

Document of  
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003220

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(IBRD-72740)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 20.0 MILLION

TO THE

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

FOR A

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

December 29, 2014

Education Global Practice  
Djibouti, Egypt and Yemen Country Department  
Middle East and North Africa Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2014)

Currency Unit = Egyptian Pound (LE)

1.00 = US\$ .14

US\$ 1.00 = 7.15 LE

FISCAL YEAR: July 1- June 30

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BEIP	Basic Education Improvement Project	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
CAOM	Central Agency for Organization and Management	MENA	Middle East & North Africa Region
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	MISA	Ministry of Insurance & Social Affairs
CAT	Canadian Assistance Team	MOE	Ministry of Education
CCIMD	Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development	MOH	Ministry of Health
CDIST	Central Department for In-Service Training	MOSS	Ministry of Social Solidarity
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	NA	Not applicable
ECD	Early Childhood Development	NACE	National Advisory Council on Early Childhood Education
ECE	Early Childhood Education	NCB	National Competitive Bidding
ECEEP	Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project	NCCM	National Council on Childhood and Motherhood
EEP	Education Enhancement Program	NER	Net Enrollment Rate
EMIS	Education Management and Information System	NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan	PCC	Project Coordination Committee
FMAO	Financial Management Advisory Office	PIP	Project Implementation Plan
GAEB	General Authority for Education Buildings	PMT	Project Management Team
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	PPMU	Project Planning and Monitoring Unit
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate	PRP	Project Restructuring Paper
GPPMU	Governorate Project Planning and Monitoring Unit	QALP	Quality
GOE	Government of Egypt	QER	Quality Enhancement Review
HDI	Human Development Index	RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	SEEP	Secondary Education Enhancement Project
ISR	Implementation Status Report	TA	Technical Assistance
KG	Kindergarten	TOR	Terms of Reference
LAU	Loan Administrative Unit	WFP	World Food Program

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**EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF**  
**Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project**

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<b>A. Basic Information</b>			
Country:	Egypt, Arab Republic of	Project Name:	Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP)
Project ID:	P082952	L/C/TF Number(s):	IBRD-72740
ICR Date:	12/29/2014	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT
Original Total Commitment:	USD 20.00M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 19.25M
Revised Amount:	USD 19.25M		
<b>Environmental Category: C</b>			
<b>Implementing Agencies:</b> MINISTRY OF EDUCATION			
<b>Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:</b>			

<b>B. Key Dates</b>				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	05/21/2003	Effectiveness:	10/09/2005	10/09/2005
Appraisal:		Restructuring(s):		01/29/2010 08/09/2011
Approval:	02/15/2005	Mid-term Review:	05/31/2009	06/14/2009
		Closing:	12/31/2010	06/30/2014

<b>C. Ratings Summary</b>	
<b>C.1 Performance Rating by ICR</b>	
Outcomes:	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

<b>C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)</b>			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
<b>Overall Bank Performance:</b>	Moderately Satisfactory	<b>Overall Borrower Performance:</b>	Moderately Satisfactory

<b>C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>Implementation Performance</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>QAG Assessments (if any)</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Moderately Satisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		

<b>D. Sector and Theme Codes</b>		
	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Central government administration	2	2
Pre-primary education	98	98
<b>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Education for all	40	40
Education for the knowledge economy	20	20
Gender	20	20
Participation and civic engagement	20	20

<b>E. Bank Staff</b>		
<b>Positions</b>	<b>At ICR</b>	<b>At Approval</b>
Vice President:	Gerard A. Byam	Christiaan J. Poortman
Country Director:	Poonam Gupta	Mahmood A. Ayub
Practice Manager/Manager:	Harry Anthony Patrinos	Regina Maria Bendokat
Project Team Leader:	Dina N. Abu-Ghaida	Arun R. Joshi
ICR Team Leader:	Dina N. Abu-Ghaida	
ICR Primary Author:	Shahram Paksima	

## **F. Results Framework Analysis**

### **Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)**

To support the Arab Republic of Egypt in providing quality early childhood education that improves the school readiness of 4 and 5 year old children, particularly the disadvantaged.



**Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)**

To support the Arab Republic of Egypt to increase access to early childhood education of 4 and 5 year-old children, particularly the disadvantaged, and to equip KG classes with learning materials.

**(a) PDO Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	(Pre-Restructuring) 20% increase enrollment over baseline in KG1-2 of adequate quality in targeted areas			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	13%	33%	NA	NA
Date achieved	10/09/2005	10/09/2005		06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	(Post-Restructuring) Increase in KG1-2 enrollment by about 30,000 children in the facilities financed by Bank project			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA	30,000	35,823
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	(Post-Restructuring) New KG curriculum and educational materials developed and implemented in 18 governorates			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	18	18	18
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	(Post-Restructuring) Two thousand KG classrooms in targeted areas receive learning materials			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	2,000	2,000	1,762
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				

**(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	(Pre-Restructuring) 119,000 boys and girls reached by public KGs plus 192,000 boys and girls reached by NGO KGs			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	311,000	NA	NA
Date achieved	10/09/2005	10/09/2005		06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	(Post-Restructuring) Number of new public KG classrooms build in targeted areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA	750	820
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	(Post-Restructuring) Number of NGOs run KG classrooms refurbished in targeted areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA	500	523
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	2,000 new KG learning materials (Packets) produced			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA	2,000	1,762
Date achieved	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	01/29/2010	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)				

## G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	04/25/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/15/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.10
3	06/22/2006	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.10
4	12/22/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.10
5	06/02/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.10
6	12/28/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.10
7	06/28/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	2.06
8	12/24/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.06
9	10/26/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	5.81
10	05/05/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.35
11	01/13/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.79
12	07/05/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	8.99
13	02/16/2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	9.58
14	07/09/2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	12.43
15	01/06/2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	12.90
16	12/15/2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	16.50
17	06/25/2014	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	17.26


## H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
01/29/2010	Y	MS	MU	7.17	5 Reasons for Restructuring: (i) Original environment misclassification as “Category C” instead of “Category B”; (ii) Revision of PDO to better align with Bank financing, modification of results framework accordingly; (iii) Project expansion from 18 to 19 governorates, 152 to 165

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
					districts; (iv) change in fixed amount per new classroom from LE100,000 to LE150,000 and re-allocation of \$550,000; and (v) Extension of implementation period.
08/09/2011		MS	MS	8.99	(i) extended the project Closing Date to June 30, 2014 to account for unforeseen implementation delays; and (ii) to allow for the use of a national competitive bidding procurement process to provide more flexibility vis-à-vis the use of local procurement guidelines, yet consistent with those of the Bank.

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below:	
	<b>Outcome Ratings</b>
<b>Against Original PDO/Targets</b>	Satisfactory
<b>Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets</b>	Moderately Satisfactory
<b>Overall (weighted) rating</b>	Moderately Satisfactory

## I. Disbursement Profile





## **1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design**

### **1.1 Context at Appraisal**

#### **Country and Sector Issues**

1. At appraisal, the Government of Egypt (GOE) had in place a framework in its 20-year national development plan for improving human development. This included a commitment to improving access to and the quality of education from preschool to the tertiary level. This was reflected in increased coverage at all educational levels: net enrollment rates (NER) for primary education (grades 1-5), the preparatory level (grades 6-8), and the secondary level (grades 9-12) were 97 percent, 74 percent, and 65 percent, respectively.<sup>1</sup> Progress had been made in narrowing regional and gender disparities, reducing class size, eliminating multiple shifts, increasing class instructional time and introducing technology. There was evidence of declining repetition and dropout rates. TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) results (2003) indicated improved science and mathematics achievement among middle school students who scored higher than students from comparable middle-income countries, such as Chile or Indonesia.

2. Although Egypt made substantial progress in educational development, it faced several challenges. As described in the Bank's Education Sector Review (2002) and the GOE's National Educational Standards Initiative (2003), these included: (i) the need to further improve access and equity by ensuring that children, especially girls, from poor households were adequately prepared to enroll and remain in school; (ii) the need to improve and maintain higher standards in teaching, curriculum and learning outcomes from early childhood education (ECE)<sup>2</sup> to university to create the knowledge and problem-solving skills required to improve Egypt's global competitiveness; (iii) the need to strengthen management at the community level and various levels in the Ministry of Education (MOE) to provide support and guidance to the education process; and (iv) the need to increase efficiency in the use of resources.

#### ***Issues in the Early Childhood Education sub-Sector***

3. Recognizing the economic benefits of ECE programs for disadvantaged children, their families and society, GOE made a commitment to ECE as an early intervention to reach vulnerable and disadvantaged children and increase investment in basic and secondary education.<sup>3</sup> The ECE gross enrollment rate (GER) was estimated at only 13 percent (354,000 total enrollees) for the 2000/01 school year with near gender parity—when aggregated at the national level—of 12.8 percent for girls and 13.5 percent for

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<sup>1</sup> More recent figures (from WB Edstats) confirm this positive trend: while NER stands at 95.1% for primary (2011), it has risen to 82.5% for secondary (2012).

<sup>2</sup> Preparatory education/ socialization for children who are 4-5 year olds (also known and used interchangeably as KG1 and KG2)

<sup>3</sup> Details reflected in the Letter of Sector Policy.

boys. This reflected an increase in ECE GER since 1991, a trend that had recently accelerated. Children from the urban centers of Cairo, Giza and Alexandria no longer dominated ECE enrollment nationally, having dropped from 66 percent of the total in 1993 to 49 percent in 1999<sup>4</sup>. ECE provision was divided almost evenly between the public and private/non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors.

4. Access to ECE programs was not universal, however, with poorer populations less likely to be enrolled. This was attributable to both supply and demand issues given a lack of ECE services and prohibitive cost, respectively. Rural-urban disparities in enrollment can be large. In poor rural governorates enrollment was approximately ten percent of eligible children compared to wealthier urban governorates where enrollment ranged from 25 to 42 percent. In all targeted governorates, which represent disaggregated units of analysis, enrolment in kindergarten (KG) programs was lower for girls than boys and the gender parity evident in the nationally aggregated data disappears.

5. Challenges to increasing access to ECE programs included: (i) the need to better target the public construction program implemented by the General Authority for Educational Buildings (GAEB) to provide additional ECE facilities; (ii) the need to reach larger numbers of children through cost-effective NGO-operated programs; and (iii) the need to reduce demand-side constraints by providing funding and technical assistance (TA) to local communities and NGOs to address community-specific constraints and promote the implementation of policies to support poor families. The quality of ECE programs in Egypt was inconsistent and did not conform to established international standards. This was attributable to three factors: (i) teachers' use of outdated teaching methods emphasizing rote learning; (ii) classrooms with limited resources and materials that did not encourage active learning; and (iii) inadequate links between ECE and nutrition and health programs, including inadequate attention to children with disabilities. Challenges to improving ECE programs' quality included: (i) the need to revise curriculum and teacher training for more child-centered, interactive teaching-learning approaches; and (ii) the need for a targeted and sustainable feeding program for malnourished four- and five-year olds with links to community health and nutrition programs, including support for disabled children.

6. MOE's management and technical capacities, particularly at the ECE level, for planning and policy formulation, project management and monitoring and evaluation needed strengthening<sup>5</sup>. A system to implement KG standards to increase uniformity in the quality of ECE programs and TA to strengthen MOE's capacity to manage ECE programs were needed. Capacity building among district-level supervisors and others working at the community level were also required to mobilize communities for greater participation in ECE programs.

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<sup>4</sup> World Bank 2002

<sup>5</sup> Institutional Assessment, 2004



## **Rationale for Bank involvement**

7. The Bank's rationale for involvement in ECE in Egypt stemmed from: (i) GOE's strong commitment to ECE reform, including the allocation of substantial resources to the ECE sector; (ii) a long and successful track record of collaboration between GOE and the Bank in the education sector; and (iii) the Bank's confidence in being able to successfully leverage its own financial resources combined with TA from other development partners, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the World Food Program (WFP).

## **Higher level objectives to which the project contributed**

8. ECEEP supported GOE's human development goals and MOE's specific ECE goals to expand coverage from 13 to 60 percent by 2010 – a goal that was not achieved, however. In addition to these goals in access, it supported GOE's efforts to address multi-faceted quality and capacity challenges in ECE for which a comprehensive approach was required to promote links and synergies between interventions. The project was designed to lay the groundwork for ECE reform and commensurate benefits at the primary education level. It aimed to build on innovative and successful education provision models implemented in Egypt, as well as the strengths and comparative advantages of development partners, including the World Bank, CIDA, and WFP.

9. ECEEP supported the Bank's strategy in Egypt. Objectives of the Egypt Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) at the time<sup>6</sup> included reducing poverty and unemployment through: (i) upgrading human capital; (ii) removing obstacles to private sector development; and (iii) addressing critical policy issues in agriculture and water resource management. It directly supported the attainment of the first objective through the provision of ECE programs of adequate quality.

10. ECEEP was also consistent with the MENA Regional Strategy<sup>7</sup> which included education as a priority area of engagement for the Bank. It also built on the recommendations of the 2002 ECE Strategic Options paper prepared by the Bank and endorsed by GOE.

## **1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)**

11. Page 5 of the PAD stated the ECEEP's original PDO was:

*“To support the Arab Republic of Egypt in providing quality early childhood education that improves the school readiness of 4 and 5 year old children, particularly the disadvantaged.”*

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<sup>6</sup> June 2001

<sup>7</sup> 2002

12. The key PDO-level indicator for the project was:

*“A 20 percent increase in enrollment over baseline in KG1-2 of adequate quality in targeted areas (with particular emphasis on those who are disadvantaged by gender, poverty and disability).”*

13. As per the Results Framework and figures from the ‘Arrangements for Results Monitoring’ table on page 29 of Annex III, project progress would be monitored against figures in the following table:

**Table 1 (a): Original PDO-level Indicator**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline 2005</b>	<b>Target (2010)</b>
Enrollment in KG1-2 of adequate quality in targeted areas	13%	33%

**1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification**

14. As per Table 1 on page 6 of the January 2010 Project Restructuring Paper (PRP), the revised PDO increased focus on access to early childhood education, rather than school readiness, plus the availability of KG classes, both of which were seen to be more in-line with the Bank’s financing of the project which focused on school construction and renovation of government- and NGO-run kindergarten facilities and the provision of learning packets. The revised PDO was:

*“To support the Arab Republic of Egypt to increase access to early childhood education of 4 and 5 year-old children, particularly the disadvantaged, and to equip KG classes with learning materials”.*

15. To accurately assess impact and focus project M&E on Bank-financing of the project, revised key PDO-level indicators for the project were modified from baseline and target percentages of children enrolled in KG 1-2 to absolute numbers of children enrolled and learning packets delivered in Bank-financed KG classes in target areas:

- (i) Increase in KG1-2 enrollment by about 30,000 children in the facilities financed by the Bank Project; and*
- (ii) Two thousand KG classrooms in targeted areas receive learning materials.*

16. Per Annex 1 on page 11 of the PRP, project progress against revised key PDO-level indicators would be monitored according to the figures in the following table:

**Table 1 (b): Revised PDO-level Indicators**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline 2005</b>	<b>Year 4</b>	<b>Year 5</b>	<b>Year 6</b>	<b>Year 7</b>	<b>Target (2012)</b>
Number of newly enrolled children	0	7,500	17,000	24,000	30,000	30,000
Number of learning materials (packets) distributed	0	0	1,000	1,500	2,000	2,000

17. Per pages 5 and 6 of the PRP, there were five reasons for restructuring the project and revising the PDO and its key indicators:

- (i) Given the project’s significant focus on construction of KG classrooms in new schools, the original environmental classification was incorrectly rated as ‘Category C’ instead of ‘B’ and, subsequently, required an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF). All bidding processes and construction activities were halted until the Bank cleared these documents and confirmed compliance with them.
- (ii) The PDO and its key indicators needed to be revised for closer alignment to anticipated access-related outcomes of Bank-funded project activities, rather than school readiness-related activities funded by project co-financiers.
- (iii) The project expanded from 18 to 19 governorates and 152 to 165 districts to include locations which met its poverty selection criteria. Selection of the new governorate and districts was guided by the latest Bank report No. 39885-EGT ‘*Arab Republic of Egypt - Poverty Assessment Update*’ dated September 16, 2006.
- (iv) The project had to compensate for significant cost escalations for civil works due to increased steel and cement prices. The Bank and GOE agreed that the fixed amount to be reimbursed for each new KG classroom built by GAEB and financed by the Bank would be increased from LE100,000 to LE150,000<sup>8</sup>. To partially cover the increase, US\$550,000 was reallocated from the unallocated Category 5 to Category 1 for civil works and public KGs.
- (v) The project’s implementation period needed to be extended given initial start-up delays owing to an agreement between MOE and the Bank to allow longer processing time for the CIDA grant to support quality and capacity building activities. This ensured that project components could commence together so that the newly-built classes would have trained teachers, equipment and teaching materials developed under the project.

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<sup>8</sup> As a result of this change, the number of new KG classrooms to be constructed was revised down from 994 to 750.

## 1.4 Main Beneficiaries

18. The primary project beneficiaries under the originally designed project were: (i) pre-school aged children (KG 1-2) in 18 economically disadvantaged governorates and 152 districts who benefitted from new or upgraded kindergarten classrooms, learning materials, and school feeding programs; (ii) government and NGO KG teachers who benefitted from new classrooms, professional development training and/or a new KG curriculum and standards; (iii) villagers and urban dwellers in disadvantaged communities who benefitted from new or upgraded KG classrooms and higher quality KG provision; (iv) leadership and members of the MOE KG Department who benefitted from a newly developed ECE curriculum and standards; and (v) governorate-based teacher training staff who benefitted from professional development training on the new curriculum and standards and training of trainer (TOT) skills.

19. Under the restructured project, the original group of primary beneficiaries was expanded to those in the same categories from an additional governorate and 13 additional districts, from 152 to 165 districts in total.

## 1.5 Original Components *(as approved)*

20. The original project had three main components:

21. **Component 1 - Increase Access (US\$74.39 million).** As the main Bank-financed part of the project, this component provided funding to: (i) construct and maintain new public KG classrooms; (ii) expand provision of KG through the renovation of MISA-registered KGs and community provided facilities; and (iii) address demand-side constraints, including annual pre-school fees and lack of awareness of ECE which limit the ability of disadvantaged families to send their children to KG1-2.

22. **Component 2 – Improve Quality (US\$28.45 million).** This component supported: (i) development of a child-centered ECE curriculum and educational materials based on national standards; (ii) development and delivery of an effective teacher training program; and (iii) links between nutrition and health and ECE programs.

23. **Component 3 - Build Capacity (US\$5.77 million).** Although Bank financing was not involved at all, this component sought to build capacity in national and regional MOE departments to implement and manage KG Standards and ECE policy reforms by: (i) developing a system to implement KG standards; and (ii) providing technical assistance and training for MOE departments.

## 1.6 Revised Components

24. As restructuring did not result in changes to project activities, the original project components were not revised.

## 1.7 Other significant changes

25. The project became effective on October 9, 2005. The Bank and MOE decided to delay the start of Bank-financed construction activities for nearly two years to allow for the processing and mobilization of co-financing from CIDA and WFP. This was done so that the timing of quality-related and capacity building activities under Components 2 and 3 would be better coordinated with the construction of new and refurbished pre-school classrooms.

26. A Level 1 restructuring was approved on November 2, 2009. This included: (i) re-assignment of the project's environmental classification from Category 'C' to the more stringent Category 'B', necessitating the development of an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF); (ii) revision of the PDO and PDO-level and Intermediate Outcome Indicators to more accurately reflect the aims of the Bank-financed activities to increase pre-school access; (iii) the addition of one governorate and 13 districts for coverage under the project; (iv) an escalation in the cost of civil works through establishment of a new higher fixed amount to be reimbursed for each new KG classroom constructed and reallocation of US\$550,000 from the 'unallocated' Category 5 to Category 1, 'civil works, Public KGs'.<sup>9</sup>; and (v) extension of the original project Closing Date by 18 months from December 31, 2010 to June 30, 2012.

27. An amendment to the Loan Agreement was approved on August 9, 2011 which: (i) extended the project Closing Date to June 30, 2014 to account for unforeseen implementation delays; and (ii) to allow for the use of a national competitive bidding procurement process to provide more flexibility vis-à-vis the use of local procurement guidelines, yet consistent with those of the Bank.

## 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

### 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

28. **Project Preparation:** The Bank team prepared, appraised and approved the project in twenty months as a result of the Bank's prior experience in Egypt with the Secondary Education Enhancement Project (SEEP) and other school construction and education sector projects. Delays in the start of several non-Bank financed project activities, particularly under Components 2 and 3, suggest that the Bank perhaps should have partially initiated construction activities earlier, or possibly pursued other approaches to reduce the eventual delay instead of completely stopping project activities until the project's co-financing was fully in place. Although the project eventually achieved or exceeded the vast majority of its output and outcome targets, CIDA's delay in securing its financing cost the project time and delayed implementation of Bank-financed activities by approximately two years.

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<sup>9</sup> As a result of this change, the number of new KG classrooms to be constructed was revised down from 994 to 750.

29. The technical team which prepared and appraised the project had most of the necessary experience and skill across a wide range of professional and technical areas which were required given the project's focus, scope and complexity. This included specialists in education, school construction, financial management and procurement. Annex 12 from the PAD describes a variety of sector studies carried out and efforts to incorporate documents and lessons learned from previous and ongoing education and human development projects in Egypt, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea and Kenya to help conceptualize the project.

30. The subsequent Level 1 project restructuring in 2010 to change the project's safeguards category from 'C' to 'B', however, suggests that the preparation team may have lacked an experienced safeguards specialist. This appears to have been an important oversight given that the majority of Bank and non-Bank financing was for school construction. As a result, the ESMP and RPF were not completed until after the start of the project, adding to cumulative project delays over time.

31. While the project's original risk assessment may not have anticipated Egypt's political instability from 2011 onward and how it would impact project implementation, the project preparation team identified the risk of the KG Department's leadership appointments based on seniority as only 'high' (PAD, pg. 13). In fact, there was no such assessment of appointment-related risks, nor mitigation measures to address potential frequent changes in senior MOE and ECEEP project leadership. The project team should likely have accounted for these given the Bank's previous and lengthy experience with MOE. These would later be cited by Bank, ECEEP and GAEB staff as significant factors which led to project delays and suggests overly optimistic and unrealistic expectations on the part of the preparation team.

32. **Project Design:** The project's design was closely aligned to GOE's plans for expansion of pre-primary education and the Bank CAS in the early 2000s, both of which supported the need for increased and more equitable access to education and pre-schooling, developing human resources and improving public sector governance and service delivery. The results framework for the Bank-financed portion of the project included an appropriate mix of intermediate outcomes and overarching PDO-level indicators to measure progress. This provided Bank staff with sound metrics upon which to monitor project performance and, over time, ensure that the project's outcomes supported progress toward the country's ECE-related goals. This increased the project's relevance and likelihood of sustainability, evidenced by the fact that GOE earmarked an unprecedented amount of government funding for the project.

33. The project's design was based on earlier successful Bank projects in the education sector in Egypt and elsewhere. ECEEP incorporated similar implementation structures and mechanisms, including joint coordination and implementation arrangements between the MOE and GAEB teams, especially at the governorate level, with good communication, direction, and follow up from national-level MOE and GAEB staff.

34. The need for project restructuring, including revision of the original PDO and increased specification of its indicators, plus the need for multiple project extensions, suggests three fundamental shortcomings in the original project design. First, the PDO was initially described in terms of improvements to children's school readiness, whereas the Bank-financed portion focused primarily on physical expansion of the ECE sector. Second, the Project Implementation Plan (PIP,) which included a rigid construction rollout plan in six governorates for Years 1 and 2, another six governorates in Years 3 and 4, and a final six during the last year of the original project, was not in-line with the local realities which required a high degree of flexibility. The plan did not account for earlier experience under SEEP which called for greater adaptability in accordance with dynamic local conditions. Combined, these factors slowed project progress and constricted ECEEP and Bank leadership in adapting to political and implementation-related challenges as they arose. Third, despite MOE's earlier success in working with GAEB counterparts at the central, governorate and district levels under SEEP, neither MOE nor GAEB had substantial experience working with counterparts in MISA<sup>10</sup>. This led to a lack of cooperation under ECEEP at the governorate and district levels and, in turn, delays in the initial identification and approval of NGO-sponsored KG schools and classrooms selected for renovation. While this was appropriately identified as a high risk in the PAD, given MISA's significant role in implementing a major project sub-component and its relative lack of prior experience in dealing with MOE on classroom renovation projects, preparation should have included a more thorough and detailed discussion of this collaboration.

35. **Quality at Entry:** The project went through a Quality Enhancement Review (QER) in February of 2004 which recommended: (i) a clearer description of the instructional model, under the 'Quality' component; (ii) taking a multi-sectoral approach to ECE sector development, rather than focusing only on education issues given the lack of collaboration between MOE and MISA for addressing the developmental challenges of a solid ECD program, under 'Integration'; and (iii) that GOE focus on funding, regulating, supporting and informing, rather than the direct delivery of services and that the roles of districts and governorates be clarified to enhance sustainability and success of the project, under 'Governance'.

36. The MOE, Bank and CIDA project teams' discussions and decision-making concerning delays in the start of most project activities until CIDA funding was in place, aimed at the more effective harmonization of project activities, suggests that the project team fully implemented the second QER recommendation. This allowed them to work more effectively in supporting MOE and GAEB's efforts to better engage MISA counterparts at the central, governorate and district levels. It also allowed the MOE project teams to adjust and adapt the non-Bank financed access, quality, and capacity building activities under Components 1, 2, and 3 to bring them further in-line with realities on the ground. Given a longstanding lack of ECE provision in Egypt, the reality was, and remains, that GOE must play a more prominent role in expanding ECE

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<sup>10</sup> Later renamed the Ministry of Social Solidarity, or MOSS.

provision and access to KG to eventually move toward a support and oversight role for the sector.

## **2.2 Implementation**

37. Project implementation was affected by a number of internal and external factors over the life of the project. These contributed to initial and subsequent project delays, the need for the Level 1 restructuring and the other changes discussed above. Implementation was successful overall, but was uneven in its pace as a result of both project-related and political factors.

38. There were four main reasons for delays in implementation. A first set of implementation delays was related to the start of project activities. On the donor financing side, CIDA took approximately two years longer than expected after the project started to mobilize its financing. The Bank and MOE decided to delay Bank-financed school construction, while MOE-funded construction continued, until CIDA financing for capacity building activities was in place. Although Bank financing—under Components 1 and 2—mainly funded construction of new and renovated KG classrooms and creation of learning materials, the overall ECEEP project was designed holistically with co-financing in mind in order to leverage and align activities related to improved ECE access, quality, and institutional capacity. As the PRP, QER and ISRs indicate, this appears to have been a good decision from a technical perspective as it allowed for more effective sequencing of the teacher training and preparation activities from Components 2 (Improving Quality) and Component 3 (Capacity Building) in newly built and renovated KG classrooms. However, this contributed to the need for later extensions. On the government side, coordination between the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) and MOE for implementing project activities proved to be more difficult than initially expected as their functionaries in governorates and districts lacked experience in the joint implementation of activities.

39. The second major source of implementation delays was the initial misclassification of the project's environmental safeguard category and subsequent Level 1 restructuring. As per the amendment document, this halted all bidding processes for school construction and led to a six-month delay.

40. The third main source of implementation challenges came from the unanticipated, yet frequent, political turmoil and instability starting in the late 2000s. In addition to the 'Arab Spring' revolution of January 2011, frequent changes in government and civil and political upheaval were reported by numerous project personnel at all levels, including Bank MOE, ECEEP, GAEB, MOE KG department staff, as impeding the timely completion of project activities. A deteriorating security situation in many governorates and districts impeded the implementation of project activities. For example, project staff often could not access school construction sites or the supply of critical construction materials was disrupted.



41. Political instability directly contributed to the fourth main source of implementation delay which was frequent leadership changes in the ECEEP project directorship and, to a lesser degree, in GAEB. The ECEEP directorship changed nine times and GAEB's leadership changed four times. Although the project teams for both ECEEP and GAEB were relatively stable throughout, each change led to frequent short-term, but cumulatively large delays in the granting of project activity and procurement approvals and highly centralized tendering processes.

42. The Bank conducted regular supervision missions throughout the project period and worked intensively with government and co-financing development partners at the central, governorate and district levels to address implementation delays and identify solutions to avert them. For example, during the majority of the 2010-2013 period when political instability and insecurity were at their height, the Cairo-based TTL frequently visited project sites with ECEEP, GAEB, KG Department and other project counterparts. Similarly, the Bank's Cairo-based Financial Management and Procurement Specialists provided regular formal and informal support to help ECEEP and central GAEB staff adapt to the challenging implementation context while adhering to Bank fiduciary requirements. Although the project left US\$.7 million in project funds undisbursed, the combined efforts of Bank, ECEEP and GAEB teams at all administrative levels resulted in the achievement of nearly all intermediate outcome targets and the full achievement of PDO-level targets.

### **2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization**

43. **M&E Design.** The original project results framework as described in the PAD was developed to measure progress toward achieving intermediate and overall project objectives according to the following three operational themes: (i) gender equality; (ii) community participation; and (iii) donor harmonization.<sup>11</sup> As evidenced through revision of the PDO and Intermediate Outcome-level indicators during the Level 1 restructuring, the initial indicator descriptions which focused on school readiness were designed to capture the holistic nature of the joint funding with CIDA and WFP and to reflect the broader project's aims to improve ECE access, quality, and system capacity. However, these indicators did not adequately reflect the more specific outcomes of the project's activities financed by the Bank, including the construction and renovation of schools and classrooms for increased access to early childhood education and the provision of learning materials. Nonetheless, according to agreements described in the PAD<sup>12</sup>, the Bank, CIDA and WFP agreed to harmonize project M&E to maximize project coherence and minimize reporting burden. Responsibility for data collection and reporting was therefore originally assigned to the central MOE KG Department using added features introduced to the main EMIS system for capturing ECE-related data. The M&E design

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<sup>11</sup> The Results Framework and Monitoring section of the PAD (Annex 3) also states the project intended to build the MOE's capacity for M&E. However, this was never formally included in any of the project's intermediate outcomes and subsequently doesn't appear to have factored into any significant project activities.

<sup>12</sup> Page 9.

also included joint annual or semi-annual progress reviews among development partners and ECEEP, including submission to the Bank of semi-annual progress reports.

44. **M&E Implementation and Utilization.** Indicators in the results framework were monitored and reported on during implementation. Despite initial agreement that MOE's KG Department would be responsible for reporting on project outcomes through use of the EMIS, for most of the project the ECEEP and GAEB teams monitored and reported on intermediate project outcomes to the Bank TTL. This was due to three reasons. First, M&E capacity in the KG department was initially lower than required. Second, outputs related to many of the restructured intermediate outcome indicators, such as the construction and renovation of new classrooms, the number of ECE learning packets and those related to NGO- and community-run KGs, were not adequately and expediently captured through MOE's EMIS. Consequently, their measurement relied on GAEB's MIS and reporting system to track intermediate outputs and outcomes. Third, increasingly persistent political instability during the project's final years made the reliability of EMIS information uncertain. This necessitated more direct communication between ECEEP, GAEB, Bank staff and project beneficiaries in the governorates and districts.

45. For much of the project supervision up to late 2013, figures for KG enrollment were reported by ECEEP and Bank teams according to estimates based on nationally accepted averages of the number of children per KG classroom. The average number of children per classroom, 35, was multiplied by the GAEB-confirmed number of new and renovated classrooms as a proxy for actual KG enrollment. As highlighted by the October 2013 mission's ISR, assessment of the PDO indicator and the project's pending closing were of such importance that enrollment figures needed to be more precisely and accurately accounted for. With the improving security situation in project locations, the Bank and ECEEP team agreed to start using MOE EMIS figures which yielded lower than expected enrollments and the project's subsequent June 25, 2014 Development Outcome downgrading to "Moderately Unsatisfactory". However, when the MOE EMIS data was more carefully examined, it exhibited its own problems as many schools did not input their enrollment data into the EMIS and it became apparent that NGO-run schools were excluded. As a result, the Bank and ECEEP agreed to further procedures to verify and report on actual increases in enrollment which were then used as the basis for this ICR's ratings on development outcomes and the recommendation of "Moderately Satisfactory". Despite these challenges, GOE collected data on a regular basis, albeit with occasional short-term delays and with accommodations for political and security-related instability.

## 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

46. **Fiduciary Compliance.** Fiduciary aspects of the project were handled by the ECEEP project team with occasional inputs from GAEB and support from Bank FM and procurement specialists. The project team was adequately staffed with qualified personnel throughout the project to ensure satisfactory financial management. Despite some early challenges when the project's ISR FM ratings were rated as 'moderately unsatisfactory', following training from the Bank to the ECEEP FM team, satisfactory

interim financial reports were prepared and submitted in a timely manner. Annual audit reports were submitted on time and were unqualified, revealing no significant irregularities. Financial management of the project was consistently rated ‘moderately satisfactory’. The project had adequate procurement staff, particularly from GAEB, who was sufficiently qualified to handle the preparation of bidding documents, conduct bid evaluations and monitor contract performance, along with ECEEP staff. The main FM- and procurement-related challenges resulted from political and security instability from 2011 onward and consequent disruptions caused by successive new governments and changes in project leadership. These made all aspects of procurement and contract performance difficult and contributed to project delays and extensions.

47. **Safeguards.** The initial incorrect designation of the project’s environmental classification as ‘C’ rather than ‘B’ meant that no Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) nor Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was developed for the project. As part of the Level 1 Restructuring, these were completed in 2009. Past and on-going project activities and protocols were deemed in compliance with them and construction activities resumed. Safeguards compliance was rated ‘satisfactory’ or ‘moderately satisfactory’ in ISRs after the introduction of these safeguards measures.

## **2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase**

48. There are no plans for a follow-up Bank-financed operation for ECE in Egypt. However, despite the recent years’ political instability and numerous MOE leadership changes, the project’s success, including increased public awareness of the importance of ECE, has led to its inclusion in MOE’s current strategic plan. MOE’s commitment to ECE is further evidenced by GOE’s allocation of significant financial resources to ECE-related construction and other activities under its current national development plan. With increased capacity and infrastructure in the ECE sector from ECEEP, MOE’s KG Department has started post-project expansion by preparing new and additional master trainers to support the use of project-financed ECE curricula and standards.

## **3. Assessment of Outcomes**

### **3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation**

49. **Relevance of Objectives.** The project’s original higher level objective before restructuring, which emphasized the provision of quality ECE to improve 4-5 year olds’ school readiness, was relevant at the time of project preparation. This is evidenced by Annex 1 of the PAD ‘Sector Overview’<sup>13</sup> which makes reference to a 2002 Bank-financed GOE paper called ‘ECE Strategic Options’, recommending cost-effective and financially sustainable ECE to support children’s school readiness. The PAD doesn’t

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<sup>13</sup> pg. 23.

define or explain what is meant by school readiness nor make the case as to how Bank-financed portions of the project, which focused solely on KG classroom construction and renovation and the provision of learning materials, would contribute to it. The relevance of the pre-restructuring objective is rated ‘Substantial’. The higher level objective of the project after restructuring, to increase access to and the provision and quality of early childhood education, continues to be relevant to the country’s needs. This is evidenced by its prominence in the current national education strategic plan, the Bank’s current CAS, increased funding for ECE in the current national budget and its inclusion in Egypt’s 2013 Constitution as a fundamental right of citizenship. The relevance of the post-restructuring objective is ‘High’.

50. **Relevance of Design.** As described in the PAD, the project design before restructuring sought to contribute to the expansion and quality of early childhood education in Egypt by: (i) increasing the availability of new and renovated KG classrooms; (ii) improving the quality of ECE through enhanced professional development and training for ECE teachers and the development of new curriculum and standards for ECE; (iii) the provision of improved ECE learning materials; and (iv) enhanced capacity in MOE’s KG Department to oversee the ECE sector.

51. The project’s original PDO was ambitious and somewhat vague, particularly in its goal to improve school readiness. The original results framework and intermediate and PDO-level indicators were insufficiently aligned with the Bank-financed portions of the project. This was evidenced by the inclusion of outputs and outcomes which were the responsibility of co-financiers. The original project had inadequate safeguards instruments which contributed to the need for Level 1 restructuring. Based on these factors, the relevance of the pre-restructured design is rated as ‘Modest’.

52. Post restructuring, the project design was significantly improved in the following ways: (i) the revised PDO focused more narrowly on Bank-financed activities to access to ECE and equip KG classrooms with learning materials; (ii) the results framework and overall and intermediate outcome indicators were simplified and focused solely on Bank-finance activities; and (iii) the project came into compliance with the required environmental safeguards. At project closing, the objectives continue to have high relevance to Egypt’s current ECE needs and are aligned to its short- and long-term national development plans. As the initial project design weaknesses were adequately addressed, the relevance of the post-restructuring project design is judged to be ‘High’.

53. **Relevance of Implementation.** The project design used existing structures to implement the project, including central-, governorate- and district-level structures and functionaries of the MOE and GAEB. These were coordinated and managed by the centrally-based ECEEP project team. The MOE and GAEB teams worked effectively together given their previous collaboration on Bank-supported operations. The project used WFP and CIDA to implement the school feeding programs, quality enhancement and capacity building activities, thus capitalizing on their established processes and field experience for delivering food to schools and communities and to design and deliver capacity building and teacher training. Before restructuring, the project relied on

previously unknown and untested structures and functionaries within MISA/MOSS to identify and approve NGO-run KG classrooms for renovation. In the initial years, it adhered to the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) which called for a rigid focus on six districts at a time during Years 1 and 2, then Years 3 and 4, with the last districts covered in Year 5.

54. Implementation delays started in Year 5 due to: (i) MISA/MOSS' frequent lack of cooperation at the central and governorate levels to assist the ECEEP team to identify in a timely fashion eligible NGO- or community-run schools and classrooms for renovation; (ii) technical and operational capacity constraints among district-level MISA/MOSS staff which slowed down cooperation on project activities with MOE, GAEB and the Bank; and (iii) a lack of authorization for ECEEP staff to shift construction and renovation activities away from communities that were initially identified, but later found to be unprepared, to prepared communities in project governorates scheduled for project activities in later years. The relevance of the pre-restructured project implementation is judged to be 'Modest'.

55. After restructuring, the project's implementation schedule was made more flexible. This allowed ECEEP and GAEB teams to identify communities and NGOs from a wider geographic pool of those which met the project's readiness criteria or were safe enough to operate in and eligible for the use of project funds. The Bank used the Level 1 project restructuring to more precisely refine the scope of the PDO and strengthen the results framework and indicators. This appears to have improved implementation. The relevance of implementation after restructuring is judged to be 'Substantial'.

### **3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives**

56. The higher level objective of the project is judged to be 'Substantial'. This can be seen by the project's support of the national education strategic plan and successful Bank and non-Bank co-financed project activities which included: (i) plans for the expansion and improved quality of the ECE sector by building new government KG classrooms and renovating existing NGO-run ones; (ii) the expansion of school feeding programs; (iii) improved ECE quality through enhanced professional development and training for ECE teachers; (iv) the development of new ECE curricula and standards; and (v) the provision of improved ECE learning materials.

57. Achievement of the project-specific objectives included: (i) increased access to ECE through the construction, renovation and maintenance of new public and renovated MISA-registered and community KG classrooms; (ii) improvement in the quality of ECE through the development of a child-centered ECE curriculum and educational materials based on national standards, development and delivery of an effective teacher training program and links between nutrition and health activities and ECE programs; and (iii) building capacity, mostly through development partner financing, of national and regional MOE departments to implement and manage KG standards and ECE policy reforms. Achievement of the project-specific objectives is judged to be 'Substantial'.

58. **Increase Access.** This goal was to be measured by the PDO indicator to increase KG1-2 enrollment by about 30,000 children in facilities financed by the Bank project. The original results framework which focused on achieving increased percentages of students with access to high-quality ECE was revised during project restructuring in favor of absolute numbers of new enrollees into ECE programs.

59. The total number of additional children enrolled in Bank-financed KG1 and KG2 classrooms increased by 35,823 as of October 2014<sup>14</sup>. This includes 25,346 children enrolled in new public KG classrooms and 10,477 children currently enrolled in renovated NGO and community-run KG classrooms. The project exceeded its enrollment target by 5,823 children, or 19 percent. Achievement against the first indicator exceeded expectations. Given early project implementation delays that led to the need for restructuring and political and security-related constraints, the project faced exogenous implementation challenges since early 2011. This makes its achievement vis-à-vis enrollment—and particularly in increased overall capacity for current and future ECE enrollment in disadvantaged communities and through NGO-run KGs which serve difficult to reach populations—quite significant.

60. Intermediate indicators used to measure progress toward achieving the project's increased access goal with Bank support were: (i) the number of new public KG classrooms built in targeted areas; and (ii) the number of NGO-run KG classrooms refurbished in targeted areas. The project was successful in completing the construction of 1,342 new and renovated KG classrooms, approximately 3 percent over the initial target of 1,300 classrooms. This includes 820 newly constructed public KG classrooms against a target of 750 and 522 newly renovated classrooms in NGO and community-run KGs against a target of 500. *The project's success in exceeding targets for these Bank-financed intermediate outcomes made achievement of the target for the overall PDO-level outcome, an increase in enrollment in KG1-2 by about 30,000 children, more likely.*

61. **Improve Quality.** This goal was to be measured by the PDO indicator of having 2,000 KG classrooms in targeted areas receive learning materials. The total number of KG classrooms in project areas receiving learning materials as of October 2014<sup>15</sup> was 1,762, or 88 percent of the target. The target for the second indicator is considered to have been nearly achieved as of project closing, with high likelihood of full or surpassed achievement in the near future. Given the substantial exogenous impediments to project implementation and the Bank's early and purposeful decision to delay implementation until CIDA funding was secured to better align and sequence Component 1 and Component 2 activities, this can be seen as another significant achievement of the project despite these significant impediments.

62. The intermediate project indicator used to measure progress toward achieving the improved quality goal, the number of new KG learning materials produced with support

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<sup>14</sup> The most recent date after project closing for which figures were available.

<sup>15</sup> The most recent date after project closing for which figures were available.

from the Bank, was similar to the PDO indicator for this component. As per the project Closing Date, the Bank was informed that a total of 1,762 learning packets produced as of project closing have been distributed. The lack of full achievement of the intermediate outcome target, the distribution of quality ECE learning materials, meant it was not possible to achieve the target for the overall PDO-level outcome during the project dates.

63. **Build Capacity.** No Bank financing was used to fund activities under this component. However, significant outcomes from this CIDA-funded component which were at least in part facilitated and jointly coordinated by the Bank TTL and visiting supervision missions include: (i) the development of national KG standards and a series of procedural manuals for their use by teachers, supervisors, families, and members of society; (ii) the establishment of an ongoing “Effective [ECE] Teacher Competition” which highlighted KG teachers who successfully implemented the KG standards and effective ECE practices; (iii) establishment of a number of follow-up, evaluation, and mentoring activities to promote long-term sustainability of ECE training in all governorates; (iv) a series of in-service programs through MOE directorates and teacher training institutes to introduce and train participants on the new KG standards, effective ECE teaching and supervision strategies and practices, ECE leadership standards, and how to conduct community advocacy for ECE, which specifically resulted in the training of 937 supervisors, 1,474 KG directors and Deputy Directors, at least 24,724 teachers, 21,269 local and community trainees, and 10,189 KG standards trainers; and the hiring of 11,668 additional ECE teachers between 2006/7 and 2012/13.<sup>16</sup> *The success of these non-Bank funded activities and intermediate outcomes also made achievement of the target for the overall PDO-level outcome, increased enrollment in KG1-2 by about 30,000 children, more likely.*

### 3.3 Efficiency

64. The project disbursed US\$19,250,000 or 96.25 percent of the total loan amount, to finance the construction or renovation of 1,342 KG classrooms and 1,762 ECE learning packets. Sixty-one percent, or 820, of these classrooms were new constructions within government schools, while the remaining 39 percent, or 522, were renovated classrooms in NGO- and community-run KGs. One hundred percent of new and renovated classrooms were targeted and completed in districts which the UNDP designated as the poorest in Egypt. As the PAD indicates<sup>17</sup>, according to substantial pre-project sector (“AAA”) research on ECE in Egypt, there was clear under-investment in ECE in the targeted governorates and GOE had previously been very reluctant to borrow for the human development sector. The opportunity to channel project investments for ECE to public sector KGs in “disadvantaged” communities and to NGOs working in difficult to reach communities was clearly expected to yield an important and above-average expected rate of return for ECE investments in these communities. Therefore

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<sup>16</sup> According to final figures from the Borrower’s ICR and the Beneficiary Evaluation Report (Dewidar, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Page 14.

there was a clear rationale and expectation for external efficiency gains from the Bank's financing in targeted communities.

65. During the project period, an agreed upon fixed amount to be reimbursed for each new KG classroom built by GAEB was increased from LE100,000 to LE150,000. This was done to account for significant cost increases in the civil works program due to higher prices for steel and cement. Despite a 50 percent increase in costs, the availability of new and renovated classrooms has led to new enrollment of 35,823 children in KG1 and KG2 in the 2014/2015 school year. The project exceeded its original PDO-level target of 30,000 new KG1 and KG2 enrollees by approximately 20 percent, despite approximately US\$750,000 of the total loan proceeds remaining undisbursed. This indicates a high rate of internal efficiency and a mixed picture vis-à-vis the project's overall efficiency.

66. Despite commendable achievements, examination of the above and broader findings of this review indicate that a combination of factors have contributed to both increased and decreased project efficiency overall. For example, factors that improved mostly internal efficiency included: (i) financing adjustments as part of Level 1 Restructuring which allowed for the inclusion of an additional new governorate and additional districts designated by UNDP as high poverty regions, resulting in all key access targets being exceeded and quality targets almost achieved; (ii) a high degree of satisfaction with the quality of new and renovated KG classrooms and project-financed learning packets, based on beneficiary analyses, suggesting a higher likelihood of them being well utilized over time; (iii) savings to loan proceeds from USD-LE currency exchange rate fluctuations which were utilized by ECEEP and GAEB to finance the construction or renovation of an additional 92 KG classrooms beyond the original project target of 1,250; and (iv) the fact that newly constructed and renovated KG classrooms now represent a durable asset in the country which will expand ECE capacity in high need communities for many years and decades to come.

67. These factors are contrasted with the following which contributed to decreased or neutral overall, also mostly internal, project efficiencies: (i) the initial estimated cost and agreed upon fixed amount per new KG classroom increased during the project period from LE100,000 to LE150,000, leading a downward adjustment in the number of classrooms to be built; (ii) tendering delays, particularly in the last few years of the project, did not allow for the timely procurement and distribution of learning packets, resulting in a failure to fully achieve the target of 2,000 learning packets to be distributed; and (iii) the absence in the project design of any community co-financing for the construction of new government or renovated NGO- or community-run KG classrooms, eliminating any expectation of a lower unit-cost for project-financed KG classrooms compared to that of regular MOE classrooms. Based on these factors, overall project efficiency is rated as 'Modest'.



### 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

68. The overall outcome rating of the project is ‘Moderately Satisfactory’. This takes into account pre- and post-restructuring overall outcome ratings (see Tables 2(a), and 2(b) below) and based on the fact that the **relevance** of the project’s design and implementation for the post-restructuring phase were rated as ‘**Substantial**’. This is supported by the fact that: (i) the project’s design fit into the national education strategy and the Bank’s CAS; (ii) the implementation mechanism was appropriate as it used existing MOE, GAEB and MISA/MOSS systems and functionaries, as well as worked through WFP and CIDA, which had significant prior experience of similar projects in Egypt.

69. This review concludes, however, that: (i) the original PDO was overly ambitious, unclear and misaligned with the Bank-financed project activities; (ii) the original PDO-level and intermediate indicators and results framework were insufficiently specified; and (iii) the project’s environmental classification was initially erroneously designated. In light of these shortcomings, the Bank and GOE worked collaboratively to restructure the project to focus more specifically on the Bank-financed activities aimed at increasing access to ECE and high quality ECE learning materials for a larger number of children. **Efficacy** of the project in the post-restructuring phased is rated as ‘**Substantial**’, while **efficiency** is rated as ‘**Modest**’.

**Table 2 (a)** Calculation of Overall Rating before and after Restructuring

	<b>Relevance</b> (Objectives/Design/ Implementation)	<b>Achievement of PDO – Efficacy</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	<b>Overall Rating</b>
Before Restructuring	S/M/M=Modest	Modest	Modest	Unsatisfactory
After Restructuring	H/H/S=Substantial	Substantial	Modest	Satisfactory

**Table 2 (b)** Calculation of Overall Rating Using Weighting Based on Approval Date

	<b>Overall Rating</b> (Pre- Restructuring)	<b>Overall Rating</b> (Post- Restructuring)	<b>Combined Overall</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Rating	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	-	Significant Improvement
Rating Value	2	5	-	
Weight	36%	63%	100%	
Weighted Value	.72	3.15	3.87	
Final Rating	-	-	Moderately Satisfactory	Early revision results in “above the line” overall rating

### **3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts**

#### **(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development**

70. The construction and renovation of public and NGO- and community-run KG classrooms in the poorest governorates and districts are assessed to have contributed positively to future poverty reduction. At the individual level, increased access by poor students to high quality ECE will improve their own human capital formation, which will enhance their future economic and livelihood prospects. As per the project's beneficiary analysis report<sup>18</sup> and according to: (i) an analysis of ECE versus non-ECE participants' school-readiness in terms of physical health, communication skills, cognitive and language skills, and emotional and social skills; (ii) outcomes from systematic teacher observations of grade 1 students; and (iii) an analysis of a representative sample of grade 1 students' performance in Arabic language, Math, and English throughout the first year, grade 1 students who participated in ECE were already demonstrating a statistically significant greater propensity for learning and human capital formation.<sup>19</sup> At the societal level, project districts and governorates which were specifically selected according to well-evidenced and nationally-accepted targeting procedures will likely benefit similarly as it is anticipated that the improved human capital of a growing youth population in these traditionally hard to reach communities will contribute to greater economic activity.

71. Although Component 1 did not focus exclusively on girls' access to ECE, as anticipated in the PAD<sup>20</sup> and evidenced by qualitative results from the beneficiary analysis report<sup>21</sup> (Ibid), targeted construction and renovation of ECE classrooms in the poorest governorates and districts had a significant positive impact on the participation of girls in communities which have traditionally under-invested in ECE. The earmarking of a significant portion of project financing for the renovation of NGO- and community-run KG classrooms, in particular, has yielded a positive social development impact, as access to ECE has expanded in areas the PAD<sup>22</sup> clearly describes as traditionally underinvesting in ECE. This is further demonstrated by survey responses from a large number of parents in poor districts who report satisfaction with project-financed NGO- and community-run KGs in their communities, exceeding satisfaction levels of others in the community<sup>23</sup>. NGO administrators and representatives report they were satisfied with the project-financed training programs. It is likely this training has strengthened their organizations' ability to meet local needs.

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<sup>18</sup> Dewidar, 2013, pg. 74.

<sup>19</sup> Although the beneficiary assessment was not able to use an experimental design that would have allowed to correct for possible selection bias, the results nonetheless are indicative of significant impact on the school readiness of ECE participants, and their corroboration through multiple sources of analysis increases their reliability and validity.

<sup>20</sup> Page 14.

<sup>21</sup> Pages 51-56 .

<sup>22</sup> Page 14.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pg. 75.

## **(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening**

72. The project sought to strengthen MOE's capacity to deliver and improve the quality of ECE. There is strong evidence that these aims were achieved as a result of both Bank and CIDA financing and project activities under Components 1, 2, and 3. Leadership and technical capacities of MOE's KG Department at the central and regional levels have been strengthened. At project closing, the central KG Department had already designed, initiated training for and started implementing post-project ECE master training and training-of-trainers to scale-up project-financed activities for the next group of priority governorates and districts. This suggests that sustainability will be further enhanced as soon-to-be-trained ECE teachers continue their professional development through project-financed teacher training colleges and institutes at the governorate level. These institutions have internalized over the last few years the project-financed ECE curriculum and standards. This has strengthened their credibility among ECE teachers and supervisors who now see these institutions as a valuable source of professional development. The project also strengthened the capacity of MOE units responsible for curriculum development which now have technical grounding in ECE and standards-based curriculum reform. All this is underscored by the fact that according to Article 80 of the new 2013 constitution, every child has the right to early childhood education in an early childhood institution until the age of six.

## **(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)**

73. There were no significant unintended outcomes or impacts.

## **3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops**

74. The Bank commissioned an evaluation of all ECEEP project outcomes regardless of the source of financing. The evaluation report, titled 'Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) Evaluation of Results'<sup>24</sup> was completed approximately one year before the project closed. It includes an analysis of extensive beneficiary focus group discussions, one-on-one interviews, direct observations and stakeholder surveys which used representative and purposive samples of teachers, supervisors, teacher educators, parents, students and other relevant central, governorate and district-level MOE personnel. The report's overall positive findings are summarized in the following statement:

*"ECEEP has satisfactorily achieved its objectives and contributed significantly to the ECE in Egypt with sustainable results in the access, quality and system management domains"*<sup>25</sup> .

75. While a more extensive summary of the report's findings can be found in a combined Annex 5 and 6, they are summarized as follows:

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<sup>24</sup> Dewidar, 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, pg. 75.

76. (i) **The project achieved a ‘satisfactory 5/6 rating’ of expected overall and output-level results<sup>26</sup>.** Project achievements cited for this rating include: (a) attaining its expected enrollment target of 400,000 children in Bank and GOE financed KGs as of 2012/13 in both public and NGO-run KGs; (b) attainment of the anticipated number of communities with ECE classrooms by the beginning of 2013/14; (c) a more than quadrupling in the number of KG teachers, supervisors, managers and staff to be trained by ECEEP by January 2013; (d) attainment of approximately 70 percent it’s the target for WFP-funded school feeding by 2011/2012; (e) establishment of a national KG standards system; (f) evidence of increased MOE capacity to plan and expand quality ECE; and (g) evidence indicating that children in project targeted schools were actively engaged in KG play-based development at an average of 73percent of the time, against a target of 70 percent, based on classroom observation data,

77. (ii) **The project achieved a ‘satisfactory 5/6 rating’ for movement toward achieving project impact<sup>27</sup>.** Project achievements cited for this rating include: (a) strong evidence of school readiness on the part of children starting grade 1 with ECE compared to those without ECE; (b) 80 percent of teachers who report being satisfied with the capacity building programs received from ECEEP; (c) parents who report that sending their children to KG education allows them to learn new things, take care of their jobs and/or housework for non-working mothers and take care for younger children; (d) NGO administrators who report that ECEEP provided technical support to all staff; and (e) parents who report being more satisfied with ECE services provided by NGOs to their children compared to other organizations.

78. (iii) **The project achieved a ‘satisfactory’ 5/6 rating’ for overall sustainability of ECEEP results<sup>28</sup>.** Project achievements cited for this rating include: (a) almost all project results are institutionalized within the system through their inclusion in the official national curriculum, teacher and supervisor guides and training modules used by the Professional Academy for Teachers (PAT); (b) increased capacity of the central MOE Directorate for ECE to maintain results and further develop the system; and (c) a high degree of ownership of project results by all main project participants.

#### **4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

Rating: **Modest**

79. The objective-level risks identified during project preparation were appropriate. Two were rated high and one was rated substantial. The high risk was related to inadequate coordination between MOE and MISA and subsequent involvement of participating NGOs and community run KGs. This was and continues to be a substantial risk to long-term sustainability of the project’s outcomes. Amidst the backdrop of an already challenging political and security context, the ongoing lack of cooperation from MISA/MOSS in identifying in a timely manner NGO- and community-run KGs could

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid, pg. 74.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, pg. 74-75.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, pg. 75.

continue to hamper future renovation efforts. The second high rating, related to the inadequacy of overall GOE support to ECE programs and delays in securing funding, has been reduced significantly and is currently rated as ‘Modest’. This is evidenced best by the prominent inclusion in the 2013 national constitution of a clause which states that every child has the right to early childhood education in an early childhood institution until the age of six and ECE’s prominent role in the current national ‘Strategic Plan for Pre-University Education for 2014-2030’. The initial ‘Substantial’ risk rating related to the expansion of ECE in the absence of effective quality assurance mechanisms is now rated as ‘Modest’. The existence of high quality and functioning ECE standards and the fact that GAEB has a solid, demonstrated track record of ensuring reasonable quality construction and renovation bodes well for future ECE prospects in Egypt. More broadly, the recent political instability and lack of security, which greatly complicated implementation efforts, has started to improve and been reduced from ‘High’ to ‘Substantial’ with prospects for further improvement over time.

## **5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance**

### **5.1 Bank Performance**

#### **(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry**

**Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory**

80. The Bank’s preparation team included the appropriate staff with the possible exception of a dedicated safeguards specialist. The Bank team actively engaged with government counterparts and local representatives of the co-financers throughout the preparation process. This collaboration ensured that relevant stakeholders were aware of the proposed project’s activities and enabled them to contribute to the development of the project’s implementation plan. The Bank team took a sufficient amount of time to prepare the project. However, initial misclassification of the project’s environmental category, an overly ambitious original PDO with ambiguous indicators and results framework, combined with an unnecessarily rigid initial implementation schedule contributed to the need for a Level 1 restructuring. This, in turn, led to significant and successive implementation delays. While the preparation team correctly identified the high risk to the project from a lack of cooperation between MOE and MISA, the risk mitigation measures identified were too vague and simplistic given the gravity of the risk and potential to undermine the success of a major project sub-component.

#### **(b) Quality of Supervision**

**Rating: Moderately Satisfactory**

81. The Bank team carried out regular semi-annual supervision missions, including frequent interaction between the country-based TTL and MOE, GAEB, MISA/MOSS and other project counterparts at the central and governorate levels. After the early project phase, in particular, when TTL-ship was transferred to a Cairo-based Bank staff member, there were frequent interactions and dialogue with government and donor counterparts which were essential for keeping implementation on track during frequent ECEEP

leadership changes until shortly after 2010 and again during the political and security-related difficulties of the post-2010 period. The later presence of local procurement and financial management specialists provided rapid and easily available technical support from which the TTL and project counterparts benefited amidst increasing political instability.

82. To address the project's design shortcomings, the supervision team restructured the project by: (i) developing a revised PDO, indicators and results framework more closely aligned to the Bank-financed portions of the project; (ii) rapidly preparing, ensuring and validating the project's compliance with the ESMP and RPF; and (iii) adjusting implementation plans and schedules to allow more flexibility and adaptation to local realities. Despite the inconvenience it caused, Bank management's and its supervision team's decision to delay the start of construction activities until CIDA funding was secured ensured better coherence between the project's construction, quality and capacity building components. However, Bank supervision could have been further strengthened during the period just before and after restructuring as there were periods when the on-site TTL, who was procurement certified by the Bank, had to play dual roles. This led to an overload of work and could have been perceived as a potential conflict of interest.

### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

83. Given the supervision team's proactivity in addressing the issues related to the Level 1 restructuring and a preponderance of evidence showing that the supervision team was proactive in its efforts, which contributed significantly to the project's final success, the overall Bank performance is judged to be '**Moderately Satisfactory**'.

## **5.2 Borrower Performance**

### **(a) Government Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

84. GOE, as defined here as being MOE senior leadership and its Office of International Cooperation, was generally available and accessible for Bank teams throughout project implementation, despite post-2010 political instability and numerous changes in national government. In the first few years of the project, GOE insisted on financing project management costs, but failed to make these funds available for over a year which led to significant delays throughout 2007. As noted in the 2009 Mid-Term Review and more recently in numerous ICR interviews prior to and after project closing, implementation was significantly hampered numerous times during all stages of the project by frequent leadership changes among key senior government counterparts. MOE assigned nine different ECEEP project directors. This led to numerous project delays and the need for extensions as each incoming director needed to be oriented to the project and it took time for each to obtain GOE authorization to sign and approve binding project approvals. While GAEB leadership was more stable during the project period, their four

directorship changes during the ten years of the project resulted in a periodic slowing and, at times, cessation of all tendering and construction activities. This resulted in significant project delays in the final years of the project and the need for extensions. An early and sustained lack of cooperation between MISA/MOSS and MOE-GAEB counterparts at the central and governorate levels made the identification of a sufficient number and quality of NGO- and community-run KGs difficult. This slowed the pace of project implementation. Government performance is rated as ‘**Moderately Unsatisfactory**’.

#### **(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

85. The ECEEP project team was adequately staffed with personnel who had reasonably sufficient capacity at project initiation to handle the project’s technical, financial management and procurement functions. With a single exception when they lost an educational technical team member, all other project team members stayed through the duration of the project. They were open to and benefitted from frequent initial and ongoing opportunities for capacity building by members of the Bank supervision and Country Office teams. As a result, they developed significant technical capacity in their respective areas of responsibility and were able to handle project requirements effectively. The financial management team provided timely and accurate information and produced or contributed effectively to reports according to requirements for internal and external audits. The procurement team also performed its duties well, although it experienced delays primarily related to frequent ECEEP and GAEB senior leadership changes and later political and security-related instability. GAEB worked well with the Bank TTL and supervision teams to adapt the project’s construction and renovation activities to changing and often difficult circumstances on the ground. Cooperation between ECEEP and GAEB project teams was effective with a high level of cooperation and frequent communication during the project’s life and various phases in the implementation of individual project activities. This was evidenced by their productive combined role in cooperating closely with the on-site Bank TTL to address the challenges in working with MISA/MOSS.

#### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

86. Given the GOE and implementing agencies’ success in meeting and, in many instances, exceeding the project targets despite a challenging political environment and based on the discussions carried out for this review, the Borrower’s overall performance is judged to be ‘**Moderately Satisfactory**’.

### **6. Lessons Learned**

87. **Lesson 1. Although project implementation units situated within the ministry are more effective than those established outside the ministry structure, careful planning is required to ensure leadership continuity.** Having the ECEEP team situated inside MOE facilitated more efficient and effective project management across MOE

departments, with GAEB and governorate and district-level functionaries. However, even though ECEEP project staff remained relatively stable through the project's life, numerous ministerial changes contributed to nine changes in ECEEP leadership during the project duration. This was frequently cited as a source of project delays. Future Bank preparation and supervision teams should identify this as a greater risk earlier in the project cycle and collaboratively work with MOE counterparts to identify solutions to reduce disruptions and ensure longer term appointments.

88. **Lesson 2. Plans for parallel financing and joint project activities with co-financing partners should be carefully designed, prepared for, coordinated, and implemented to avoid project delays.** A more than one-year delay in implementation of classroom construction and renovations to allow for CIDA funding to be fully in place was ultimately a wise decision which, because the project design called for a holistic approach to improving access, quality, and institutional capacity, allowed for better coordinated and aligned activities across project components. However, it contributed to significant project delays, compressed the timeline for the completion of project activities and ultimately led to the need for a project extension. If a delay of this nature is inevitable and appears likely during project preparation, task teams and Bank management should consider delaying project initiation to avoid negative outcomes related to slow or delayed project progress and allow a project's to start on a more positive footing.

89. **Lesson 3. Project implementation plans and schedules should be more realistic, flexible and in-line with the Bank's previous country experience.** ECEEP's implementation suffered from an overly rigid initial implementation plan which did not allow the supervision team to adequately adapt to challenging and changing local project and political realities. Given the Bank's previous experience with school construction on the SEEP project and challenges of implementing such projects in Egypt, the sector management's insistence on implementation in six governorates for Year 1 and 2, another six governorates in Years 3 and 4, and the last six governorates in the final year of the project proved to be too rigid. It also limited the government and Bank teams' ability to work early enough with a sufficient number of communities and district administrations which were ready for implementation. It was not until the restructuring of the project and then again during the early stages of the 2011 political instability that this approach was reconsidered. Although valuable time had been lost by that point, the less rigid implementation plan allowed the supervision team to work more flexibly with their ECEEP and GAEB counterparts to identify which communities and locations were most safe, stable or supportive of the project's goals and ready for the implementation of project activities.

90. **Lesson 4. Assessment of impact and monitoring and evaluation of school construction projects may require a new approach.** During project restructuring, the PDO, PDO-level indicators, intermediate outcome indicators and the results framework were modified and brought more into closer alignment to the Bank-financed portion of the project's focus on increasing KG enrollment through expanding the supply of public and NGO- and community-run KG classrooms. However, in-line with government requirements regulating school construction, communities with newly constructed KG



classrooms could only enroll children once the whole school was constructed or fully renovated, even though KG classrooms were often completed and could be fully functional before this point. This inhibited KG enrollment and, while out of the control of the ECEEP and Bank teams, negatively affected perceptions and the tracking of project progress on the PDO-level outcomes. Even when construction was fully completed, it was often in the middle of the school year and impossible for MOE to mobilize teachers and enroll children until the next school year started. The challenge of adequately monitoring project performance, especially at project closing, was further complicated because new enrollment figures are not usually collected until one or two months into the school year. This did not allow for the timely and accurate assessment of increased enrollments in project sites at project closing. This suggests a need for more nuanced approaches to the assessment of impact and monitoring and evaluation of progress in school construction projects. For instance, in countries and contexts such as Egypt, with challenges related to political and economic stability, or where governments have traditionally been reluctant to borrow for investments in the human development sectors, the progress made in increasing infrastructural capacity for ECE alone—and especially in targeted communities—is a success. Since increasing actual enrollment itself relies on many factors that may be out of the Bank’s control, and since current MOE databases often times are not adequately designed to reliably capture enrollments in NGO-run KGs, this suggests a need to reconsider what the likely outcomes of infrastructure projects should be.

## **7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners**

### **(a) Borrower/implementing agencies**

91. No comments on the Borrower’s ICR.

92. The Bank received a number of comments from the ECEEP team and revised the draft ICR according to those comments. The only exception was a comment regarding the targeted number of learning material packets. The ECEEP team indicated in this regard that only 1,000 learning material packets were to be financed under the Project, with another 1,000 being financed by the Government. However, as per the Project Restructuring Paper (page 9), the target number of Bank-financed learning material packets is 2,000.

### **(b) Cofinanciers**

93. No comments received from co-financiers.

### **(c) Other partners and stakeholders**

94. Not applicable.

## Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

### (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component A: Increase Access	74.39	114.23	153%
Component B: Improve Quality	28.45	68.30	240%
Component C: Build Capacity	5.77	6.76	117%
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	108.62	189.29	174%
Physical Contingencies*	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies*	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Project Costs</b>	108.62	189.29	174%
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	100,000.00	100,000.00	100%
<b>Total Financing Required</b>	108.62	189.39	175%

\* As stated in the PAD: “the contingencies are low because the GOE will be reimbursed for KG construction and furniture on an agreed fixed amount throughout the life of the project.”

### (b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		51.56	147.38	286%
CANADA: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)		14.47	13.5	93%
Local Communities		6.66	NA**	NA**
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development		20.00	19.28	96%
World Food Program		16.34	9.13	56%

\*\*The ECEEP project team indicated that in terms of the participation of local communities, available data are only for the numbers of classrooms the community added, and there is no information on operating costs for those classrooms, for example.

## Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Key Performance Indicators (Post-Restructuring)								
<b>Revised PDO:</b> To support the Arab Republic of Egypt to increase access to early childhood education of 4 and 5 year-old children, particularly the disadvantaged, and to equip KG classes with learning materials.								
ECEEP PDO Indicators		Basic Line	Prior to	Year Seven	Year Eight	Year Nine 2013-2014	Target	Achieved
<b>Component 1</b> Increasing Access	The number of children who receive ECE education recently	0	The data on the directorates are currently being collected.				30,000	35,823
<b>Component 2</b> Improving Quality	The number of educational packets distributed	0	325	287	-	1150	2000	1762
Intermediate Results Indicators								
<b>Component 1</b> Increasing Access (Establishing and Equipping New KG Classrooms)	The number of classrooms of the new kindergartens established in the targeted areas and by means of the WB loan (Accumulative)		405	679	758	820	750	820
	The number of classrooms operated by NGOs which were equipped in the targeted areas by means of the WB loan (Accumulative)		281	374	388	523	500	523
<b>Component 2</b> Improving Quality (Educational Packets for the KG Classrooms)	New educational packets prepared for the KG classrooms	0	352	325	621	621	2000	1762

### **Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis**

The ECEEP PAD Economic and Financial Analysis has two primary pillars, one focusing on the rationale for public intervention, and the other on the cost effectiveness of the investment operation.

In terms of the *rationale for public intervention*, the PAD Economic and Financial Analysis stresses that disparities in KG enrollment rates can be large in Egypt: in poorer, rural governorates, KG enrolment was approximately 10 percent of children, as compared to KG enrolment rates of 25 to 42 percent of children for the relatively wealthier, urban governorates. In other words, there is a strong argument to be made for public intervention for equity considerations – and it is for this reason that the Project focused on socioeconomically disadvantaged governorates in its Bank-financed interventions.

As regards the *cost effectiveness* aspect of the operation, the PAD Economic and Financial Analysis stresses that the access gap in ECE in Egypt is so large that relying on expansion of public provision alone is unaffordable. Instead, the cost effectiveness analysis recommends a mix of public and private delivery – and it is for this reason the project finances both construction of new KG classrooms in public schools as well as refurbishment of classrooms in NGO-run schools. The associated cost for the NGO-run KGs is lower.

In assessing the *efficiency of achievements* of the Project, and referring back to the above arguments laid out in the PAD Economic and Financial Analysis, the question becomes whether the Project was able to achieve desired outcomes in disadvantaged areas, on the one hand, and whether outcomes were achieved both in MOE public schools as well as NGO-run schools, on the other hand. Indeed, as the 2013 beneficiary evaluation documents, improvements in monitored project outcomes were achieved in disadvantaged areas (whether the governorate as a whole or in rural versus urban areas), and the positive achievements were made both in MOE public as well as NGO-run KGs. The evaluation documents these findings in a range of indicators, including conformation of buildings to standards, as well as child school readiness and communication, language, and cognitive skills.

## Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

### (a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
<b>Lending</b>			
Ahmed Al Damrawy	Consultant	MNSHD-HIS	
Nello Angerilli	Consultant	CIDA	
Regina Bendokat	Sector Manager	MNSHD-HIS	Manager
Melanie Boyd	Sr. Development Officer	CIDA	
Mae Chu Chang	Lead General Educator	EASHE-HIS	Education
Vasilios Demetriou	Consultant	MNSHD-HIS	Architect
Aurelia Di Santo	Consultant	CIDA	
Christina Djemmal	Operations Officer	GEDDR	Operations
Iman El Kaffass	Consultant	CIDA	
Emma Etori	Sr. Program Assistant	GEDDR	Program Assistant
Lara Fossi	Head, School Feeding	WFP	
Mahmoud Gamal El Din	Sr. Operations Officer	MNSHD-HIS	Operations
Deborah Gomes	Second Secretary, Development	CIDA	
Guillermo Hakim	Sr. Economist	MNSHD-HIS	Economist
Arun R. Joshi	Lead Education Specialist	GEDDR	Education
Umar Kamarah	Social Development Specialist	MNSRE-HIS	Social Development
Michael Latham	Consultant	MNSHD-HIS	
Jack Loughton	Consultant	CIDA	
Donna MacCormac	Consultant	CIDA	
Carmen Messerlian	Consultant	CIDA	
June Pollard	Consultant	CIDA	
Rusdie Saleh	Sr. Officer	WFP	Operations
Patricia Thomas	Consultant	CIDA	
Ayesha Vawda	Sr. Education Specialist	GEDDR	Education
Hisham Waly	Practice Manager	GGODR	Financial Management
Mario Zelaya	Consultant	MNSHD-HIS	Procurement
EQI Team	Consultants	EQI	
ROA Team	Consultants	ROA	
Al-Fustat Team	Consultants	Al-FUSTAT	

<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Mohamed Yahia Ahmed Said Abd El Karim	Sr Financial Management Specia	GGODR	Financial Management
Noha Nabih Abdel Gawad	Resource Management Analyst	BPSGR	Resource Management
Raghada Mohammed Abdelhad Abdelhamied	Team Assistant	MNCEG	Team Assistant
Sally Abdelnabi	Temporary	MNC03	Team Assistant
Ahmed Al Damrawy	Consultant	MNSHD - HIS	
Sidi Mohamed Boubacar	Chief Counsel	LEGAM	Legal
Ernesto P. Cuadra	Lead Education Specialist	MNSHE - HIS	Education
Ahmed Mohamed Mahmoud Dewidar	Senior Education Specialist	GEDDR	Education
Nadia El Gohary	E T Temporary	MNC03	Program Assistant
Marwa El-Mossalamany	E T Temporary	MNC03	Program Assistant
Akram Abd El-Aziz Hussein El-Shorbagi	Sr Financial Management Specialist	GGODR	Financial Management
Emma Paulette Etori	Senior Program Assistant	GEDDR	Program Assistant
Brigitte S. Franklin	Program Assistant	MNSHD - HIS	Program Assistant
Mahmoud Gamal El Din	Senior Operations Officer	MNSHE - HIS	Operations
Sahar Mohamed Hegazy	Program Assistant	MNC03	Program Assistant
Maiada Mahmoud Abdel Fatt Kassem	Finance Officer	CTRLA	Financial Management
Iqbal Kaur	Sr Social Protection Specialist	GSPDR	Social Protection
Ayesha Y. Vawda	Senior Education Specialist	GEDDR	Education
Hisham Ahmed Waly	Practice Manager	GGODR	Financial Management
Christina D. Wright	Operations Officer	GEDDR	Operations
Sara Youssif	Temporary	MNC03	Program Assistant
Mona Sabet Zikri	E T Consultant	MNSHD - HIS	Program Assistant

**(b) Staff Time and Cost**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
<b>FY03</b>	10.12	28.29
<b>FY04</b>	70.91	294.72
<b>FY05</b>	46.62	169.27
<b>FY07</b>	0.13	0.71
<b>Total:</b>	127.78	492.99

<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
<b>FY06</b>	25.75	85.65
<b>FY07</b>	30.86	113.46
<b>FY08</b>	30.10	98.85
<b>FY09</b>	22.43	102.20
<b>FY10</b>	21.86	105.01
<b>FY11</b>	17.27	60.70
<b>FY12</b>	20.36	99.25
<b>FY13</b>	10.18	123.74
<b>FY14</b>	8.88	68.29
<b>FY15</b>	12.50	70.40
<b>Total:</b>	200.19	927.55

## **Combined Annex 5 (Beneficiary Survey Results) and Annex 6 (Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results)**

[Full report is on file under: Dewidar, Ahmed. 2013. “Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) Evaluation Results”. World Bank]

As part of the closing of the project, the Bank commissioned an external evaluation of *all ECEEP project outcomes*, whether from Bank or donor partners’ parallel financing. The evaluation, titled “Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) Evaluation of Results” was completed in July 2013 and contained an analysis of extensive beneficiary focus group discussions, one-on-one interviews, direct observations, and stakeholder surveys among representative and purposive samples of teachers, supervisors, parents, students and other relevant central, governorate, and district-level MOE personnel.

The overall findings are positively summarized by the following study statement:

*“ECEEP has satisfactorily achieved its objectives and contributed significantly to the ECE in Egypt with sustainable results in the access, quality and system management domains”* (pg. 75).

The report analyzes results related to three overall research questions referred to as Key Evaluation Questions or “EQs” (pg. 1):

- **EQ1. Achievement of Results:** To what extent has the project achieved the expected results with reference to its key performance and output indicators?
- **EQ2. Progress Towards Impact:** What is the impact of ECEEP on its beneficiaries?
  - 2.1 What is the impact of the project on the school readiness of its primary beneficiaries (KG enrolled children)?
  - 2.2 In addition to KG children, who are the other beneficiaries of the project, if any? What benefits have they gained, if any?
- **EQ3. Sustainability of Results:** To what extent will results/benefits continue after the project ends?
  - 3.1 To what extent are there sufficient financial and human resources committed to maintain benefits and results?
  - 3.2 To what extent is there local ownership of the project results?

**EQ1. Achievement of Results:** the project achieved a “satisfactory” level (5/6 rating) of achievement on overall and output level results (Ibid, pg. 74). This includes:

- Achievement of the expected increases in Gross Enrollment Rates by 2012/13.
- More than 400,000 boys and girls reached cumulatively during the project in both public and NGO KGs.
- At least 500 communities were reached by the beginning of 2013/13. The remaining 200 communities are expected to be reached by the beginning of 2013/2014 school year.



- Classroom observations have shown that children are actively engaged in KG play based development at an average of 73% of the time (Target is 70%).
- A total of 63,752 KG teachers, supervisors, managers and staff were trained by ECEEP until January 2013. At least 35,000 of them were teachers (Target was 14,200).
- 721,591 children benefited from WFP until 2011/2012 (Target; 1.1 million).
- National KG standards system was established.
- MOE capacity to plan and manage expansion of quality ECE has been strengthened.

**EQ2. Progress Towards Impact:** the project achieved a “satisfactory” level (5/6 rating) of movement toward achieving project impact in terms of (Ibid, pg. 74-75):

- **School Readiness of Entrants with ECE Compared to Entrants Without ECE**
  - According to an extensive series and battery of items for each sub-category of “school readiness” which compared initial baseline and then KG1 and KG2 observations, there is a developmental order for school readiness that grows from KG1 to end of KG2 in all aspects: physical health, communication skills, cognitive and language skills, and emotional and social skills as proven by the study.<sup>29</sup>
  - Teachers’ survey confirmed that the school readiness and performance of children with ECE is better than those without.
  - Analysis of first year primary students’ performance throughout the first year showed that the children with ECE preformed significantly better than those without in all school subjects (Arabic language, Math and English) in addition to school activities and religion (all school aspects).
- **Impact on Other Beneficiaries**
  - 11,668 teachers’ jobs were added from 2006/2007 to 2012/2013.
  - Teachers are 80% satisfied with the capacity building programs received from ECEEP.
  - Parents reported that sending their children to KG education allowed them to learn new things, take care of their jobs and/or housework for non-working mothers.
  - Parents reported that sending their children them to take care of younger children.
  - In addition to financial support, NGO administrators reported that ECEEP provided technical support to all staff.
  - Parents reported that they were satisfied with the ECE services they provided by NGOs to their children compared to other organizations.

**EQ3. Sustainability of Results:** the project achieved a “satisfactory” level (5.13/6 rating) for overall sustainability of ECEEP results (Ibid, pg. 75). This includes:

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<sup>29</sup> The data collection methods, rating scales, and evaluative constructs across school readiness domains in the study vary so widely that it’s not feasible to report it in sufficient detail in this summary. However, the reader is referred to pages 33-43 of the report for further methodological details.

- Almost all project results are institutionalized within the system. Examples include the National Standards, the new [ECE] curriculum, the teachers and supervisors guides (n=10), induction program and training modules used by PAT in addition to classrooms constructed and others renovated at NGOs.
- MOE Directorate of ECE at the MOE central level as well as the KG force at the governorate level have the capacity to maintain results and to develop the system further.
- There is a high degree of ownership of project results as materialized in institutionalization of results.

## **Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR**

[The full Borrower's ICR is on file under the title: "ICR Report on Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP), Ministry of Education, The Arab Republic of Egypt". The following summary is taken from the English translation and contains excerpts from the most relevant portions of the report regarding GOE's comments regarding the Bank, CIDA, WFP and their own performance. Note: the term "availability" was used instead of "access" when describing the project focus on increasing KG access.]

### **ECEEP [Project] General Framework (pg. 3)**

The Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) is a national project aiming to support and develop early childhood in Egypt. The Ministry of Education coordinated and cooperated with the childhood care authorities internally and externally in order to prepare all the material, human, organizational, educational and technical elements that guarantee ECEEP success and ensure due achievement of ECEEP targets, namely:

- To increase the educational attainment at the KG level.
- To improve the quality of education.
- To build up the institutional capacity at the KG level.

It is worth mentioning that the ECEEP has achieved great improvement in the KG level and was able to attract the attention of all entities and change the focus to KG. In the fiscal year that started in 1/7/2004 till to-date 12919 KG rooms were build 6722 of them are the ones funded by the project, in addition to supporting children's nutrition countrywide. In addition the Ministry has also added a special part for KG in its 2007/2008 – 2011/2012 strategic plan including the same project components, and this component (KG part) is the most successful ones in the plan because of the activities done by the ECEEP.

### **Evaluation of the Egyptian Government Performance as Borrower (pgs. 17-26)**

#### **A. The Ministry of Education**

The Ministry of Education has been engaging with the ECEEP to confirm its obligation to provide the best means of care for its children, especially the children in the unprivileged and marginalized areas. The Ministry, for this purpose, moved for providing all the material and human resources available and coordinated with the other stakeholders to successfully implement the ECEEP. It provided technical, administrative and financial contributions at a rate of 50% of the ECEEP finance, and further established an ECEEP unit at its premises in coordination with the other stakeholders and undertook the management and the activities relating the Egyptian Government Component. At the internal level, the Ministry of Education assigned all its competent departments, including the financial affairs, the kindergartens, the books sector, the primary education and the NGOs department, etc., each according to its scope of competence, to support the implementation of the ECEEP. At the external level, the Ministry of Education entered into a

cooperation protocol with the Ministry of Social Affairs to make use of the adjacent NGOs rooms. It further cooperated with the faculties of education and the kindergartens at the level of the Republic in order to expand the training services to the official of concern with kindergartens. The Ministry, additionally, coordinated with the Governors in the directories where the ECEEP operates in order to facilitate matters.

However, the Ministry of Education faced a number of impediments that affected the ECEEP work process, including the changes occurred to the Ministry's leadership and the delay in obtaining the finances allocated by the Egyptian side for the ECEEP activities.

### **Lessons Learned**

- Finances should be available prior to starting the implementation of the project activities. The delay in providing the finances required had an impact on the time allocated for implementing the project and agreed upon with the stakeholders. It is also necessary to facilitate the procedures for disbursement of the finances required for implementing the project.
- The Developmental Projects Management requires performance flexibility and to be liberated from the administrative routine. It should not also deal with the ECEEP Implementation Units in the same perspective of the administrative units at the Governmental institutions.
- The authorities affiliating to the Ministry of Education should be supported and guided for the purpose of sustainability of the activities performed and maintaining the outcome of the efforts exerted in the projects.
- The ECEEP acquired experiences should be relied on. This could be realized by using the place and the individuals of the ECEEP Unit for performing similar activities or for coordinating with the entities that support childhood in Egypt.

### **Classification: Satisfactory**

#### **B. The Ministry of International Cooperation**

The Ministry of International Cooperation and the Ministry of Education represented the Egyptian Government as a borrower. The Ministry of International Cooperation performed a significant role in establishing the ECEEP, including the procurement of grants and grantors, the planning for the ECEEP, the conclusion of agreements with the grantors and lenders, and the drafting of a cooperation protocol between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The role of the Ministry of International Cooperation clearly appears in the coordination with the ECEEP Unit and the Ministry of Education regarding the stakeholders missions, the follow-up of the ECEEP activities, the attempts to remove any impediments, and the review of the WB loan withdrawal transactions and the grant disbursements.

## **Lessons Leaned**

- The continuous follow-up by the Ministry of International Cooperation of the ECEEP work process reflects the transparency and seriousness of the Egyptian side as a borrower.
- Relying on the nature of its business with the grantors and lenders, the Ministry of International Cooperation should perform a role in the sustainability of any project when it becomes successful and the education sector requires more services.

### **Classification: Satisfactory**

### **Evaluation of the ECEEP Executive Authority**

#### **A-Early Childhood Project**

One of the positive points of planning the ECEEP is the establishment of an ECEEP unit to perform the ECEEP activities, handle its affairs and coordinate with the stakeholders. The ECEEP Unit is located at the premises of the Ministry of Education and is, accordingly, near to the kindergartens, the decision makers and the assisting authorities. The unit's staff are employees of the Ministry of Education who enjoy expertise, efficiency and technical and administrative competence for the purpose of proper management and implementation of activities.

The unit, at the beginning of its activities, faced some difficulties as to the means for dealing with the World Bank and the Stakeholders and the means to prepare an executive plan to transform the ECEEP Components into executive activities. However, the employees who joined the unit were technically specialized in kindergartens and in the other financial and accounting affairs. They also managed to build up good relations and fruitful cooperation with the stakeholders. All these elements assisted in the fulfillment of the Egyptian Government's obligations and the performance of its activities, and in cooperating with the stakeholders for due performance of their activities.

At the beginning of its activities, the unit was planned to have other several subunits representing the three ECEEP components. This is in addition to a financial, media, follow up, secretarial and administrative subunits. However, due to the non-completion of these subunits and the departure of some employee to find better job opportunities, the unit has been restructured and has become comprised of only two subunits; a technical and financial subunit. Given the homogeneous atmosphere, the spirit of cooperation between the employees of the two subunits who were few in number but keen to effectuate the role of the entities affiliated to the Ministry of Education, the ECEEP Unit managed to meet its obligations technically and financially.

The repeated ECEEP Manager replacements have affected the activities of the ECEEP Unit and, sometimes, its stability. Replacements further consumed much time to obtain approvals from each new manager and resulted in changing the form signatures kept with the World Bank and Commercial Bank. These circumstances affected the time allocated for the ECEEP and delayed the procurement of the finance for the Egyptian Component and further resulted in the Canadian Agency's delay in obtaining the related approvals.

## **Lessons Leaned**

The implementation of projects in accordance with their plans and timeframes would be affected by conditions of the country which may involve the replacement of leaderships.

The teamwork spirit and the atmosphere of homogeneity assist the employees who manage and implement a project in overcoming the impediments and performing the wide variety of tasks in spite of their small number.

### **Classification: Satisfactory**

#### **B- General Authority Educational Buildings**

The General Authority Educational Buildings (GAEB) was assigned to construct the KG rooms, restore the NGOs rooms, invite for educational instruments tenders either through the Government or the World Bank. The GAEB has already performed its duties in coordination with the other GAEB branches in the targeted directorates. Constructions have taken effect in accordance with the GAEB -recognized design and construction standards. The GAEB have been obtaining its financial entitlements for the construction, maintenance, restoration, educational instruments procurement activities in accordance with systems and mechanisms agreed upon with the Ministry of Education and the World Bank. Payments were used to be made at the time of bidding, completion of works, handover or supply. After completion of works, the school was used to be handed over to the education directorate in which geographic zone the school is located.

Nevertheless, the GAEB faced a number of impediments including the following:

- The difficulty to find pieces of land for construction.
- The lack of proper cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs at the central level in the course of providing data on the NGOs which desire to participate in the ECEEP.
- The delay in financing the construction of the schools where the ECEEP-financed KG rooms are annexed, given that the kindergarten rooms form part of the schools.
- The delay by some branches in requesting their financial entitlements.

All these issues naturally affected the value of withdrawals and disbursements of the ECEEP balance and the commitment to the time allocated for implementation.

## **Lessons Leaned**

- Providing the pieces of land for construction as well as the NGOs rooms should have been given the first priority. The delay in doing so consumes large part of the ECEEP life time.
- The stakeholders, including the Ministry of Social Affairs, should cooperate effectively in order to facilitate the role of each other even if the leadership has been changed.
- The GAEB is to remain committed to meet the needs of the projects' activities for which clear and evident agreements were concluded even if changes occur to the policies of the Ministry of Education.

**Classification: Satisfactory**

**Evaluation of the ECEEP Stakeholders**

**A. The World Bank**

The World Bank was a principle stakeholder who performed a significant role in the ECEEP. The World Bank was available from the first moment of planning the ECEEP and during the execution phases thereof until the ECEEP targets have been fulfilled. The World Bank participated in a variety of activities relating to Availability. It contributed to the construction of new Governmental rooms and restoration of NGOs rooms. It also supported the quality activities by providing educational instruments through the Educational Buildings Authority, in accordance with the finance system whereby regular withdrawals and disbursement mechanism, agreed with the ECEEP Unit, were applied. The World Bank also used to give approvals of the activities to be performed through tenders, whether these activities were in the form of construction, restoration or procurement of educational instruments. The World Bank was then to conduct financial reviews through statements prepared by an independent auditor, describing the scope of compliance with the World Bank's rules in the course of performing the works until finalizing same.

One should confirm that the World Bank Experts were real supporters to the ECEEP Unit. They managed to create a good relationship with the ECEEP officials during the ECEEP term. They participated in all the ECEEP activities, not only the WB interventions. The World Bank sought several times to renew the ECEEP due to the circumstances faced the project and restricted the implementation of its activities on the planned time frame. Moreover, the WB external missions had a profound impact on following up the implementation of the ECEEP activities and on the attempts to overcome the impediments occurred.

However, due to the increasing prices of construction materials, the WB targeted number of constructions and restorations has not been completed, as no prior solutions for such risks were prepared in the course of planning the ECEEP.

**Lessons Leaned**

- The atmosphere of homogeneity and the positive cooperation between the WB Experts and the ECEEP Unit help facilitate the works and achieve the targets.
- The procedures, rules and disbursement and tender invitation mechanisms of the lender have been adapted to the rules and regulations of the borrower country, but without prejudice to the laws and regulations of the lender.
- The World Bank provided technical support to the ECEEP officials on the means to manage and implement the project, starting from the ECEEP planning, the implementation mechanisms and the performance of the required tasks during the ECEEP term, up to the preparation of the reports and evaluation studies.

**Classification: Satisfactory**

**B. Performance of the World Food Program (WFP)**

The World Food Program has contributed to the ECEEP by an in-kind grant valued at Sixteen Million Sixty Thousand United States Dollars. This grant was in the form of meals. However, the WFP grant was conditional upon the finance provided to the World Food Program, which means that the in-kind grant referred to herein above should not be presumed to be fully provided. If the program did not reach this amount, but it was able to reach a number of children more than what has been targeted at the planning phase. It was planned that the WFP serves in seven educational directorates. However, it started activities only in three educational directorates. The WFP activities expanded to six directorates, then to nine directorates. The WFP provided meals in the form of milk and biscuits. Then the meals have become limited to biscuits. The Ministry of Education was assigned to provide meals to the remaining educational directorates where no WFP activities were performed.

The WFP contributed to the ECEEP by raising awareness of the significance of these meals and prepared a nutritional education manual. These activities were limited to the educational directorates where the WFP works. The WFP further supported the ECEEP by arranging for a visit to Chili in order for the ECEEP to be aware of the Chilean KG nutrition experiment and make use thereof in Egypt.

### **Lessons Leaned**

- When an activity is properly selected and linked to reality at the time when the project is planned, it would be possible to support this activity by more than one component. This fact has taken place in the activity of providing meals. The activity has been included in the quality component which supports the children's ability to learn. It, moreover, assisted in increasing the children attendance and regular presence in the kindergartens (Availability).

### **Classification: Satisfactory**

#### **The Performance of the Canadian Agency**

The Canadian Agency contributed to the ECEEP by an in-kind grant valued at Fifteen Million Fife Hundred Thousand Canadian Dollars. This grant has been disbursed by the Canadian Agency to support the technical activities. These technical activities were materialized in supporting the preparation of a curriculum, standards, manuals and training materials and in holding workshops and providing experts. The Canadian Agency performed a significant role in supporting the kindergarten expansion through the Social Grants Fund which assisted in qualifying and opening the NGOs rooms. The Canadian Agency further focused its activities on the central levels, namely supporting the General Administration of Kindergartens. It further served in six neighboring educational directorates located in Upper Egypt.

The project plan did not include the participation of the Canadian Agency in the availability component, but the Canadian Agency offered to participate in this component (availability). Due to coordination and flexibility between the partners and the ministry to achieve the best benefit, the Canadian Agency has participated in the availability component through the community grant fund which resulted in making the best use of



the NGO's rooms (1,132) that are renovated by the Canadian Agency and this a positive task.

The Canadian Agency was delayed for two years. It started activities in the year 2007, while the ECEEP started activities in the year 2005. This two-year delay was caused by the procedures required for obtaining official approvals from the competent authorities in Canada and for assigning a Canadian development company to implement the project in Egypt. In spite of this delay, the Canadian Agency performed a significant role during the ECEEP term. This role had a profound impact on the three components of the ECEEP activities. It further enriched the KG system with a variety of activities and good initiatives that assisted in the developing and raising the level of the kindergartens.

### **Lessons Learned**

- The presence of Canadian offices in the KG supervisory sectors of the directorates where the Canadian Agency served has clearly assisted in the accurate performance of the activities and in building up KG supervisory capacity in these areas.
- The directorates, in which the technical activities are to be performed, are not preferred to be neighboring to each other, even if they all need these technical activities. Activities should be distributed at the level of the directorates of the Republic. This is to facilitate the expansion to the untargeted directorates. This means that the targeted directorates should become models for the other surrounding directorates.
- The starting and ending dates of fiscal years should be applicable to all the stakeholders of the ECEEP. The variance in the starting and ending dates of a fiscal year could affect the performance of activities, especially the activities that are jointly performed by some stakeholders.

### **Classification: Satisfactory**

### **Sustainability of the ECEEP Activities**

A careful reviewer of the ECEEP outputs would find that the project's outcome includes the element of sustainability. This is due to the nature of the project where activities are performed on site, as clarified below:

- There are rooms built in the targeted areas. These rooms are annexed to the Governmental schools and the NGOs, and shall remain existing to serve the kindergartens after the ECEEP finalization.
- There is a KG national standards instrument. This instrument has been printed out and distributed to the kindergartens. The officials in charge of kindergartens received training on the contents of this instrument. Moreover, each field of action described in the standards instrument has been transformed into a manual for use by the officials of concern with kindergartens. Moreover, a curriculum has been prepared, printed out and provided to the kindergartens. The officials in charge have also been trained on this curriculum. The teachers currently prepare a daily plan for the activities, in accordance with the fields of action and the indicators contained in the KG standards instrument. Additionally a group of educational

instruments have become available to the Governmental kindergartens and the NGOs.

- All the employees of the General Administration for Kindergartens have been subject to capacity build up programs, including their participation in all the technical activities performed by the project. Moreover, they have been provided with all the ECEEP documents.
- The training modules prepared by ECEEP have been delivered to the Academy in order to be used for professional development of the officials in charge of the kindergartens in the course of their services.
- The ECEEP activities have been carried out by a technically and financially competent teamwork from the Ministry of Education, which means that this cadre exists in the Ministry of Education and can be used for continuing the ECEEP activities or for any other similar projects. This is due to the experience they gained in the course of dealing with the grantors and lenders and in holding and managing the workshops, conferences and other technical and financial activities.
- The Ministry of Education and the General Administration for Kindergartens are also required to keep performing the activities and to act for sustainable development of the kindergartens. For his purpose, they are:
  - To move for the creation of a new project with the same ECEEP components to assist the Ministry of Education in meeting its obligations towards the kindergarten children.
  - To follow up the children's annual joining of the kindergartens and their presence in the KG rooms prepared by the ECEEP and the other properties allocated by the Ministry for kindergartens in general and not to leave these rooms empty, and to search for alternatives for finance and expansion of kindergartens.
  - To follow up the implementation of the technical activities in the rooms, in accordance with the standards instrument, the new curriculum and the standards-accompanying manuals, and to spread out and generalize the initiatives prepared by the ECEEP, namely Change Pioneers, Communication, Follow-up and Evaluation.
  - To apply the memorandum of understanding which was concluded between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs, and to cooperate with the Ministry of Social Affairs to prepare a database on the NGOs rooms which receive the children ranging in age from four to six years.
  - To continue the coordination with the Social Affairs Directorates to provide licenses to the NGOs to open KG rooms, and to provide technical support to the NGOs rooms.
  - To continue providing meals to the children who joined the kindergartens in accordance with the actual needs of the educational directorates.
  - To benefit from the experiences gained from the ECEEP by using the teamwork who participated in the ECEEP activities for the implementation of new projects. It is to be noted that there is a place and there are individuals who gained a variety of experiences that should be used for performing similar activities.

- To set sustainable and systemized mechanisms to coordinate with the official and unofficial authorities of concern with childhood to make use of their efforts in the development of kindergartens.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, we should confirm that in spite of the impediments that faced the ECEEP, it managed to achieve its targets. There were interventions took place in some activities and their results were higher than the planned targets. The interventions into the ECEEP, as materialized in the efforts of the Ministry and the stakeholders, namely the World Bank, the World Food Program and the Canadian Agency the kindergarten system has been improved. This could be properly evidenced by simply comparing between the kindergartens in Egypt prior to launching the ECEEP and after implementation thereof on site. At the present time, **we shall find** that:

- The KG availability rates have been increased. Although these rates leave much to be desired, as it was 13% in 2003 at the time of planning for the project, 16% in 2005 upon starting the project implementation and has now reached 30%.
- A partnership between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs is present. This partnership, which have not been present before, is materialized in:
  - An MOU was signed by the two Ministries. The MOU is still operative and can be applied and developed.
  - The restoration of some NGOs rooms that receive children ranging in age from four to six years, both through the World Bank and the Canadian Agency.
  - The receipt by the NGOs, restored by the World Bank, of educational instruments as similar as the Governmental kindergartens.
  - The presence of Ministerial Decrees issued by the two Ministries to permit the NGOs to open KG rooms though the education directorates.
  - Qualifying the NGOs facilitators and allow them to participate in the training programs implemented by the ECEEP.
  - The attendance by officials in concern from the Ministry of Social Affairs in workshops, and their participation in the ECEEP activities.
  - The appointment of KG teachers by the education directorates to serve in the KG rooms restored by the Canadian Agency as part of the ECEEP activities.
  - The fact that the NGOs rooms, which are licensed by Ministerial Decree No. 335/2008, fall under supervision, follow-up and guidance by the Kindergarten Department of the concerned Educational Directorate.
- A new curriculum has been prepared for the kindergartens. This curriculum has existed before. The newly introduced curriculum considers the international KG developments, relies on the standards and is accompanied by educational instruments that assist in applying same and achieving the kindergarten objectives including the improvement of the education quality. Moreover, the KG officials, including the KG teachers, supervisors and NGO facilitators, have received training on applying this curriculum.

- A national standards instrument is available to the kindergartens. This instrument is accompanied by procedural manuals that assist in creating a system supportive to the KG development of process.
- The children who joined the kindergartens have received meals since the starting date the project up to the present date.
- A number of training modules have been prepared and provided. This is to assist in the professional development of the officials of concern with the kindergartens.
- The capacities of the officials concerned with kindergartens have been built up. They have been involved in a package of training programs based on the developments took place in the field of kindergartens, i.e., the standards and the new curriculum. These programs have been accompanied by a number of training modules and handled by a TOT team specialized in kindergartens at the level of the Republic.

**We hereby confirm** that kindergartens in Egypt still require much effort both on the official and unofficial levels.

**From the service prospective,** it is required to reduce the cultural and social differences. It is to be noted that 70% of the children ranging in age from four to six years have not yet joined the kindergarten institutions.

**From the educational prospective,** the kindergarten phase is considered to be a necessary educational phase that paves the way for the educational process. The more care the child enjoys at this phase the more proper and constructive adaption to the following education phases is achieved. This clarifies the quantum of the child's participation in the society build-up process.

## **Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders**

No comments were received from the co-financiers.

## **Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents**

Dewidar, Ahmed. 2013. “Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) Evaluation Results”. World Bank.

Egypt Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project Appraisal Document. World Bank, 2005.

Egypt Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project Restructuring Paper. World Bank, 2010.

Egypt Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project Restructuring Paper. World Bank, 2011.

Project Aide-Memoires and Implementation Status Reports (ISRs)

# MAP

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