbated the considerable economic damage that occurred as a consequence of the revolution in 2011, including the marked decreases in tourism that occurred then.⁴⁰ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign reserves also fell sharply after the revolution and there was a steep rise in poverty and unemployment. An estimated 600,000 workers lost their jobs within Egypt because of declines in tourism, construction and associated services – previously some of the best growing sectors. The Arab Spring in general was also a contributing factor; for instance, Egypt received an estimated 264,000 Egyptians and third-country-nationals as a result of Libya's war.⁴¹ By the third quarter of 2012 there were 1 million *less* jobs than a year earlier and poverty had jumped above the previous 25 per cent. GDP growth had slowed to only 1.8 per cent⁴² and the economic outlook for 2013 was uncertain.

The Government today is facing even more enormous economic challenges than before the revolution, and even greater imperatives for economic reform. For the first quarter of 2013 the fiscal deficit was running at 220 billion Egyptian pounds per year or about 14 per cent of GDP. People are feeling the pinch of recent sharp devaluation of the Egyptian pound. The poor rely even more on unsustainable, untargeted food and fuel price subsidies which totaled 8 per cent of GDP in the financial year 2011/2012. However, according to the IMF total public debt remains below 80 per cent of GDP.⁴³

3.3 The scale of Egypt's migration

About eight million Egyptians are international migrants or emigrants, at least another eight million are internal migrants and there are up to another million are foreigners in Egypt. These roughly 17 million people are equal to nearly one fifth of Egypt's population of 84 million. They move, primarily, to places where demand for additional workers is greatest and are thus a driver of economic growth and development.

Egypt's population living abroad (totaling nearly 10% of the population) is much greater than the world average of 3.2 percent. In contrast, Egypt's internal migration is probably about equal to the world average of 10 per cent of population but lower than average for a lower middle income country. Some of those women who have migrated internally have migrated for marriage, and are therefore not labor migrants in the classic sense; however, even excluding this group, migrants would still be equal to about one sixth of Egypt's population.⁴⁴ We can infer from this that a significant proportion of Egypt's households must have such an absent migrant member, and the majority of such migrants send remittances – an enormous force.

3.3.1 Eight million Egyptians abroad

Following full independence in 1952, the state still provided the majority of jobs in the country. Egypt was mainly a country of immigration and in the 1960s labor migration was discouraged through a system of exit permits. However, labor surplus was growing fast and this policy was soon reversed.

In the 1970s, labor migration took off to the suddenly rich Arab oil-producing countries; most Egyptians found work mainly as construction workers in the rapidly developing Gulf. Being the most

⁴⁰ Tourists were down by 60 percent in March 2011 compared with March 2010 with losses of over \$2bn in the month of May 2011 alone. See Verner (ed), D., 2012. *Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries: A Case for Adaptation Governance and Leadership in Building Climate Resilience*, Washington: World Bank.

⁴¹ IOM, 2011b.

⁴² United Nations Egypt, 2012. *UN Strategy during Egypt's Democratic Transition, 2012: Poverty Alleviation through Pro-poor Growth and Equity*, s.l.: s.n.

⁴³ IMF, 2012 (where stated) *Middle East and North Africa: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges*, s.l.: IMF.

Food and fuel subsidies have totaled 10 per cent of GDP some years. Data on debt in 2013 were taken from unpublished government sources.

⁴⁴ The breakdown of 8 million + 8 million + 1 million is given below. If we subtract 3 million as marriage migration, the remaining 14m would be 1/6th of a population of 84m.

populous country in the Arab world, Egypt quickly became a major source of migrant labor. From 1975 to 1980, net migration from Egypt is thought to have totaled about 2.4 percent of the population.⁴⁵ By 1980, an estimated two million were abroad.⁴⁶

Beginning in 1975, many well educated Egyptians emigrated abroad to Europe, North America or Australia. Many studied in foreign countries and then remained permanently upon completion of studies. Many doctors, famously, emigrated after studying medicine abroad or at the American University in Cairo. Since 2000, the majority of growth in Egyptians abroad has been through labor migration to the Gulf, although longer-term migration also still continues and is still mainly to developed countries.

The Iran/Iraq war abruptly reduced oil flows and therefore migrant flows to the entire sub-region as economic activity and demand for labor suffered in general and not only in the two countries at war. Egyptians abroad are thought to have declined by about a third during the mid-to-late 1980s. The Gulf War in 1990 then pushed a further million Egyptians out of Iraq and Kuwait, followed by a rebound to a stock of perhaps two million in 1992.⁴⁷ The remainder of the 1990s there was gradual but steady growth in emigration and remittances to Egypt.⁴⁸

In the 21st century, Egyptian labor migration and remittances surged strongly. By 2008, Egyptian consulates estimated that 6.5 million Egyptians were estimated to be living abroad (see Table 1), excluding irregular migrants, and this paper adopts the rough estimate of eight million⁴⁹ – compared to a domestic labor force of 25.5 million in 2006. Egyptian emigrants are first and foremost in Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Until 2011, approximately 10 per cent were employed in Libya.⁵⁰

Egyptian labor migration is very much male dominated, with an estimated 87 per cent men of Egyptian labour migrants being men.⁵¹ However, there is room for growth in the number of Egyptian women working abroad, particularly in the Gulf. Such a phenomenon could have social as well as economic benefits given that women who work abroad successfully generally enhance their status within their family and community back home.⁵²

Other Egyptians abroad are mostly emigrants to the United States, Canada, Australia and Italy, working primarily in commerce, engineering, pharmaceuticals and health services. A large majority of Egyptians living in the West return to Egypt at least once per year, and nearly one third do so 'a

Table 1
Official estimates of Egyptians Abroad with documents, and author's estimate of additional migrants

<u>Where</u>	<u>Numbers (rounded)</u>
Arab countries	4,800,000
African Countries	2,500
Asian countries	6,000
Australia	110,000
European countries	800,000
USA and Canada	780,000
Total official estimate	6,500,000
Estimated additional	1,500,000
Estimated TOTAL	<i>circa</i> 8,000,000

Source: Government of Egypt Emigration Section based on MFA's estimates 2008, supplied by Dr. Zohry. Estimate of additional migrants are the author's.

⁴⁵ This was a rate of 4/1000 net migration per year for those six years. IOM, 2012b. Egypt -- Mobility of Health Professionals.pdf, Brussels: IOM.

⁴⁶ Zohry, A., 2007. Migration and Development in Egypt, Berlin: Institute for Migration and Cultural Studies.

⁴⁷ ILO, 2010a, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Wahba, J., 2007. An Overview of Internal and International Migration in Egypt, Cairo: Economic Research Forum.

⁴⁹ The figure of 6.5m in 2008 is the compilation of each Egyptian consulate's estimate of the numbers of Egyptians in their country. There are two reasons why such numbers are low estimates. Firstly, irregular migrants try to stay invisible and are usually undercounted. Secondly, even regular Egyptian migrants traditionally try to stay 'under the radar' and report to their consulate only when they must, such as to renew their passport. This is at least partly because in the past, registration at the consulate was not free after the first three months. It is therefore assumed that consulates must estimate conservatively, on average by 20-25 per cent.

⁵⁰ IOM, 2012a, op. cit.

⁵¹ IOM, 2012a, op. cit.

⁵² Interviews with Egyptian women, including those who work at IOM and know the migration field.

few times per year'. These kind of 'frequent flyers' are a new and significant development, blurring the distinction between emigrant and temporary migrant.⁵³

Remittances were estimated at nearly USD 18bn in 2012 or about 7 per cent of GDP⁵⁴, with the majority originating from Egyptians in the United States, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Remittances are highly effective at reducing poverty because they go mostly to economically vulnerable households.

The government of Egypt has been only moderately active in attempting to manage migration. A Higher Committee for Migration was set up in 1997 to enhance inter-ministerial cooperation, but it was not seen as truly inter-ministerial. Headed by the Minister of Manpower and Emigration, it has not been very active. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a Migration Division that has a coordinating and research role. The Ministry of Interior has responsibilities related to border control and thus is involved in efforts to manage and curb irregular migration while responsibilities for awareness raising on the dangers of irregular migration and trafficking sit with the Ministry of Information. The lack of inter-ministerial coordination constitutes an overall lack of national policy on migration, and on migration and development.

Egypt has a number of bilateral agreements on international migration, such as with Libya, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. Italy, which hosts an estimated 40 per cent of Egyptian migrants to the European Union, has a joint full information management system for Egyptian/Italy migration and a fair amount of capacity building activity in this regard. Dialogue with the EU on irregular migration is fairly intense, particularly as such migration is presently thought to be growing.

3.3.2 Internal migration of 10 per cent of population

This paper estimates Egypt's internal migrants at about 10 per cent of the population. There is evidence that internal migration was already as high as 11 per cent in the mid 1970s,⁵⁵ and it is unlikely that it has declined much although some do believe that it is as low as six per cent. Data from the *Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey* found that 10 per cent of Egyptians were from another Governorate in 2006; 60 per cent were women including many who moved after marriage. However, many others are excluded as they moved within the same Governorate. About a third of rural to urban migrants have moved to Greater Cairo where two million residents were born outside the city. Rural to urban migration has slowed a little recently while urban to rural migration has picked up,⁵⁶ no doubt encouraged by the economic slowdown of the last several years.

Migrants are often from Upper Egypt and most migrate to cities in Lower Egypt or the pace of economic development has been relatively quicker in tourism centers.⁵⁷ Internal migrants move to nearby cities or Governorates. For instance, poorer households in Upper Egypt seeking work in the tourism sector just take the shortest route to the coast. Internal versus international migration appear to be interchangeable strategies.

Between 1980 and 2010, rural population in eight of the more populous Arab countries fell from 60 to 40 per cent, but Egypt's rural population remains 55 per cent of the country's population. The peak of migration contributing to population growth in Cairo was in the 1980s and today many go elsewhere to look for work, especially in tourist hubs on the coast. Prospective migrants judge that they have a better chance of improving their income and access to services if they move to another destination such as a coastal town with a strong tourism sector and less of the expense and logistical challenges of a mega-city such as Cairo. However the long term trend is the same as in

⁵³ IOM, 2012a. Humanitarian Response to the Libya Crisis February to December 2011 Report, Geneva: IOM. Ghoneim, 2010a, op. cit. IOM, 2012b, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Forecast made in late 2012. World Bank staff calculation for each country, based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2012 and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. See Migration and Development Brief 12 for the methodology for the forecasts. Table kindly supplied to the offer by A Zohry.

⁵⁵ Herrera, S. & Badr, K., 2012. Internal Migration in Egypt: Levels, Determinants, Wages, and Likelihood of Employment, s.l.: World Bank. A common source is CAPMAS, 2008. Arab Republic of Egypt: Housing and Population Census, Cairo: CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statics), which found internal migration to be only 6% but there is reason today to think this may have been an underestimation.

⁵⁶ Wahba, 2007, op. cit.

⁵⁷ Herrera & Badr, 2012, op. cit.

most other countries; rural populations are gradually aging due to falling fertility rates and an exodus of youth to jobs in urban centres.⁵⁸

Greater Cairo continues to expand firstly through endogenous population growth. In satellite cities migrants from other parts of Greater Cairo seeking to lower their cost of living and/or improve their quality of life often now outnumber those from outside the city. Decreasing rural/Greater Cairo migration reflects perceived poor job opportunities and limited services. However, rural migrants do continue to arrive by the thousands and they are much more likely to live in poverty, coming often from the poorest Governorates such as Menoufia and Suhag.⁵⁹

3.3.3 Up to a million non-Egyptians in Egypt

Though numbers are unreliable, the best estimate possible at present puts the number of foreigners living in Egypt at between 500,000 and 1,000,000. Large differences in the estimates seriously cloud analysis, with high estimates (up to seven or eight million) invariably un-sourced and lower estimates relatively well-substantiated.

The UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated for Egypt in 2010 that there were 250,000.⁶⁰ Leading scholars on migration in Egypt now estimate foreigners at 250,000 to 500,000.⁶¹ IOM's official website puts the foreign population at 0.3 per cent or a number similar to 250,000.

Some of the poorer migrants, particularly in a city as big as Cairo, are quite invisible to efforts to count them due to their informal status and/or employment within domestic settings. Others are hidden in less governed areas such as the Sinai. It can be safely assumed that under-counting in censuses and surveys is more prevalent than over-counting, that other groups are completely underground, and that large recent influxes such as 150,000 Syrians or more needed to be included, thus arriving at the estimate of 'up to one million'.

Sudanese are often thought to be the largest group of foreigners and do not need a visa to enter Egypt. They come for a combination of reasons from economic to asylum seeking. They include many very vulnerable persons, despite a relatively good history of agreements to grant them access to services. Schooling has historically been a serious problem, not helped by their preference for English language schooling to prepare for the dream of resettlement in the West.⁶² One recent study found that 43 per cent of Sudanese migrants in Cairo earned USD 100 or less per month and 44 per cent of live-in domestic workers put in more than 15 hours of work per day. Over one third worked seven days per week. There were also frequent accounts of abuse.⁶³

An attempt to conduct a census of Sudanese living in Egypt a few years ago estimated a total of only 60,000, living mainly in Cairo and Alexandria,⁶⁴ (compared to previous estimates of up to two million). A recent study on Sudanese in Cairo concurred with the 60,000 estimate. No doubt there is some under-counting and there has also been a recent increase as more and more Sudanese who enter Egypt as a transit country find their onward journey to Europe or the Gulf to be blocked.⁶⁵

After the revolution the new Government stopped many contracts for foreign workers and set a limit of 10 per cent per employer, as an effort to address domestic unemployment. However, employers immediately complained and exceptions were quickly made in areas deemed to have a

⁵⁸ ESCWA, 2007. *The Demographic Profile of Arab Countries*, New York: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia.

⁵⁹ Kato, H., Iwasaki, E. & El-Shazly, A., circa 2004. *Internal Migration Patterns to Greater Cairo*, s.l.: accessed on <http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~areastd/mediterranean/mw/pdf/17/10.pdf>.

⁶⁰ See <http://esa.un.org/migration/>.

⁶¹ Dr. Ayman Zohry, President of the Egyptian Society for Migration Studies and one of Egypt's most senior migration experts has previously published figures as high as three million but has more recently decided to lower his estimates. For instance, he has conducted a detailed study of the numbers of Sudanese in Egypt and concluded that there are only about 60,000. Based on such fairly detailed research he has concluded that there are only about ¼ million foreigners in Egypt – at least from the traditional source countries such as Sudan or Ethiopia. These figures have been at least partly overtaken today by the most recent influxes during the Arab Spring.

⁶² Peterson, N., 2001. 'School's out,'. *Cairo Times*, 25 August - 5 September, pp. Vol 25 (5), cited in Zohry 200x. Cited in Zohry, A., 200x. *Cairo: A Transit City*. <http://www.zohry.com/pubs/Zohry-CEDEJ2005.pdf>.

⁶³ DRC, 2009, op. cit.

⁶⁴ Zohry, Ayman (unpublished), *Estimating number of refugees and migrants in urban areas: The Case of Sudanese in Cairo*. Refugee and Migration Centre, American University in Cairo

⁶⁵ Jacobsen, K., Ayoub, M. & Johnson, A., 2012. *Remittances to Transit Countries: The impact on Sudanese refugee livelihoods in Cairo*, Cairo: American University in Cairo: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, Paper No. 3, September.

shortage of domestic skilled labor supply, including for garment workers from Bangladesh and higher skilled workers in tourism and petroleum.

Many of the largest cohorts of foreigners in Egypt date back to sudden influxes during wars, revolutions and unrest, going back more than a century. Today there are Palestinians, Iraqis, Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Libyans to name some of the larger groups. Most recently another 150,000 or more Syrians have arrived. Altogether there are refugees or others seeking refuge from at least 30 countries.

Those recognized as refugees by the *UN High Commission for Refugees* are issued a card that allows residence. While Egypt does not have reservations on articles 17 and 18 of the *1951 Refugee Convention*, which protect refugees' rights to employment, there are significant legal constraints on refugees' ability to support themselves economically in Egypt. Refugee residence permits do not contain the phrase "Work is Permitted," and in practice refugees may only work legally in Egypt if they meet criteria required of other migrant workers. To obtain a work permit, a refugee must find an employer to sponsor them (including the payment of fees), which includes the requirement that no Egyptian be available to fill the same job. An employer must also employ 10 Egyptian nationals for every foreign worker. The result is that many refugees practice unauthorized labour, which is usually tolerated by the Egyptian Authorities.⁶⁶

Egypt is also a signatory of the 1989 *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* which gives children free access to education. Nevertheless primary and secondary education for most refugees is not always allowed in Egyptian public schools. Refugees who want a university education must pay fees at foreigners' rates.⁶⁷

Refugees suffer many disadvantages, lacking networks and forced to rent housing in the private sector. Assistance is concentrated in Cairo and many refugees are among the poorest of the poor. Somalis began coming to Egypt when their civil war began in 1991. They often live in difficult economic circumstances and are isolated from the broader economy. Many households are female headed and many men work in the Gulf. While in the 1990s, many were highly educated, in recent years, newly arrived Somalis are younger, unskilled and from rural backgrounds. Like many groups, Somalis have trouble getting their children into school and keeping them in school for both economic and social reasons.

Refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea have come in waves since the 1970s, firstly to escape persecution, later to escape armed conflict and seek better employment. They have been relatively successful, due primarily to their work in the domestic sector and relatively strong English language skills. As with other groups, Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants in the 1990s were educated and skilled, mostly men arriving by plane, whereas today they are poorer, less skilled and younger.

Egypt is doing a good job of coping with the Syrian influx from the war. For instance, Syrians are granted an entry visa and are able to later obtain residence permits for up to a year at a time. Unofficial estimates go as high as 150,000 Syrians now in Egypt and are still rising. They are mostly staying in satellite communities around Cairo and Alexandria where it is often difficult for them to access health and education services. The Egyptian government has taken measures to improve their access to education and health care and international organizations do provide additional health care and some housing support.⁶⁸ However, many cannot pay school fees, buy school supplies or overcome the informal barriers their children face in schools. In Alexandria, for instance, 90 per cent have no income and most are still living on savings brought with them from Syria. Young women are particularly at risk of exploitation.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Kagan, Michael, 2011. Shared responsibility in a new Egypt: A strategy for refugee protection, Cairo: American University in Cairo: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, Scholarly Works, Paper 677, September.

⁶⁷ There were numerous references to such problems among well-informed interviewees.

⁶⁸ UNHCR, 2012b. Note on Syrians in Egypt, Cairo: UNHCR Egypt, short unpublished note dated 20 November.

⁶⁹ UNHCR; WFP; UNICEF, 2012. Joint Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Egypt, s.l.: s.n.

3.3.4 Trafficking and smuggling of Egyptians and migrants

The levels of Egyptian irregular migrants to the European Union are thought to be modest, mostly those overstaying tourist visas to Italy or seasonal labor migrants staying on. The levels to the Gulf area are higher, with migrants commonly paying a fake 'sponsor' (supposedly the employing company) to gain entry and then looking for work upon arrival. Irregular migrants cannot return home and typically stay until they fulfill their goals or are arrested. Those Egyptians paying to be smuggled include many middle-aged men heading for construction, service or agriculture jobs in Jordan. Conditions can include the withholding of their passport, nonpayment of salaries and other coercive measures.⁷⁰

Egypt has especially good cooperation with Italy on managing migration, including job matching for Egyptians and readmission for irregular migrants. Egypt has also been forthcoming in patrolling the Red Sea channel for migrants, often from as far away as Asia, heading for Turkey and onward.

The numbers of foreigners being smuggled into or through Egypt are significant though difficult to estimate. A migrant who leaves Eritrea can be accompanied along several legs of their journey by a well-communicating network of smugglers, and often those that are smuggled end up being victims of extreme exploitation. Smuggling from Somalia to Yemen to Saudi Arabia, or from Eritrea to the Sinai to Jordan can all be part of one package.

Smuggling, while a less coercive practice than trafficking, can also become very coercive during the journey. For instance, smugglers taking migrants to Italy via Lampedusa often show one young man how to steer the boat and then send him off alone into the sea.⁷¹

In addition to the dangers posed by putting themselves into the hands of smugglers, irregular migrants usually suffer from insecurity, lack of access to health care and other services, and lack of access to justice in host countries (even if they are relatively highly developed).

Trafficking in people remains one of the most challenging and difficult topics in migration, one which many governments are uncomfortable with, crippling research and awareness raising. There are significant overlaps between people trafficking networks and drug trafficking networks, as drugs are the main source of income of international organized crime. Indeed, these two kinds of networks are often mixed and help to sustain each other.⁷² Some of the North African drug trafficking networks that have received the most attention are those for cannabis resin and the region has long been the predominant supplier of this drug for the European market.⁷³ It is likely that these networks have links with those that traffic people given the geographical overlap.

Egypt was commended by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in persons in 2010 for initiatives such as the establishment in 2007 of a *National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Persons*.⁷⁴ Egyptian legislation on trafficking is advanced and its development included at least some consultation with civil society.⁷⁵ Much could be done (including an increase in number of trafficked cases investigated and prosecuted) to build further on this record and place Egypt among leading developing countries for facing this scourge.

The backbone of international organized crime is drugs, accounting for the majority of their revenue worldwide. Other types of international organized trafficking such as in persons or weapons have strong ties to drug trafficking. In Northern Africa, drugs tend to come into West Africa and move eastward towards the Horn of Africa and onwards from there, mostly northward.⁷⁶

Most trafficking worldwide is thought to be of women and children and in the Middle East adult women are the majority of victims detected.⁷⁷ The Special Rapporteur found that common forms of

⁷⁰ United States Department of State, 2012, op. cit.

⁷¹ Interview with IOM official.

⁷² UNODC, 2012a. Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, Vienna: UNODC.

⁷³ UNODC, 2012b. World Drug Report, 2012. Vienna: UNODC

⁷⁴ UN Human Rights Council, 2010. Preliminary Note on the Mission to Egypt 11-21 April 2010, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Joy Ngozi, New York: UN General Assembly - Human Rights Council.

⁷⁵ Egypt's Law on Combating Trafficking in Persons, on 20 April 2010, is considered even better than the Palermo Protocol on the same issue, and has also adopted an Organ Harvesting and Transplant Act. The Civil Status Law has been amended to raise the minimum age of marriage for girls to 18 years the Penal Code now specifically criminalizes child trafficking.

⁷⁶ Interviews.

⁷⁷ UNODC, 2012, op.cit.

trafficking in Egypt included 'temporary marriage' of under-aged girls for sexual exploitation, child labor, domestic servitude and forced prostitution. The incidence of internal trafficking was found to be higher than international trafficking from Egypt and street children were especially vulnerable. She went on to write that "*a large number of domestic workers [...] are trafficked to Egypt for labour exploitation*" and that trafficking in human organs may be more prevalent than thought.⁷⁸

The US State Department also reported an increase in the number of foreign migrants trafficked in Egypt in 2012, especially from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Bedouin and others smuggling migrants through the Sinai sometimes take their own 'customers' captive and force them into sexual servitude or forced labor.⁷⁹ In these instances, migrants that began as smuggled migrants then become victims of human trafficking, held against their will, tortured and sometimes left for dead when they cannot meet the demands of their traffickers. Eritreans accounted for 70 percent of the cases of kidnapping into slavery that were recorded by IOM in 2012.

The Government of Egypt is primarily with IOM as well as other members of the UN Country Team, for instance on training law enforcement officials on implementation of the law, and on victim support, although much more effort is needed in many different areas. While Egypt's law on human trafficking is comprehensive, implementation of the law is key, especially in the area of migrant protection and law enforcement.

⁷⁸ UN Human Rights Council, 2010, op. cit.

⁷⁹ United States Department of State, 2012. 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report - Egypt, s.l.: accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,EGY,,4fe30cce2d,0.html>.

4. Migration, development and United Nations assistance in Egypt

This paper, as explained in Section 1.1, aims to promote the wider ‘mainstreaming’ of consideration for the impact and importance of migration across many sectors of the economy and society. Migration considerations have often been overlooked in Egyptian development and poverty-reduction.⁸⁰ This must be understood against a background of years of *laissez faire* policies,⁸¹ reinforced by the lack of questions and analysis of responses on migration status in key surveys such as the *Egypt Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Panel Survey* or the *Egypt Labor Market Panel Surveys* – which are otherwise invaluable baseline works.⁸² A forthcoming *Household International Migration Survey* (HIMS) will yield groundbreaking data and should also cover internal migration and foreign migrants in Egypt.⁸³

Better data will not automatically be digested into policy and programming. For instance, a *Situation Analysis* prepared by the Government, UN and multiple stakeholders placed migration, especially of youth, in the larger development context, calling for practices that combined the consideration of migration abroad into development strategy and policy in multiple sectors.⁸⁴ However there has not been solid follow through on this advice to date. While key planning documents including the *Strategic Framework for Economic and Social Development 2013-2022* or the current one and ten-year development plans do now mention migration more than before – particularly the potential of ‘emigrant minds’ – the consideration of migration is still far from being mainstreamed into overall national planning.⁸⁵

Particular attention is paid here to the *UN Development Assistance Framework for Egypt 2013-2017*, looking for opportunities to better leverage the migration and development nexus in achieving the results that the *United Nations Country Team* would like to contribute to in Egypt. This section is therefore divided into the five ‘pillars’ of the UN’s Framework, with a table presented for each to summarize the potential under each individual outcome to leverage migration for greater results:

- 4.1 Poverty alleviation through pro-poor growth and greater equity
- 4.2 Quality basic services
- 4.3 Democratic governance
- 4.4 Food security and nutrition
- 4.5 Environment and natural resource management.

The impact of migration on development reaches much more widely than just the United Nation’s framework for its work. Therefore, the text gives the subject a somewhat broader treatment and provides specific suggestions in each of the five sections.

4.1 Poverty alleviation

Under this first pillar of the UNDAF, three main areas of important interaction with migration are discussed. Firstly, remittances of migrants are one of the greatest contributors to poverty reduction

⁸⁰ For instance, even the World Bank – one of the organizations that has published the most research on migration and development – only mentions migrants once in its current Strategy, making a brief reference to returnees from Libya. The African Development Bank’s Interim Strategy for 2012-2013 does not mention migration or migrants at all. World Bank, 2012. Interim Strategy Note for Egypt 2012 to 2013, Washington: unpublished. ADB, 2012. Egypt – Interim Strategy Paper, s.l.: African Development Bank.

⁸¹ For example Wahba is often quoted for this as in Wahba, 2007, op. cit.

⁸² The International Organization for Migration itself could certainly take more responsibility for ensuring that such troves of useful data are not left undiscovered.

⁸³ CAPMAS, 2011. Egypt Household International Migration Survey - Project Document, Cairo: CAPMAS.

⁸⁴ Situation Analysis Taskforce, 2010. Situation Analysis: Key Development Challenges Facing Egypt, Cairo: Situation Analysis Taskforce: Minister of International Cooperation and Donor Partners Group.

⁸⁵ الدولي التعاون و التخطيط وزارة، القاهرة، 2022، عام حتى الاجتماعية و الاقتصادية التنمية لخطط الاستراتيجية الإطار. 2012، الدولي التعاون و التخطيط وزارة

(Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2012. *The Strategic Framework for the Planning of Socio-Economic Development until the Year 2022*, Cairo: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation). Draft for Community Consultation.





الدولي التعاون و التخطيط وزارة، القاهرة، الثورة لمصر التنموية الرؤية إطار في (2012-2013) الحكومة عمل خطة، 2012، الدولي التعاون و التخطيط وزارة

(Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2012. *Government Action Plan in the Framework of the Developmental Vision for Revolutionary Egypt, 2012-2013*, Cairo: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.)




in Egypt and more can be done to leverage them. Secondly, there is enormous potential for increasing the use of Egyptian expatriate talent for Egyptian development and poverty reduction through the ‘remittance of skills and knowledge.’ Thirdly, the importance of the migration/education nexus is underlined, including the importance of technical vocational training and ‘soft skills’ in facilitating entrance into domestic and international labour markets.

Table 2

Mainstreaming Migration in UN work on Poverty Alleviation

UNDAF Outcomes	Outcome 1.1 Government is operating with efficient and adequately resourced mechanisms of awareness creation, equitable targeting, delivering and monitoring of social protection services and access to adequate and affordable housing for children, young people, rural women, elderly and other vulnerable groups.				Outcome 1.2: Government applies improved pro-poor, inclusive and gender sensitive policies in financial and non-financial services supporting Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs).				Outcome 1.3: Strengthened private sector businesses in tourism, agro-industries, and other key pro-poor sectors are able to address gender, equity and environmental sustainability				Outcome 1.4: More and better skilled youth, women and other vulnerable groups have decent job opportunities.			
Anticipated Results	<i>Increased number and quality of social services.</i>				<i>Increased job creation through more sustainable and competitive MSEs.</i>				<i>More predictable income of MSEs that are integrated in bigger value chains and increased number of sustained jobs for their employees.</i>				<i>Increased decent work options and employability of youth and women.</i>			
Migration Relevance Rating																
Explanation for Rating	<p>Migrants abroad are paying into social insurance schemes, including pensions, but often do not enjoy sufficient mobility for their benefits.</p> <p>Remittances worth 7% of GDP are far more targeted at lower income households than 8% of GDP spent on untargeted food and fuel subsidies. Remittances could help understand how poorer households spend additional income.</p> <p>Topics such as pension mobility, access to justice and investment promotion could be included in talks with the EU on bilateral agreements.</p>				<p>With two thirds of remittances going to female headed households, they provide a rare opportunity to assist women to further strengthen their role and income.</p> <p>Households with and without remittances have different default rates and other characteristics in micro-credit schemes.</p> <p>Egyptians abroad might support online ‘micro-lending’ to MSEs.</p>				<p>Small and medium sized private sector investments from Egyptians abroad deserve special focus, aimed at already-growing sub-sectors for export.</p> <p>Migrants abroad and the heads of their households back home would benefit from more information on ways to invest part of their savings, particularly if it could employ the head of household or the migrant back at home.</p>				<p>The international labour market can offer job opportunities and help to reduce unemployment.</p> <p>Improving many educational curricula to international standards would increase both international and national employment opportunities.</p> <p>‘Up-skilling’ of lower-paid migrants helps them find higher paying jobs.</p> <p>TVET programs could address both internal and external demand for labor in design and delivery of their curricula, including links to foreign employers.</p> <p>Migration also promotes education, including of girls at home.</p>			

Egypt’s overall development strategy, human resources strategy and sector-specific strategies and plans could be aligned with labor migration policy and employment opportunities, for greater synergy. Low cost online networks of highly skilled Egyptians abroad could be organized by profession – a starting point for linking their contributions through short visits, virtually or longer stays, including post-retirement. They could support MSEs, government institutions, TVET or youth programmes with their specialized knowledge, fresh perspectives and varied experiences in other countries.

-  Migration highly relevant to outcome and result.
-  Migration somewhat relevant to outcome and result.
-  Migration only a little relevant to outcome and result.

Remittances of USD 18bn recorded for 2012

One quarter of Egyptians were living in poverty in 2011/2012 (with an income below LE3,000 or USD 500 per year), up from 22 per cent in 2008/9 and 17 per cent in 1999/2000. An Egyptian is more likely to be poor if s/he is illiterate, has many siblings, lives in a rural area of Upper Egypt or in a female headed household.

Those who live in rural areas of Upper Egypt are also more likely to become internal migrants or international labor migrants – documented and undocumented alike. Emigration patterns to Western countries are different, favoring the more educated from cities and Lower Egypt. These have been the general migration trends in Egypt for nearly half a century.⁸⁶

Remittances are the aspect of international labor migration that receives the most attention. Average remittances to Egypt per capita are at least equal to per capita GDP and probably higher. They go to households which would otherwise be poorer than average.⁸⁷

(i) Quantifying remittances and their impact

Remittances in 2008 by Egyptians working abroad totaled nearly USD 9bn, the same year that remittances also reached a peak worldwide.⁸⁸ Egypt was by then the seventh largest country for remittances in the world. Its USD 9bn came close to matching the USD 12bn Egypt was then receiving in foreign direct investment. Remittances had already nearly tripled from 1999 to 2008,⁸⁹ and after a brief setback they then doubled again to reach an estimated USD 18 or 19 billion in 2012. This is equivalent to nearly one in twenty remittance dollars worldwide.⁹⁰

Such a large amount, and such a large increase just as the economy stalled, is of huge significance to millions of households. Fully 70 per cent of Egyptians abroad are sending money home for personal or family reasons and in two thirds of cases to female headed households.⁹¹ In one survey in 2010 the most typical amount (median) of remittances was under USD 300 per month. Average remittances overall are over USD 3,000 per year – or six times the poverty level – and are the majority of the receiving household's income. Typical consumption expenditure is for general expenses, education, health care, food and utilities. Large marriage and wedding expenses for young men are also a common reason for migration and remittances.⁹²

About 20 per cent use at least part of their remittances for investment, excluding savings. Typical investments in real estate or land but also sometimes in starting a business. Households that do not invest a part of their remittances usually save some. They cite risks as the main reasons for not investing, as well as government policy, lack of access to credit, red tape and corruption.⁹³ A different survey found that 37 per cent were sending remittances to Egypt for a business or trade.⁹⁴

Migration also increases investment in education, a primary use of remittances and often an express migration goal, particularly for university.⁹⁵ Remittances also increase the likelihood that school fees will be paid, both for boys and for girls, thus keeping them in school.⁹⁶

When understanding the impact of remittances in Egypt, it is also important to note that the majority of migrant sending households are female headed. Such heads rarely have a wage sector

⁸⁶ Zohry, A. & Harrell-Bond, K., 2003. Contemporary Egyptian Migration - An Overview of Voluntary and Forced Migration, s.l.: Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme, American University in Cairo. Population Council, 2011. Migration Aspirations and Experiences of Egyptian Youths, Cairo: IOM.

⁸⁷ With remittances of \$17.7 billion divided by 70% of 8 million who send remittances, average remittances would be over \$3,000 per year compared to a per capita GDP of \$2,750 or so in 2012.

⁸⁸ ILO, 2009, op. cit.

⁸⁹ IOM, 2010a op. cit.

⁹⁰ Forecast made in late 2012. World Bank staff calculation for each country, based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2012 and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. See Migration and Development Brief 12 for the methodology for the forecasts. The Government of Egypt estimates remittances for 2012 at \$19bn, perhaps allowing for some undercounting by the World Bank.

⁹¹ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

⁹² IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

⁹³ IOM, 2010b. A Study on Remittances and Investment Opportunities for Egyptian Migrants, Cairo: IOM. The survey found that remittances were on average 45 per cent of household income in 2008. However, remittances have doubled in volume since then while domestic incomes in poorer households have most likely fallen.

⁹⁴ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

⁹⁵ IOM, 2010b, op. cit.

⁹⁶ El-Badawy, A. & Rashdy, R., 2010. Impact of International Migration and Remittances on Child Schooling and Child Work: The Case of Egypt, Cairo: Population Council, Working Paper 545.

job (17 per cent) or land (20 per cent). In general, female headed households are about 20 per cent of households in Egypt and are poorer on average.⁹⁷ Male migrants in the Gulf are usually only home once per year, thus women take on much more responsibility, including managing the remittances in consultation with the migrant. Most remittances are well spent, paying for food, school fees or health care.

(ii) Policies to maximize remittance flows and steer remittances into sustainable development.

Efforts have been made to better harness the power of remittances, notably by banks who offered free account opening and free transfers before realizing that migrants withdrew their money as soon as it was inside Egypt.⁹⁸ Egyptian migrants today are quite well served by several low cost transfer systems and they continue to improve.⁹⁹

Decades of tinkering has yielded some successes, such as the exemption from taxes of remittances and preferential exchange rates that attracted more remittances into the formal sector. Legislation also ensures that remittances are treated equally to foreign investments. Migrants would of course be loathe to see any interference in their transfers. However, they do want help starting businesses. Of the hundreds of thousands who fled home from the Libyan war, 75% wanted to stay in Egypt and the most common idea was to 'try and start a business'.¹⁰⁰

To assist migrants and their households to use their private remittances more effectively, more services for the promotion of safe investment and business start-up schemes could be provided. Migrants themselves say that they wish they could find more information on lower risk, lower hassle investments. More schemes could be developed to target the development of female-headed-households with migrants abroad. Small amounts of remittances could be used to create more employment for members of these female-headed-households in the informal sector and small businesses. It should also be remembered that expenditures on education are also often wise investments.

Virtual networks focusing on information, in combination with social networking around small business ideas of interest to migrants, would be well received by migrants. Such networks would be less expensive than offices on the ground, although a limited number of offices would still be needed for face-to-face contact. Understanding is an important prerequisite; for instance married men are more likely to return and start a business.¹⁰¹

The experience of other countries and surveys of migrants both suggest that small business promotion and investment promotion for migrants can and does work. Projects should concentrate on areas where small Egyptian businesses are already having success and good growth, minimizing the risks to be taken with hard-earned savings.

Maghreb countries have a little more experience than Egypt with promoting migrants investments and other contributions.¹⁰² New types of efforts to assist expatriates to contribute to socio-economic development must take a fresh, more 'social networking', online approach. Micro-lending or and other forms of crowd sourcing for funds/expertise might also succeed.

⁹⁷ Verner (ed) 2012, op. cit.

⁹⁸ Ghoneim, 2010, op. cit.

⁹⁹ The Egyptian post office offers an economical system of making remittances from abroad. Bank Misr charges \$2 per transfer plus \$2 per thousand. Recently, 'Giro Nil' – a new consortium – has launched an economical set of products for payments of salaries, bills, pensions and other electronic payments, including especially international payments from migrants. Jacobsen, et. al. , 2012, op. cit.

¹⁰⁰ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

¹⁰² Both Morocco and Tunisia, and to an extent also Algeria, have decades of history at more actively promoting investment by their nationals living and working abroad. This is usually linked to wider policy on attracting foreign investment. The collective experience of these and other countries suggests that the weak point is often still the spread of information. See Morocco's website for investors: <http://en.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/investing-in-morocco.aspx>. See also: IOM, 2012c. *Projet Pilote de Mobilisation des Marocains Résidant en Belgique pour le Développement du Maroc (MEDMA2)*, Cairo: Funded by Fondation Hassan II. See also: Thibault, J., 2012. *The Tunisian State and the Tunisian Abroad*. In: *A Study on the Dynamics of Arab Expatriate Communities: Promoting Positive Contributions to Socioeconomic Development and Political Transitions in their Homelands*. Cairo: IOM and League of Arab States., Chapter 6.

(iii) Pension portability

Pensions are something else to consider. Migrants outside Egypt frequently do contribute to pension plans, even final salary based pension plans, but there are usually no bilateral agreements to allow them to bring these pension entitlements back to Egypt. Often they may only withdraw their own contributions and not their employer's. Such barriers may even prevent Egyptian retirees from returning to reside in Egypt despite their frequent desire to do so.

Within Egypt there is a similar problem. In order to qualify for a pension, most Egyptians must pay into the plan for at least 120 consecutive months. If there is a break, there are penalties. Migrants going abroad to work may pay the gap months, but with a fine and many do not. Whether at home or abroad, migrants usually pay into schemes that do provide them equal benefit.¹⁰³

(iv) Research into remittance use to inform broader poverty alleviation policy and programming

There is also great potential to use the knowledge that could be generated by studying the use of migrant remittances. If seven per cent of GDP in remittances are largely targeted at lower income households, then this money must compare favorably for its impact on poverty reduction to the eight per cent of GDP spent on untargeted food and fuel subsidies. The expenditure patterns of remittances could therefore help to understand how lower-income households use additional cash.

Using Egyptian expatriate talent better

Today's Egyptians abroad are often in higher-skilled work requiring scientific or technical knowledge. Those in lower-skilled work still tend to be semi-skilled rather than low-skilled. They tend to work in production or sales, with a declining number in agriculture or fisheries. The number of Egyptians in management positions is higher than those doing clerical work. Teachers in the Gulf are a significant cohort, including women. Among emigrants to Western countries, over 17 per cent have a Ph.D. and 86 per cent a university degree.¹⁰⁴

Egypt could do much more to get maximum benefit from the knowledge and skills of its Egyptians abroad, something that pays off for other countries in increased trade, businesses and skilled professionals.

Egyptians abroad say that they would especially like to participate in more cultural activities through their consulate, to maintain their cultural identity and that of their children.¹⁰⁵ This is a good entry point for engagement that could also be gently used to spread information about virtual groupings of migrants – organized around professional interest.

Almost every profession might be able to make a contribution in their sector back home, even just through virtual mentoring or perhaps short visits, motivated by benevolence and reputational reward, combined with the intrigue that greater involvement might lead to a personal opportunity.

Such networks should also include a potential investors' network – supporting those who might be considering a small or medium investment back in Egypt. This second tier is qualitatively different; the main service would be the provision of accurate information and a discussion forum on which business sub-sectors are doing the best and how to invest, followed by practical assistance getting going when the time comes.

This is a part of economic development where bold, government-led strategy has often paid off by fostering key sectors sufficiently for the private sector to take off in them. For instance, with so many highly trained doctors abroad, what are the particular specialties in health care where Egypt's private medicine industry might focus and compete? What would the training needs be? How can this help Egypt's public health care provision more generally?

¹⁰³ Sieverding, M. & Selwaness, I., 2011. Expanding Social Insurance Access to Egypt's Informal Workers.docx, s.l.: unpublished brief, available at IOM Cairo.

¹⁰⁴ IOM 2010a, op. cit.

¹⁰⁵ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

Migration, education, training and 'soft skills'

With inadequate human capital impeding Egypt's growth, a greater effort is needed at improving education and training, linking education to job demand, providing more non-formal education and job-related training, and improving the quality of university education.¹⁰⁶

In the 21st century getting a job or a better job not only means having a better education, it often means migrating. Both for internal and international migration, Egyptians with low education have significantly less opportunity to find employment by migrating. Indeed, the higher a person's qualifications and education, the more likely they are to migrate.¹⁰⁷ As noted above under remittances, migration is often motivated by the desire to earn the money for an education in a 'virtuous circle'.

Female migrants from Maghreb countries, where women's share of migration abroad was already larger than in Egypt, appear to be on the increase. This topic deserves direct investigation in Egypt, including on differing patterns of employment and remittances for women migrants.¹⁰⁸

The Government of Egypt and several important development partners including the EU, USA and World Bank recognize the need to invest more in human resource development in Egypt, with particular emphasis on technical vocational educational and training. National and international labor markets today are closely related and there is little difference in most sectors between the kind of education and training needed to get the best jobs at home – or abroad.

Several agencies help develop curricula that meet such standards for those most vulnerable to un-employment, including in the Gulf and Europe for qualified construction and textile workers, receptionists and assistant chefs. Education and training need not always be formal to yield results. Practical or 'soft' skills such as how to read a job advertisement, write a *curriculum vitae* or conduct oneself in an interview have also paid off, as measured in tracer studies. Another area where students need more such 'soft' education is on where the real demand is from employers, based on up-to-date data.¹⁰⁹

The government is also now pushing Governorates to have local employment strategies, and action plans. Tourism is a good example as Egypt is already highly competitive. However, there are myriad jobs in the tourism sector and many foreigners are brought in to fill them. Not just hotel managers, but trained dive masters and a host of other specializations are in short supply. Already several technical vocational schools have been set up in Egypt to educate and train young people to a standard that they can compete for tourism jobs. Tourism can also demonstrably bring opportunities for employment abroad as locally hired staff may find promotion opportunities in international hotel chains.¹¹⁰

Another idea is a training centre for textile workers. A famous case of over 10,000 Bangladeshis brought in to work in garment factories in Egypt begged the question: Why aren't Egyptians doing these jobs? While interviewees suggested this was about the quality of the Egyptian worker willing to work for USD 300 per month away from home – at least from the employer's viewpoint – training could clearly help.

Every sector in the Egyptian economy needs a human resources strategy. Tourism was already mentioned, but much more could be done for other, perhaps smaller or just emerging growth sectors of the economy. Investigation of where the manufacturing sector is growing fastest might yield some prime opportunities to accelerate this sector through education and training. Agribusiness, the renewable energy sector and petrochemicals all deserve attention.

¹⁰⁶ OECD, 2011, op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ Herrera & Badr, 2012, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸ Et-Tayeb, A., 2012. The Participation of Migrant Women in the Socio-economic Development Scene in Two Maghreb Countries: Social Reading of Status and Roles. In: Chapter 2: A Study on the Dynamics of Arab Expatriate Communities: Promoting Positive Contributions to Socioeconomic Development and Political Transitions in their Homelands. Cairo: IOM and League of Arab States.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Ms. Piera FRANCESCA SOLINAS, Country Programme Coordinator, IOM, Egypt, 28 January 2013.

¹¹⁰ Of course the tourism has been severely affected by the revolution and again by unrest in 2013 but this is temporary.

– Suggestions

- Assist migrant households more to make sensible investments with their remittances, by providing access to knowledge, practical assistance and links to expatriate skills and assistance.
- Design programs to build on the women's empowerment already taking place in many migrant sending, female-headed households. For instance, assist investments that create more gainful employment for them, particularly in the informal sector and small enterprises.
- Study how households use the extra cash from remittances, as an important part of understanding household poverty and expenditure patterns.
- Assist Egyptians abroad more to contribute their enormously valuable knowledge, skills, experience and networks to Egypt's economic development. The most cost effective initial entry points would be cultural or sporting events through consulates, later combined with platforms supporting migrant-controlled online networks in different professional areas.
- Study female migration more and how to improve women's prospects and benefits from it. Young women in Egypt are the most likely to be unemployed and many are potentially interested in finding work, even by moving if they have acquired skills that are in demand.
- Education policy needs to be more firmly linked to employment potential in Egypt, both within the country and abroad. Sectors with the highest potential for growth in employment need to be targeted for intensive investment in technical education and vocational training, and for the raising of educational qualifications to international standards. Nearly every sector of the economy needs a human resource strategy that takes account of migration for employment opportunities.
- More should be done to ensure that migrants are able to contribute as fully as possible to mobile, fair pensions plans, whether abroad or within Egypt. The benefits of a migrants' income and remittances must usually be spread over a lifetime.
- Further assessments of labour market demand abroad should be made and, on this basis, strategies should be developed to market the Egyptian labour force abroad.

4.2 Quality basic services

Under this UNDAF pillar four key areas are discussed where migration-related issues cross-cut with work to enhance the provision of, and access to, quality basic services. These are: Migrants' health vulnerabilities, migrants and preventive education; children and child migrants; and Egyptian expatriates and services. Most of the emphasis is on health, as in the UNDAF and as education was already discussed above.

Migrants' health vulnerabilities

Labor migration in Egypt, both internal and international, is mainly from the poorer Governorates and especially from rural Upper Egypt – the area which provides the lowest average access to health care in the country.¹¹¹ People from such areas as Sinai or Aswan sometimes even migrate internally to seek health care.

Migrants often end up with poorer access to health care where they have gone to work. Many regular migrants lack access to health care. They can usually afford primary care from their savings, but not hospitalization or other secondary care. Migrant workers in Jordan are somewhat better off than elsewhere in the Middle East as they are not subject to medical screening for HIV or Hepatitis C before entry and have annual checkups.

Irregular migrants in most countries have little or no access to health care. Even where it is provided, they fear arrest if they expose themselves. Egyptians in the Gulf, or in Europe often find themselves in this predicament. One of the most common reasons for an Egyptian to request assistance to return home is in order to get health care. Even in the European Union – which makes a greater effort than most to respect migrants rights – irregular migrants are usually unable to access health services.^{112,113}

Undocumented foreign migrants within Egypt do not experience any de jure barriers to accessing primary and emergency health care. However, due to their inability to pay, they often experience severe de facto barriers to access. Many refugees in Egypt are able to access separate health care systems provided with aid money. Such systems are often badly needed for these groups, who might otherwise go without, and they do relieve excess burden on the Egypt's strained health systems. However, parallel services are not cost effective, cause inequity and undermine community cohesion.

Greater access to health care for migrants is makes sense from a human rights, public health and economics point of view. Health is the *“leading factor for determining whether the migration experience for the migrant, their family, and the countries of origin and destination will be positive or negative.”*¹¹⁴ Ensuring migrants' access to primary and preventative healthcare saves costs in the long-term and reduces the possible negative health impacts on host communities. In Egypt the state will be increasingly burdened by Egyptian returnees if they are in poor health as a result of lack of expenditure by a previous host state. Investment today in negotiating insurance schemes with host countries – and demonstrating reciprocity within Egypt – will be highly cost effective in the longer term.

Health is the leading factor for determining whether the migration experience for the migrant, their family, and the countries of origin and destination will be positive or negative.

¹¹¹ As in other sectors, there is a consistent lack of treatment of the subject of migration in the health literature for Egypt. For instance, the otherwise excellent survey and publication on health in Egypt by El-Zanaty & Way, 2008 (op. cit.) – 463 pages long – makes no mention of migration or migrants.

¹¹² Romero-Otuno, 2004, op. cit.







¹¹³ PICUM, 2007.

¹¹⁴ IOM, 2013b, op. cit

Table 3

Mainstreaming Migration in UN work on Basic Services – Health

UNDAF Outcomes	Outcome 2.1 Vulnerable mothers and children under 5 have increased access to continuous and integrated primary health care (PHC) services, particularly perinatal care (PC) and nutritional services.	Outcome 2.2: Women, men and young people have increased access to quality FP/RH services.	Outcome 2.3 The health system is strengthened to improve the health literacy of vulnerable populations (particularly on proper feeding practices, birth spacing and Family Planning, prevention of Communicable Diseases (CDs) and Non Communicable Diseases (NCDs).	Outcome 2.4: Vulnerable populations have improved access to quality prevention, care, support and treatment for Hepatitis C, HIV and TB.
Anticipated Results	<i>Improved child survival and development amongst under 5 boys and girls.</i>	<i>Reduced fertility and incidence of gender-based violence (GBV).</i>	<i>Adequate health related knowledge and improved behaviour towards major health problems in Egypt.</i>	<i>Equitable, accessible and improved quality services for people living with, or affected by Hepatitis C, HIV and TB.</i>
Migration Relevance Rating				
Explanation for Rating	<p>Migrants are among the most affected by lack of access to health services. Linguistic or cultural differences, a lack of affordable health services or health insurance, administrative hurdles, legal status, and the fact that migrants often work extremely long hours are among the key barriers.</p> <p>Health professionals are already working in a very international labor market. Human resource policy in these two sectors needs to fully take account of this reality, doing much more to attract contributions from Egyptian and other nationals working abroad while also adapting education and training to a combined domestic and foreign labor market.</p> <p>Remittances of migrants abroad back to Egypt are a major source of access to health systems for poorer households. Migrants – who may lack full access to health care themselves where they are – are supporting the access of their households to health care back home. This makes them an opportune vector for health education and other prevention work and for the analysis of household vulnerability.</p> <p>Migrants have tremendous potential for advancing economic and social development – if they are healthy. Poor health is the biggest reason why migration can have a negative outcome. With migration now such a mega trend, the issue is more and more pressing.</p> <p>Significant proportions of migrants have no access to health care at all – a fundamental human rights issue that grows as migration grows. Health systems, too, can poorly afford to provide fragmented coverage. Migrants need full access to health systems where they are, not just for primary care but also for secondary care. Egypt should support international reciprocity in complying with Article 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which requires states to ensure that everyone within their jurisdiction has access to the underlying determinants of health, such as clean water, sanitation, food, nutrition and housing, and through a comprehensive system of healthcare, which is available to everyone without discrimination, and economically accessible to all. Preventive care to Egyptians abroad will also yield future health savings for Egypt and host countries alike.</p> <p>Migrant-friendly, affordable health insurance could ensure uninterrupted access care, including when not working.</p> <p>Victims of trafficking – Egyptians and foreigners alike – are especially in need of social protection and, despite good legislation, are not getting the attention they deserve. Work must be continued to implement the plan of action to detect victims and then to enforce the 2010 Law to Combat Human Trafficking.</p> <p>Migrants should be given more attention in efforts to prevent the spread of HIV, particularly among most at risk groups such as men who have sex with men, injecting drug users, and also female sex workers.</p> <p>It is not known what proportion of these most at risk groups are migrants but in other countries high proportions of female sex workers and their customers are migrants.</p> <p>Egyptian migrants to the Gulf are routinely forced to take HIV tests and deported from some countries when they test positive, without receiving care.</p> <p>The spread of Hepatitis C is also of international concern. Multi-country prevention can reduce multi-country combined costs.</p>			

<p>UNDAF Outcomes continued</p>	<p>Outcome 2.5 National health system is strengthened for preparedness and response to public health emergencies with special focus on Avian and Pandemic Influenza in accordance with (International Health Regulations (IHR 2005)</p>	<p>Outcome 2.6: Children in Egypt aged 4-5 have more access to inclusive quality pre-primary education</p>	<p>Outcome 2.7 Children in Egypt aged 6 – 14 have more access to, and complete, quality basic education (formal and non-formal) with a special focus on vulnerable groups and gender equality</p>
<p>Anticipated Results</p>	<p><i>Improved national preparedness and response planning for public health crises, hazards and/or disasters.</i></p>	<p><i>Improved children’s developmental readiness to start primary school on time, especially for marginalized children.</i></p>	<p><i>Reduced gender and other disparities in relation to increased access and completion of quality basic education.</i></p>
<p>Migration Relevance Rating</p>			
<p>Explanation for Rating</p>	<p>In the event of a serious pandemic, such as of a strain of highly infectious, high-mortality influenza, any measure taken to reduce or suspend air travel – theoretically to prevent the spread of infection – would be futile and economically devastating. Mobility is thus a central issue in pandemic contingency planning. In the more serious pandemic scenarios, the global drop in economic output would affect almost all Egyptians abroad, stopping or interrupting their incomes and ability to send remittances, or provoking a tidal wave of one-time transfers of savings.</p> <p>National health emergencies can have some similar effects with regard to internal migrants.</p> <p>Migrant communities should be included in any preparedness activities.</p>	<p>Remittances presumably do also pay for pre-school education in some cases.</p> <p>Children of poor foreigners in Egypt are among the most marginalized and least likely to be ready to start school.</p>	<p>The hope of a better education and future for their children is a major motivating factor for many migrants, both internally and abroad.</p> <p>Children living in households that receive regular remittances are less likely to leave school or home early.</p> <p>Female headed households receiving remittances are an opportune group for raising awareness on the importance of sending all girls and boys to school.</p> <p>Migration of women themselves often impacts positively on gender roles including in education.</p> <p>Migrant children often cannot realize access due to linguistic, administrative or financial barriers or legal status.</p>
<p> Migration highly relevant to outcome and result.</p> <p> Migration somewhat relevant to outcome and result.</p> <p> Migration only a little relevant to outcome and result.</p>			

Communicable diseases, migrants and preventive education

The prevalence of HIV in Egypt is thought to be under 0.2 per cent (one in 500 persons 15-49 years old). However, in Cairo and Alexandria concentrated epidemics have spread among injecting drug users (7-8 per cent) and men who have sex with men (5-7 per cent).¹¹⁵

Prevention efforts in Egypt continue to concentrate on injecting drug users and men who have sex with men, but also on other most at risk groups to prevent more concentrated epidemics. For instance, female sex workers are also now targeted by prevention campaigns though their prevalence rate remains low.

¹¹⁵ NAP, 2012, op. cit.

There is strong evidence worldwide that migrants are more at risk of contracting HIV. The National Aids Programme's report mentions refugees as more at risk and Egypt's mobile clinics do include the targeting of truck drivers in migration corridors. However, other migrants need more prevention education. Many sex workers are not only migrants themselves – their clients also include many labor migrants, particularly in port towns.¹¹⁶ Men away from home, whether inside Egypt or abroad, are more likely to frequent sex workers and engage in other high risk behavior.¹¹⁷ Women migrants face special risks of HIV infection linked to sexual abuse or trafficking for forced sex work.¹¹⁸

Many Egyptian migrants going abroad in the Gulf are still subjected to compulsory testing for HIV and Hepatitis C before being accepted. Saudi Arabia and other countries even deport migrants who test positive, without extending access to health care. There is a need for more international strategies on disease prevention and treatment, which could benefit both host and home countries.¹¹⁹

Migrants are also vulnerable to the spread of several other important communicable diseases. HIV/AIDS is a better documented example but migrants (including transit migrants) need to be included in health policy on any major disease. This would include ensuring that public health services are migrant- friendly and minimal health-care standards for all vulnerable migrant groups. International migration means that international cooperation is particularly important.

Child migrants

Providing a better future for their children motivates migrants the world over and this paper has already discussed the use of parents or siblings' remittances to pay children's school fees.

However, being a migrant themselves can be a child's nightmare – becoming victims of trafficking for forced labor or sex work, or delivered into domestic or farm work situations that leave them no choice – 'super cheap workers'. Hundreds of thousands of street children in Egypt, many of them migrants or children of recent migrants, become victims of these and other practices including forced begging. A great deal is already being done in Egypt, including with the assistance of United Nations Country Team members and other development partners, to assist Egypt to improve the protection of children. However, the problem is enormous and progress is slow; several international organizations feel obliged to assist children working in hazardous jobs by giving them items like protective clothing until the practices can be stopped.

Girls younger than 18 years old – even much younger – are sometimes forced into bogus or 'temporary' marriages, frequently related to international visiting grooms from the Gulf or involving migration of the 'bride'. Other forms of sex tourism involving minors are also available in Egypt.

Child protection is about strengthening families thus migration is a very significant consideration. Indeed, the poorer a household is in Upper Egypt the sooner the children are obligated to leave and try to make their own way in the world. Often they migrate to a nearby town or city – something true of many children struggling with the transition from school to work. If their household receives remittances regularly they are presumably less likely to leave home early.

IOM assisted 60 unaccompanied minors found among the thousands who reached the island of Lampedusa *en route* to mainland Italy during the Libyan war. Families in Upper Egypt sometimes send their children to Italy unaccompanied as children are not deported from Italy and are able to eventually attain regular documentation. When they turn 18 years old, they can also sponsor their family members to come. Practices like these, involving the irregular migration of unaccompanied minors, underline the importance of providing viable alternatives to irregular migration. This includes

¹¹⁶ NAP, 2012, op. cit.

¹¹⁷ UNDAIDS, IOM & ILO, 2008, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ See for instance: OKUP & UNDP, 2009, op. cit.

¹¹⁹ A good illustration of the importance of international cooperation on migration and disease, in general, is the high cost of treating Hepatitis C – which can often require a liver transplant. The cost of treating a single immigrant with advanced Hepatitis C in Europe is over € 200,000 or more than 10 times the cost of early treatment. Hepatitis C virus prevalence in Egypt is thought to be about 10 per cent.¹¹⁹ Better Hepatitis C prevention and early detection in Egypt could thus greatly benefit the European health system as well as Egypt's own.

moving towards international standards in education in key sectors to provide children with skills appropriate for the domestic and international labour market.

Egyptian expatriates and services

Doctors and other health professionals are also the most famously cited example of the brain drain from Egypt, with about five per cent of all Egyptian doctors believed to have emigrated or be working abroad temporarily. They migrate not only because of lower pay in Egypt but also because of poor working conditions in many institutions.

Given growing international demand, nursing is a logical next sector to invest more in training and is more accessible to women in Egypt. There are even many foreign nurses in Egypt due to the perceived low quality of Egyptian nurses. The Egyptian government is making a greater effort at the training and remuneration of nurses and this can also help meet international demand. This approach should be expanded to other sectors.¹²⁰

Egyptian doctors abroad could also be tapped into more, through either short term visits, 'tele-medicine' or other knowledge sharing, particularly on training and health systems strengthening as managing the health care system in Egypt is a great challenge.

Egyptian doctors and other professionals abroad might be especially useful to advise and assist the setting up of schemes to buy migration friendly insurance plans for migrants and their households – plans that allow for both mobility and uninterrupted care when remittances are interrupted.

– Suggestions






- Egypt should champion migrants' access to health care, leading by example at home and negotiating with host countries of Egyptians abroad.
- Increase efforts to reach migrants with preventive health care and health education as this would be cost effective, including for the Egyptian government.
- Meet the needs of migrants and their households for health insurance tailored to them and their needs for mobility and uninterrupted coverage even when out of work.
- Adapt efforts to address special health vulnerabilities of migrants especially in relation to communicable diseases such as HIV, malaria, Hep C and TB.
- Research and understand child migrants as both migrants and children, in order to improve their protection. Not only are they the most vulnerable of migrants, their exploiters are also often migrants too.
- Help connect Egyptian health workers abroad and at home more, in particular to transfer modern health management practice but also to develop areas where Egypt's health sector could grow.

¹²⁰ *Improving society's view of nurses in Egypt*, by Amina Abdul Salam - The Egyptian Gazette, Wednesday, July 27, 2011.

4.3 Democratic governance

Two areas are explored under this pillar of the UN Framework. Firstly, Egyptian expatriates abroad gain skills and values that could be useful in promoting better governance and civil participation in Egypt. Secondly, migrants – whether Egyptians abroad or foreigners within Egypt – are in severe need of greater access to justice.

Table 4
Mainstreaming Migration into UN work on Democratic Governance

UNDAF Outcomes	Outcome 3.1 National and local capacities and systems are enhanced for decentralized, inclusive and gender sensitive planning, budgeting, monitoring & evaluation.	Outcome 3.2 National institutions and CSOs are strengthened to further promote, protect, respect and fulfill human rights in line with Egypt’s international commitments, with a special focus on women, children, disabled persons, refugees, the elderly and migrants.	Outcome 3.3 Anticorruption and accountability institutions, legislation and policies are reformed, modernized and transparent to ensure social justice and Rule of Law in line with Egypt’s International commitments.	Outcome 3.4 The voice, leadership, civic engagement and political participation of women and young people are visible and effective in public spheres.	Outcome 3.5 Institutions, legislation and policies are responsive to the immediate requirements of the transition to democracy.
Anticipated Results	<i>Central and local authorities have a strengthened capacity for decentralized, inclusive and gender sensitive planning and budgeting processes, as well as a strengthened capacity for evidence-based M&E.</i>	<i>Women, children, juveniles, refugees, migrants, the poor, elderly and the disabled benefit from enhanced culture for the protection, respect and fulfillment of human rights and have improved access to judicial services and legal aid. Strengthened co-operation of national authorities and national human rights institutions with UN treaty bodies and the UN Human rights mechanisms.</i>	<i>National Anti-Corruption Strategy developed and improved ranking for Egypt on international indicators for transparency and anti-corruption.</i>	<i>Improved roles and higher visibility of actions taken by women in decision making positions and more active youth structures/groups, along with higher positive community perception of young people’s right to participation.</i>	<i>Institutions, legislation and policies are responsive to the immediate requirements of the transition to democracy.</i>
Migration Relevance Rating					
Explanation for Rating	Skills in well-functioning local government are best acquired through experience, which is more easily gained in a different context. The potential should be explored to attract temporary postings of Egyptians abroad to the local government in their area of expertise and geographical origin.	Many Egyptian (e)migrants abroad would like to support the strengthening of respect for human rights and justice in Egypt if they had the opportunity. Such strengthening directly benefits migrants of all types, in particular victims of trafficking including many girls and women, and abused domestic workers, who are among those <i>most</i> in need of protection and access to justice.	Egyptians’ experience of well-functioning legal systems and lower corruption levels in other countries is a valuable asset that can be leveraged to increase rule of law and justice in Egypt.	More women represent their households in community affairs due to migration of mostly men – and thus more female headed households. Egyptian women and youths abroad today are usually still virtual members of their households, with considerable influence. In some countries they have experienced more equal gender roles and/or greater opportunity for public participation. Efforts at enabling positive participation of women and the young in the public sphere would benefit from outreach to those working or studying abroad. Egyptian volunteers from abroad could strengthen volunteering in Egypt.	

Egyptians abroad experience different systems of governance, with strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages compared to Egypt’s. They also experience different normative value systems. Their greater inclusion would enrich and strengthen dialogue, forums and work on issues such as strengthening institutions, social justice, gender roles, justice and rule of law and comparative democratic transitions among different states – particularly Arab states.

Enriched skills and values among Egyptian expatriates

Whatever their profession, Egyptians abroad have the potential, desire and demand to make a contribution to Egypt. Architects, for instance, might help with a low cost urban housing project. Academics could help Egyptian Universities learn about the newest management practices. Egyptian expatriates have vast collective experience of societies with different governance, often less corruption, and both more conservative and more liberal gender roles, especially within their respective areas of professional expertise.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries have made more than a little effort to engage Egyptians, notably by organizing conferences and study tours, but current practice is still far from reaching its potential. Egyptian consulates continue to live with a negative stereotype from years of poor service, particularly as many expatriates feel that poor governance was one of the reasons they left.

No government today can afford to neglect the potential of its citizens abroad. They not only have financial and human capital to offer – they also have social capital, experience with and involvement in civil society, and often carry influence with constituencies in their country of origin. For example, when the post-revolution government allowed Egyptians to vote abroad at their consulates for the first time, the media in Egypt paid special attention to the results of exit polls of such voters abroad. Many registered at their consulate for the very first time in order to vote; apparently they felt this was the most valuable service their consulate had ever offered them.

There is good evidence that Egyptian migrants continue to participate in Egypt's civic affairs. About 90 per cent of emigrants – usually to Europe, North America or Australia – regard staying aware of Egyptian current events as 'very important' or 'important'.¹²¹ Over 30 percent maintain membership in associations, societies or some project back in Egypt, usually for many years.¹²²

In a survey of youths not long after the revolution started in 2011, 79 per cent said that employment was their top concern and 44 per cent said they had already decided to migrate abroad. Those who planned to leave were less interested in 'democratic governance', perhaps figuring that it soon wouldn't matter to them as they would be gone.¹²³ In reality, migration abroad actually *raises* the interest of a country's citizens in public affairs back home, on average.¹²⁴ Those who move to places that they feel are better governed are especially likely to become interested in governance issues in their country of origin.¹²⁵ Transparency is a closely related area; according to a popular index of the perception of corruption, most destinations of Egyptians abroad enjoy a higher rating than Egypt.¹²⁶

Migrants in the twenty-first century are no longer as 'absent' as they once were. Cheap telephone calls, instant messaging, e-mail, free online chat, audio and video calls have revolutionized communication to the point where many migrants communicate daily and are thus virtually 'present'. They are also often particularly respected members of the household, including many older brothers or sisters looked up to by their siblings for their success and the money they send home.

¹²¹ IOM, 2010a, op. cit.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ IOM, 2011a, op. cit.

¹²⁴ Batista & Vicente, 2011, op. cit.

¹²⁵ Batista & Vicente, 2011, op. cit.

¹²⁶ <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>. The weakness of this index is that it is a measure of perception, but in this case perception is what matters most. For comparison, the World Banks indicator of Governance: Control of Corruption yields a similar same ranking for Egypt. In MENA, several countries including Libya, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon rank worse than Egypt but other than Libya, the main migrant destination countries of Egyptians rank better than Egypt http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp.

Upholding the human right of and access to justice for irregular migrants

One of the most pressing problems surrounding irregular migration is how to ensure that the human rights of irregular migrants are upheld in a context where those migrants may be trying to avoid the institutional structures that surround them at all costs.

This context poses significant barriers for irregular migrants when it comes to accessing justice. How do you seek redress for crimes committed against you when you are yourself afraid of the police and other authorities because your documents are not in order? For such migrants, the lack of valid visas, residency documents or the right to work – and thus their eligibility for fines or deportation – are a major barrier to their recourse to justice, even for very heinous crimes committed against them. This is an underlying source of vulnerability and a major cause of many of the kinds of exploitation that they become subject to such as exploitative labor practices, poor conditions, the withholding of pay, physical abuse and worse.

Many such irregular migrants fear authority so greatly that they will continue to tolerate almost any degree of abuse and exploitation. They feel they have no choice – that they are obliged to live outside the law. Children are especially easy to manipulate; they are uninformed and often have very exaggerated perceptions of their situation. In some countries irregular migrants are quite correct that authorities would be unsympathetic to their claims because of their irregular status.

Many countries struggle with this problem and better policies in some now extend considerable protection to irregular migrants, avoiding unnecessary exacerbation of their fears and thus enabling them to seek justice. For example, a victim of forced prostitution needs to feel that if she escapes and goes to the police that she will be treated in such a way that her life will improve and her basic rights will be protected fairly, even if her immigration status and right to remain in the country is in question.

– Suggestions








- Design special programs to take advantage of the skills of Egyptian expatriates abroad with governance and transparent management practice in their professional areas.
- Promote greater civic participation of Egyptians abroad in Egyptian society in different sectors including as volunteers or advisors.
- Follow up soon with expatriates who register at their consulate for the first time, for instance to vote, perhaps inviting them to attend an Egyptian cultural or sporting event.
- Engage in activities which build cohesion among the migrant communities and Egyptian communities living in Egypt.
- Make particular use of online, virtual methods of communication as they are the area where the participation of Egypt's absent migrants is increasing and making them more 'present'.
- Support the government in upholding the basic human rights of migrants.

4.4 Food security and nutrition

Under this pillar of the UNDAF, there are two main interactions with migration: Firstly, as in so many other countries, agricultural restructuring combined with environmental factors is steadily reducing the agricultural labor force and pushing former farm workers to migrate. Secondly, households with members most prone to migrating to work are among the most vulnerable to food insecurity.

Table 5

Mainstreaming Migration into UN work on Basic Food Security and Nutrition

UNDAF Outcomes	Outcome 4.1: Relevant institutions/bodies develop and implement evidence based policies and joint sustainable intervention on food security, food safety and nutrition in coordinated manner.	Outcome 4.2: Food subsidy system delivers good quality food packages and in an efficient manner, to vulnerable and poor families and other targeted high risk populations.	Outcome 4.3: Vulnerable people, especially women and children, consume adequate, healthy and nutritious food.	Outcome 4.4: Efficient food production supply chains, including the adoption of good agricultural practices, are achieved.
Anticipated Results	<i>The GOE endorses and implements an integrated national long-term food security strategy and action plan.</i>	<i>Vulnerable people have access to better quality commodities in the food subsidy system.</i>	<i>Vulnerable populations have better access and awareness regarding adequate and nutritious foods.</i>	<i>Starting with better agricultural practices, food is produced and marketed more efficiently.</i>
Migration Relevance Rating				
Explanation for Rating	<p>Changes in agriculture spur migration away from the land, and continuing urbanization over the long term.</p> <p>Remittances, particularly from abroad, pay for a substantial proportion of food for millions of households.</p>	<p>Tensions arising between host communities and internal and international migrants due to scarce resources must be anticipated, managed and ameliorated.</p> <p>As migrant sending areas are the most food insecure, and remittances key to improving food access, further study can provide a wealth of useful data for food security program design.</p> <p>The food subsidy system should include vulnerable migrant communities as a target group.</p>	<p>Poorer households in the most food insecure areas – and without remittances – are the most vulnerable.</p> <p>Households could be helped to invest part of remittances in future food security.</p> <p>Migrant-sending, female headed households would be a good target group for raising nutritional awareness.</p>	<p>Egyptian expatriates abroad have skills in agriculture that could be applied in Egypt to improving practices, especially on small farms.</p> <p>Agricultural transformation will continue to underlay millions of Egyptians leaving the land and policy in many areas including agriculture, urbanization and basic services must factor this in.</p>
	<p> Migration highly relevant to outcome and result.</p> <p> Migration somewhat relevant to outcome and result.</p> <p> Migration only a little relevant to outcome and result.</p>			

Agricultural restructuring, environmental change and migration

Ninety-seven per cent of Egypt's population is concentrated on just four per cent of its territory – the irrigable area and coastal towns, within which the population density is about 1,500 persons per square kilometer – or triple that of the Netherlands.

About half Egypt's population therefore lives in the Nile River Delta, mostly the lower parts closest to the sea; a quarter or so lives in Cairo, where the Nile River Valley reaches the Delta and most of the rest live upriver in Upper Egypt or in a few coastal towns.

Ninety-five per cent of Egypt's fresh water supply comes from the Nile River (about 60 cubic kilometers of water per year), of which 80 per cent is used for irrigation. Between a quarter and a third of the labor force is still engaged in agriculture but produces a much smaller share of GDP. Four farms out of five are of less than two hectares.

With little rain, 95 per cent of land is fully irrigated but with low efficiency. Much of the irrigation water that drains off the land is re-used, supplementing those 60km³ by another 20 km³. These and other practices have caused the majority of land to become seriously salty or water logged, reducing productivity and thus Egypt's overall GDP by over two per cent.¹²⁷

The small scale of most farms currently prohibits costlier technology such as efficient irrigation equipment, thus the trend is towards commercialized farming and decreasing labor requirements. Farm work has already ended for large numbers, especially in the Delta, while others are selling their land. Opportunities for employment abroad in agriculture are also declining for similar reasons, thus some farm workers no longer find such work at home nor abroad.

As this process continues in stops and starts, millions more will be leaving farm work and agricultural areas in search of new livelihoods in towns and cities. It is often older workers who lose their jobs and they have a hard time finding new ones. Many have paid to be smuggled into Libya to work.

Urban expansion is another factor in loss of farm land, ironically displacing rural inhabitants into the very city – Cairo or Alexandria – that absorbed their land and thus further fueling the expansion. Such households can be 'doubly displaced' – obliged to move within Egypt to search for a new livelihood and services, and also obliged to see one of their members off to work abroad.

During the large scale return of labor migrants from Libya, the numbers living in farm households rose, and the slowdown and increased unemployment in Egypt the last several years also appears to have increased the numbers moving back to rural areas, especially in Upper Egypt. Such areas are functioning as labor reservoirs from which more labor is willingly supplied whenever enough jobs can be had.

Research should be conducted into how Egyptian expatriate returnees who have worked abroad in the agriculture sector can have an impact on farm practice in Egypt after their return. Visits or virtual support from Egyptian agriculturalists still abroad could help smaller scale farms achieve greater efficiency, for instance with improved but inexpensive irrigation practices.



Nile River Delta and Nile Valley

Google Earth

¹²⁷ Verner (ed) 2012, op. cit.

Food security and migrants' households

Beyond the links between agriculture and migration discussed above, there is another strong geographical correlation between food insecurity and labor migration, as both are strongly linked to poverty.¹²⁸ During the Libyan war, when hundreds of thousands of Egyptian migrants fled and returned home to Upper Egypt, many received food through the World Food Program. Their household had simultaneously lost its foreign income and gained one more mouth to feed.¹²⁹

Migrant remittances and the household contain a wealth of information to inform the development of programs aimed at reducing food insecurity. Migration abroad by a member more than doubles household income on average, and thus nearly doubles expenditure on food. Egyptian households spend only a gently declining share of their total income on food as income increases. For instance in 2010/11, while the poorest quintile spent more than 49 per cent of their income on food, the richest quintile still spent 33 per cent.¹³⁰ It is important to keep in mind that 2/3 of households that are therefore able to double their food expenditure with remittances are female headed.

Food subsidies in Egypt are one of the country's most critical macroeconomic issues and a big slice of GDP as they are mainly untargeted. As the very poorest households can spend as much as 60 per cent of income on food, they do depend considerably on the subsidies. Bread subsidies alone are equal to roughly two per cent of GDP.¹³¹ The income expenditure patterns of households receiving remittances versus non-migrant households should be studied to understand what it takes to improve nutrition and access to food.

– Suggestions

- Accelerate work to enhance the technology and crop varieties for irrigating with salty and brackish water and thus mitigate these effects and the additional push to migration they cause.¹³²
- Research and promote techniques that could improve efficiency on small scale farms in order to reduce the push off the land, at least while alternatives remain limited.
- Develop initiatives for the reskilling of internal migrants who are moving from rural to urban environments.
- Study what practices have changed on farms where a household member gained experience in agriculture abroad and then returned, to understand the potential for expatriates to promote improvements.
- Link up Egyptian expatriates abroad who have experience in more technologically advanced agriculture to programs that promote improvements in methods on small scale farms.
- Study in more detail the expenditure patterns of households with and without remittances in order to better understand how to increase long term food security.
- Include migrants inside Egypt as a target group for all food security planning and subsidy targeting.
- Target households in poorer areas with high migration rates in nutritional education campaigns, as they would particularly benefit in deciding how to spend remittances on food as well as when their remittances are delayed or interrupted.

¹²⁸ A clear map of food insecurity, with Governates in red and green, is found in WFP, 2009, op. cit.

¹²⁹ Interview with Ms. Rukia Yacoub, Deputy Country Director WFP, 29 January 2013.

¹³⁰ IOM, 2010b, op. cit.




¹³¹ <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2011/02/18/9009/making-egypt-more-food-secure/>




¹³² See EEAA, 2010. Egypt's Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cairo: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency for work already begun on this

4.5 Environment and natural resource management

In this last of the five pillars of the UN Framework, migration is examined as particularly relevant in two ways: Firstly, there are the consequences of migration induced by environmental change and natural disasters – on migrants, vulnerable communities and growing cities. Secondly, planned migration may be one means of adapting to the effects of environmental deterioration and its exacerbation by climate change.

Table 6
Mainstreaming Migration into UN work on Environment

UNDAF	Outcome 5.1:	Outcome 5.2:	Outcome 5.3:
Outcomes	The Government of Egypt has adopted and effectively implemented sound climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes focused on vulnerable sectors, groups and high risk geographic locations.	The Government of Egypt, private sector and civil society have complied with multi-lateral environmental agreements, adopted policies, and implemented operational measures towards a green and sustainable economy and society.	The Government of Egypt and local communities have strengthened mechanisms for sustainable management of, and access to, natural resources such as land, water and ecosystems.
Anticipated Results	<i>Adopted climate change adaptation policies and disaster risk reduction policies and action to reduce risks for different vulnerable sectors.</i>	<i>Less carbon intensive development.</i>	<i>Better and sustainable access to natural resources that support the livelihoods of local communities.</i>
Migration Relevance Rating			
Explanation for Rating	<p>Existing migration trends away from rural areas, particularly in the Nile Delta, will be increased by climate change as it exacerbates trends in agriculture which are already pushing considerable internal and outbound migration.</p> <p>Some locations will now inevitably be flooded by rising seas and millions will be displaced this century. Considerable mitigation work needs to be done to reduce the scale of displacement, along with planning and preparation for it.</p> <p>The effects of climate change and disasters are felt most by the poorest – already more likely to migrate and/or urbanize. Disaster risk reduction should focus on them more as many will lose their homes and livelihoods.</p> <p>Planned migration from high risk locations and for some of the most vulnerable groups are among the policies that can be applied.</p>	<p>Urbanization is a main factor in the carbon intensity of development. For example, two million persons commute daily to Cairo from satellite cities.</p> <p>Urban growth can both intensify carbon emissions per capita and reduce emissions per unit of GDP, depending on policy and other factors.</p> <p>The impact of migration on the urban demand for such services as water and sewage, electricity and solid waste management is significant and typically overstretches their supply.</p>	<p>Prospective or potential migrants are an important share of the target groups of all assistance with protecting agricultural land, urban planning, peri-urban development plans, sustainable water use – including improved irrigation methods – and other natural resource management, particularly near the coast.</p> <p>Tensions arising between host communities and internal and international migrants due to scarce resources must be anticipated, managed and ameliorated.</p>

-  Migration highly relevant to outcome and result.
-  Migration somewhat relevant to outcome and result.
-  Migration only a little relevant to outcome and result.

Environmentally induced migration and its consequences

The trend to intensification of agriculture and displacement of rural population discussed in the previous section is already being exacerbated by climate change and this will continue to worsen. The rising salinity of land is increasing most near the coast, where it is worsened by rising sea levels salting the water table.¹³³

Egypt – along with Bangladesh, Thailand and Nigeria, is one of the four countries with the most densely inhabited river deltas in the world. It is thus one of the most vulnerable places in the world to the effects of rising sea levels due to climate change. All of the land in the Nile River Delta within 30 or 40 km of the sea is less than two meters above sea level, sloping down to the coast. The wider, lower-lying parts of the Delta altogether are home to 1/3 of Egypt's population and produce half its crops.¹³⁴ Both corners of the Delta where it meets the sea are below sea level, in polygons 30 to 50 kilometers wide comprising about 2,000 square kilometers and with between a million and a million and a half residents. Between these very low lying areas and the sea are extremely delicate sand dune formations and this coastline is retreating in most places. Similar areas along the coast have long been inundated or are lagoons and this is growing.

The *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* has estimated that sea levels rose 22 centimeters in the 20th century and will rise up to 79 more in the 21st.¹³⁵ It is now inevitable that millions will be displaced by flooding this century. Alexandria, Egypt's second city, is expected to be 30 per cent flooded if sea levels rise another 50 cm, displacing another 1.5 million persons and this is not the worst case scenario.¹³⁶

Temperatures are also rising in the Arab region, with the work of the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* projecting rising temperatures and aridity throughout the Arab world. Even in places where rainfall is minimal, increased evaporation rates of irrigation water still exacerbate water shortages and salinization, further reducing yields.

Like most arid areas, Egypt is also susceptible to flash flooding when sudden rains quickly run off baked earth. In 2006, Nile River floods killed 600 people and left another 35,000 displaced.¹³⁷ Ironically, such increased flooding can occur simultaneously with decreased overall mean rainfall.

Planned migration as a response to environmental change

The Government of Egypt has been planning migration to specific areas for decades. Some 20 per cent of Egypt's 3.5 million cultivable hectares has been 'reclaimed' from the desert by installing irrigation farther east, south and west from the Nile River Delta, and farther 'inland' away from the banks of the river. Low elevations and flat land make this relatively feasible as it is based on pumping water.

Beginning in the 1970s, many graduates from university departments and others accepted land and migrated to their new communities. A variety of international development partners have assisted, the rationale being that not just more intense farming was needed but also a larger cultivated and populated area. Many have questioned the necessity and sustainability of the new lands but it is counter-argued that it is also unsustainable for Egypt's population to remain so concentrated on just four per cent of its land. Reclaiming the desert can be said to have been successful overall so far. For example, much of Egypt's waste water is now reused for irrigation of reforestation and other desert reclamation schemes.

Fieldwork in such a new village found the migrants who moved there were stressed by the lack of a sense of community and the lack of services such as schools, especially as their children's future was one of the main reasons for making the move in the first place. However, most felt that the move had benefited the family economically. Women had considerably expanded their role in

¹³³ Verner (ed), 2012, op. cit.

¹³⁴ El Raey, 2011. *Impact of Sea Level Rise on the Arab Region*, Cairo: s.n.

¹³⁵ Maslin, 2009, op. cit.

¹³⁶ Verner (ed), 2012, op. cit.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

agriculture after the move.¹³⁸ Government plans have for many years included more new cities in desert areas, to spread the population, and such efforts will likely continue, if intermittently.

Government-led construction of satellite cities around Cairo, to which millions have moved, was successful pro-active urban planning, although the greatest weakness was again the lack of adequate services like transport. Dozens of important neighborhoods in Cairo did still spring up spontaneously as the large numbers of arrivals more than overwhelmed planning efforts. This is not a situation unique to any country but rather a global phenomenon.¹³⁹

Famously, two million people now commute daily in and out of Cairo with its greater city population of around 20 million – by far the largest city in the Arab world. Migrants arriving in Cairo are more and more obliged to find housing in the most disaster prone, least clean and least safe areas but conditions would probably have been considerably worse for them had the Government not developed Cairo's satellite cities.

The impact on carbon emissions of migration to cities and new areas, planned and unplanned, is sometimes unclear. While larger cities are part of the growth that increases emissions per capita, good policies can succeed in helping to lessen emissions per unit of GDP.

– Suggestions

- While Egypt deserves some congratulations for its efforts to measure the risks and changes on its coastline and at least begin to mitigate them, such work requires urgent intensification despite the costs, particularly implementation of concrete disaster mitigation measures such as coastal defenses in Alexandria or Port Said.¹⁴⁰
- Disaster risk reduction efforts and disaster response plans will need to factor in considerable migration due to climate change, most likely in the millions of persons. It is important that people migrating to escape flooding or other environmental deterioration do not move into areas that are also disaster-prone, risking displacement again.
- Alexandria and several other coastal towns or cities need to plan now, well in advance, for the rising sea and flooding. This is an opportunity to improve urban planning rather than let it be driven by disaster, with an emphasis on planning far ahead for service provision in sustainable new areas. Cairo has successes with such planning that can be drawn on.
- National development planning also needs to take full account of this kind of internal migration. As such migration will be inevitable for many decades to come, planned migration can be an important part of the response and better than chaotic alternatives, especially if service provision can be provided for. In the better scenarios people on marginal or flooding land can move to areas with greater demand for workers in growth sectors, in a 'win/win' outcome for both migrants and Egypt's economy.

¹³⁸ Adriansen, H. K., 2009. Land Reclamation in Egypt: A Study of Life in the New Lands. *Geoforum*, Volume 40, pp. 664-674.

¹³⁹ Saunders, Doug 2011, *Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping our World*, London: William Heinemann and Random House.

¹⁴⁰ Agrawala, S. et al., 2004. *Development and Climate Change in Egypt*, s.l.: OECD.

5. Conclusions and major recommendations

Based on the literature regarding migration and development, the case of Egypt has been examined for the relevancy of 'mainstreaming' consideration of migration into wider development policy and programmes. Areas of work have been identified where a range of UN and other agencies can apply the analysis of migration and development in Egypt to their work. This process has provided a foundation for the inclusion of migration-related issues in the development of Egyptian government strategies, including macroeconomic, human capital development and industrialization strategies. Furthermore, in the context of the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, the national consultations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the establishment of a Regional Thematic Working Group for the Arab States on International Migration, this paper can feed into discussions on migration and development strategies at the regional level or at the level of the migration corridor and contribute to the harmonization of states' migration policies.

The lens selected was the *United Nations Development Assistance Framework* for Egypt and its 23 outcomes and results. In text and in tables the rationale was set forth for placing more emphasis on the importance of migration in development, with corresponding ratings. For 15 outcomes the migration and development nexus was rated highly relevant (🔴); for 7 somewhat relevant (🟡) and for one only a little relevant (🟢).

Migration on the scale of Egypt's – about 17 million migrants (emigrants, immigrants and internal migrants) in a population of 84 million – is indeed an enormously important cross-cutting consideration, neglected in the past, that must be mainstreamed into development strategy, policy, planning and programming in future.

The poor are most often the labor migrants and poverty reduction work cannot neglect this. There are also many skilled Egyptians abroad who would contribute more to Egypt's development were this facilitated. Women's roles are profoundly affected by migration, often positively but sometimes very negatively.

Migration is also one of the most serious challenges in access to health and as migration increases this issue becomes more pressing. When migrants are unhealthy, their migration is often a burden to their countries and their households. Remittances are strongly linked to education including higher enrolment of girls and boys in schools as well as access to higher education. Children are also among the most vulnerable of migrants themselves.

Many migrants today, given the internet and inexpensive telephone calls, are often still 'present' in their households. Such virtual members are influential participants in civic affairs with an interest in governance and culture and would be an important asset for Egypt if they were networked better.

Food insecurity and migration are very intensely linked by agricultural commercialization. Remittances and their use by poorer households to buy food and other consumption are an important dynamic to understand in pursuit of more targeted subsidies to the poor. Rural / urban migration can be expected to continue for decades.

Environmental exacerbation of these pressures to migrate out of many rural areas are already high in Egypt, centered around agriculture and water. Climate change will be exacerbating this through flooding and rising salinity of the land, displacing millions more.

However, in every one of these areas not enough is known to take full advantage of migration for development, nor to mitigate against migration's negative effects on some. This paper must therefore serve only to open lines of enquiry.

5.1 Major recommendations

(For both the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and international development partners and organizations, especially the UN Country Team.)

5.1.1 Mainstreaming migration at the policy and strategic level

- 1) Migration is a very cross-cutting, and multi-sector issue that requires establishment of a fully *Inter-ministerial Commission on Migration*. Such a *Commission* would lead efforts to mainstream migration into national development planning. It could be created through an expansion and renewal of the Higher Committee for Migration that currently exists. The Committee has been tasked with some important activities, including the establishment of vocational training centers and specialized courses for potential migrants before departure, during their stay abroad, and upon return. However, it is not fully inter-ministerial and in practice the activities of this body have been very limited.
- 2) Mainstreaming migration should include many individual sectors, from education to agriculture, from health to industry. It could also include relevant authorities with border management and control in their mandate. Each sector's individual efforts to mainstream migration should be shared and knit together with those in other sectors through the *Commission*.
- 3) The *Commission* should also promote regional level strategizing on migration, seeking to organize conferences of sending and receiving countries together, around common interests and perhaps single migration corridors – inviting multi-sector participation.
- 4) The *Commission* should lead the setting up of online networks for Egyptians in different professions, fostering their involvement in businesses or non-profit undertakings and especially knowledge transfers. The content and interaction in the networks should be distanced from Government direct involvement so as to be 'migrant owned'.
- 5) An inter-ministerial *National Focal Point for Migration* should be appointed, preferably with personal experience migrating abroad, to a) chair the *Commission*, b) act as an envoy to Egyptian migrants abroad and within the country, as well as to foreign migrants in Egypt, c) develop and fundraise for initiatives on migration and development and migrants rights, d) raise awareness of migration's benefits and issues, and e) participate at a senior level in key government strategy, planning and policy exercises to ensure the mainstreaming of migration
- 6) The *National Focal Point* and *Inter-ministerial Commission* should also ensure that Egypt is a leading contributor to the international discussion on migration and development including the coming *High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development* in 2013, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Cairo +20 in 2014 and the *Post-2015 Development Agenda*.
- 7) International and bilateral development organizations should support the efforts of a new *National Coordinator for Migration* and the *Inter-Ministerial Commission on Migration*, strongly respecting the new role and coordinating with it.
- 8) Within the development partner community, the UN Country Team is uniquely suited to addressing a widely cross-cutting issue such as migration and should assist to mainstream migration into development work in many different areas.
- 9) International and bilateral development organizations should organize themselves through a *Series of Thematic Meetings* on mainstreaming migration, aimed at gathering more policy strategic information on migration and development issues in different sectors, such as health, youth, employment, agriculture, tourism, micro-credit and so on.

- 10) Egypt should also study migration disaster scenarios and conduct risk analyses, as there is a history of wars and unrest in the region interrupting labor migration and causing repeated migration emergencies. Disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness practices are highly relevant and should be applied to future migration emergencies for such issues as transport, schooling and employment, for both Egyptians and foreign migrants alike. Such risk analyses should be conducted not only at the national but also the transnational level to develop joint preparedness practices with neighbouring countries.

5.1.2 Internal and external migrants as a target group

- 11) Universal access to health services by migrants will be an important topic and Egypt could both ensure that all those within Egypt are able to access its health system as well as call for greater access to health care for its citizens working abroad.
- 12) The rights of migrants, and particularly of victims of trafficking in and from Egypt, require an increasingly proactive defence, including especially training and awareness raising of many different types of officials, including border officials. The Government of Egypt should more proactively implement their law on combating human trafficking (Law 64) with a particular focus on ensuring increased access to justice for victims and provision of protection assistance, such as shelter and medical services.
- 13) The glaring disparities in the protection of human rights among different groups of migrants, combined with their swelling numbers, poses a growing challenge to the universality of human rights and will require a major international effort to turn around.
- 14) International and bilateral development could ensure that their programs do not exacerbate such disparities, and could increase support for defense of the worst victims, especially victims of human trafficking.

5.1.3 Engaging expatriates in socio-economic and political development

- 15) Egyptian consulates should do more 'soft outreach' to citizens abroad, through cultural and sporting activities, aiming to turn around the old, negative stereotype of their services. Such events could then provide a quick forum for raising awareness of new development networks.
- 16) Better utilization of remittances would be achieved by migrants themselves, voluntarily and privately, were they better informed about opportunities, including existing arrangements. Those ready to invest should be extended very practical assistance – similar to that given foreign investors in 'one stop shops' that deal with everything necessary in a single location.
- 17) Develop low cost, online networks of highly skilled Egyptians abroad, organized mainly by profession and thus in different sectors – such as agriculture. They would be the starting point to linking their contributions through short visits, virtually or longer stays after retirement. This could include supporting MSEs, government institutions, TVET or youth programmes with their specialized knowledge, fresh perspective and experiences of other countries.
- 18) By accessing these online networks, every member of the UN Country Team could leverage such expertise in their work and programs, for instance in marketing, manufacturing, IT, social assistance systems, financial regulation, police and trafficking in persons, health, education, agriculture or environment.

5.1.4 Egyptians as a target group, including potential migrants, returnees, and host communities

- 19) National education policy needs to aggressively raise curricula to international standards in those sectors with both high potential for working abroad and for domestic growth in jobs.

- 20) More work needs to be undertaken to identify actual and potential host communities that are at risk of being put under social and economic strain need as a result of migration flows, including return migrants. This process should feed into the development of preparedness activities to support host community livelihood activities and prevent tensions arising between those communities and the migrants that they host.

5.1.5 Improving migration-related research, analysis and data collection

- 21) More work needs to be done to generate data on migration and development in Egypt. There are only glaringly vague numbers on internal migrants and on foreign migrants within Egypt, and a paucity of data and analysis of migration and poverty.
- 22) Egypt should study *future* migration flows rather than just the recent past. Will migrants become one in four Egyptians? How fast will the cities grow? How fast will the Delta flood? How much of the workforce will be employed in agriculture in 10, 20 or 30 years? Will Egyptians maintain their share of the Gulf workforce and what will it take to do so? What are the minimum and maximum scenarios for each and what policies could make what difference? What are the migration disaster and migration emergency scenarios?
- 23) Migration needs to be studied more holistically and not segmented so much. In particular, migration abroad and internal migration need to be studied together, as they are two prongs on a single strategy. Far less is known about internal labor migration than international migration.
- 24) International and bilateral development organizations should support highly targeted, low cost, policy research on mainstreaming migration into development. For research to be highly cost-effective, it is important to identify the main policy questions to be answered *before* designing research. Examples include i) a study of internal migration based on identity cards' place of issue, ii) an interview-based study on how migration affects women's roles, iii) a micro study of the relationship between migration and access to health care in several small locations, and iv) more opportunistic surveys during migration emergencies such as was done during the Libyan war.

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